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Abstract 
 
With China's rise as a world power, understanding what the country's political elite 
thinks is no longer a matter that just concerns China or China scholars. This thesis 
contributes to knowledge of China's future political elite through long-term research 
among students at the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU), whose graduates 
form a key talent pool for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These students’ 
attitudes, ideas, and convictions will, therefore, in the not too distant future, have a 
direct impact on the behaviour of China's foreign affairs establishment. 
 
This research pairs a Constructivist approach to International Relations Theory with 
Political Anthropology, particularly the Anthropology of the State, as a means of 
studying up processes of power and thus enriching the positivist approaches currently 
dominant in explaining and interpreting China's global activities.  
 
In circumstances where people are being intentionally trained as representatives of the 
state, understanding how they conceptualise what the state is and does is critical to 
understanding how that state will operate in the international arena. Based on 
interactions with CFAU students, this research explores the ‘social imaginary of 
Chineseness’ that permeates every aspect of students’ worldview. Through the 
subjects in the curriculum and the control of the practices of their everyday lives, the 
CFAU experience teaches students both what worldviews are appropriate for future 
foreign policy officials, and at the same time carefully precludes other ways of seeing 
the world. The thesis examines students’ views of history; obligation and social 
relations; power and governance in the nation-state; and China’s role in the world. 
 
The research concludes that prevalent views of China’s foreign policy, which 
uncritically accept the ‘reality’ of the state as a central actor, neglect the innumerable 
variations of what a ‘state’ can mean to the people who constitute it. While my 
students at CFAU did share many views in common with this understanding of 
international relations and diplomacy, their views diverged dramatically regarding 
why states would act in certain ways in the international system. My students were 
ix 
 
 
convinced that a unique ‘Chineseness’ fundamentally underpinned China’s 
international behaviour. 
 
The thesis reveals how this shared sense of Chineseness is created and maintained 
among China’s future elite and shows that the clear geo-political entities imagined by 
dominant approaches to international relations are not universal, but held together by 
convention and shared belief. 
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Chapter One – 
Citizens of the Nation, then Students: 
An Introduction to Being Chinese at the China Foreign Affairs 
University 
 
We students at CFAU are citizens of the nation first, and then students. 
      - Cello, International Economics major 
 
 
China is becoming a global superpower, and its role in the world is a topic of great 
interest in international relations and foreign policy discussions. However, 
mainstream debates tend to overlook the training of the elite professionals who will 
staff the Party-state and make decisions in the international realm. This thesis 
examines some of the people and ideas behind China’s international behaviour and 
sheds light on international debates around China’s role in the world: scholarly, 
political and popular. The research takes an anthropological approach to analysing the 
education, training, and institutionalisation of a group of around 150 students at the 
China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU, Zhongguo waijiao xueyuan: 中国外交学院) 
in Beijing, and their perceptions of their own and China’s role in the world.  
 
The anthropology of the state understands the state and its associated processes of 
power to be empirical questions to be examined in and of themselves, rather than as a 
priori fixed and pre-existing entities. Within this framework, my analysis is 
theoretically premised on Foucauldian notions of governmentality and discipline-as-
power, and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice. According to Michel Foucault 
(1975), institutions such as hospitals, schools, military institutions, factories and 
prisons are all aspects of a vast network of disciplinary organisations which serve to 
subjectify the individual in an ongoing and imperfect process. Schools and 
universities like the CFAU serve to inculcate certain acceptable forms of knowledge 
about what it means to not only be educated, but also civilised, ‘proper’ members of a 
society. In the process, approved and taboo ways of thinking and practices are 
produced and reproduced. These can eventually form a coherent ‘social imaginary’ 
(Taylor 2004) which comes to be seen as quite natural, rather than a specific 
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articulation of a unique set of circumstances. Following Bourdieu, this social 
imaginary at CFAU is particularly powerful as the subjectification of the university 
experience was reinforced through the control of temporal, spatial and linguistic 
practices.  
 
Prior to undertaking this research, my study was in International Relations (IR) at 
post-graduate level in Australia. I also worked in the Australian Public Service as a 
policy analyst in an international area. I found that in both fields, discussions of 
China’s role in the world were largely premised on assumptions from the Realist 
school of IR theory. This reflected trends across broader Western academic and 
policy literature. According to this approach, China as a rising power is accepted as a 
given. In IR’s state-centric approach, China is in itself conceived of as a monolithic 
and unitary actor, and all of its foreign policy and international behaviour is 
understood as based on the pursuit of its pre-determined national interest. According 
to the Realist approach, this national interest is by definition the increase in state 
power relative to other states, within an anarchic system of sovereign, bounded 
nation-states, that is, a structurally induced ‘will to power’.1  
 
However, if, as the Constructivist School of International Relations contends, 
behaviour in the international system is not simply an automatic function of structural 
constraints, and rather, ‘ideas matter’, explaining China’s behaviour in the 
international realm requires an understanding of the people and ideas behind the 
decisions. Using Constructivism as an entry point to a more empirically informed 
study of international relations (both theory and practice), allows a focus on the 
worldviews of the people behind the state which adds depth and breadth to the 
existing literature on China’s role in the international system. Through analysing the 
role of the national logic in CFAU students’ social imaginary, and how the practices 
of their everyday lives (de Certeau 1984) produce subjects of and for the Chinese 
state, we can better understand how these elites-in-training understand their own, and 
China’s, role in the international system. This information is of value not just in what 
it may add to anthropological understandings of the state. It also has a more 
                                                
1 While the Realist school tends to be the most dominant in political discussions of China’s role in the 
international system, and holds considerable influence with politicians and policy-makers, the IR 
scholarship on China is becoming increasingly diverse with insightful work arising from the English 
School and the Constructivist School, among others.  
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immediately practical use in challenging the conventional wisdom about China’s role 
in the world in International Relations theory and foreign policy conversations more 
broadly. Realist assumptions overlook the contribution that an understanding of 
Chinese policy-making elites’ views of the Chinese nation-state and China’s role in 
international relations can offer. This research aims to address this analytical lacuna. 
Examining training practices is an entry point for better understanding the “opaque 
and mysterious world of the people in China who staff the Party-state and rule the 
country” (Pieke 2009b,1). 
 
Introducing Buddy2 
 
Unlike most major Chinese universities such as Peking and Tsinghua, the CFAU is 
managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rather than the Ministry of 
Education. Until a few decades ago, only students from CFAU could become MFA 
diplomats and even now, the university retains a particular connection to the Ministry. 
I first met Buddy when he was a junior student at CFAU. Buddy had come to Beijing 
from his hometown in Xiamen to study diplomacy at the CFAU because he wanted a 
career in the Chinese foreign service. We met one evening in mid-October 2008 at a 
café/bar near Houhai in the centre west of Beijing. He was attending an English-
language discussion group I had established to talk about issues around international 
relations. He had come along, he said, to perfect his (already excellent) English to 
help him achieve his primary goal – to pass the public service exam and work for the 
MFA. He had heard that people had failed the exam because their English had not 
been good enough.  
 
Buddy seemed just the type of young man to be selected as one of the few graduates 
to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was focused, diligent, hard working, 
with excellent English and firm career goals. He pursued every opportunity to extend 
himself in fields related to working with foreigners or learning about foreign 
relations, both for his own satisfaction as much as for his resumé. Buddy was also a 
good example of the young modern Chinese man. He was the lead guitarist and singer 
in a rock band which had done well in several big competitions, and he enjoyed 
                                                
2 All names in this thesis have been changed to protect the identity of the students.  
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spending time listening to music and watching live bands with his friends and 
girlfriend. He was also a keen basketball player. At the same time, he was committed 
to Chinese tradition, particularly Confucianism, which he saw very clearly as 
underpinning contemporary everyday Chinese life, as well as China’s behaviour in 
the international system. Buddy was a big fan of Chinese traditional medicine, 
particularly acupuncture, and he had a dream of working with his mother, an 
acupuncturist in Xiamen, and travelling with her around the world to treat great 
sporting stars in anything from healing a sprained ankle to curing cancer. Buddy had 
also heard that the MFA preferred students straight from university and without a 
Masters degree, as time spent studying for a Masters could encourage too much 
independent thought and questioning, inappropriate for the Chinese foreign service. 
Buddy was therefore also undecided about what to do when he graduated. He was not 
sure whether to pursue further study, which he very much wanted to do, or apply for 
the MFA. Ultimately, he decided not to take the risk and chose to postpone study and 
begin his career straight out of university.  
 
Buddy was a fascinating interlocutor because of the way in which he framed his 
beliefs and life goals within a national discourse. In conversations with Buddy, I 
became aware of how much he identified with the Chinese nation-state. He felt 
personally defensive about foreign criticisms of any aspect of China, because, as he 
saw it, “humiliation by foreigners” had disrupted China’s long history as a great 
country, and Western countries continued to bully and victimise China. Buddy 
explained China’s behaviour in the international system as based on traditional 
Chinese values, which were shared by all of “us Chinese”. I was struck by the way in 
which Buddy tended to conceive of the world as ‘China’ and ‘outsiders, and view 
anything which was not China as one imagined community of ‘foreign’. The only 
exception seemed to be the distinction between ‘the West’ and ‘other developing 
countries’ – understood to also be victims of Western imperialism, like China. Buddy 
told me about the ‘China threat theory’, which he saw as the Western world’s 
prevalent framework for understanding China’s growing international role. He 
explained to me how this was an extension of the West’s fear of China, and how it 
formed the basis of Western policies to control and diminish China’s role in the 
world. He stressed however how misguided this ‘China threat theory’ was, as all of 
China’s domestic and international behaviour had always been and would always be 
5 
 
 
founded on a traditional Chinese philosophy of peaceful development and a 
harmonious world.  Overall, I was impressed by the strength and coherence of the 
national logic underpinning Buddy’s imaginary of what it meant to be Chinese. 
Through talking to Buddy, it became evident to me that the existing frameworks 
dominating Western analyses of China were theoretically insufficient for explaining 
the difference in Chinese worldviews and how they could influence international 
behaviour.  
 
When I met Buddy, I had been in Beijing for just over a month, and was keen to get 
started on my fieldwork – the difficulty was getting access to a field. I had been trying 
for months in Australia to connect with research institutes in Beijing, but to no avail. 
Particularly around the time of the Olympics in Beijing in August 2008, it was 
difficult for foreigners with unclear research goals and no particular academic stature 
to get visas into China. Indeed many foreigners in Beijing at that time were unable to 
extend their visas and had to leave the country. When I arrived in Beijing, I began 
building networks of contacts from which I could develop my research. I tried 
repeatedly to make contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Commerce, including through tenuous connections from friends, all of which 
amounted to nothing. However, I was able to conduct a number of interviews with 
scholars and researchers in Beijing and Shanghai, including at Fudan University, the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
in Beijing.  
 
In an effort to broaden my contacts and get in touch with more ‘everyday’ 
perspectives, I began putting notices up at universities around Beijing advertising 
English-language ‘discussion groups’ on the topic of China’s international relations. 
Buddy was one of several people who responded to these notices. Other participants 
included a young journalist who had studied communications in New Zealand; an HR 
employee from the Sheraton hotel who just had a general interest in the topic; a senior 
student from the Beijing International Studies University who wanted to know more 
about the relationship between East and West; a young woman who worked for an 
NGO for the visually impaired; and an English teacher at Peking University who had 
majored in American Studies. For about three months, I held two or three discussion 
groups a week, with between three and five people in each group. I set up a group 
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email account, and each week posted a reading for us to discuss in the next meeting, 
ideally with one of the participants giving a brief presentation and overview to get the 
conversation started. In the first week, Buddy volunteered to present a topic of his 
own choice, the role of China in East Asian integration.  
 
In the course of a month or two, I had successfully applied for a teaching position at 
CFAU, which I began in September 2009. During first semester, I taught a class on 
Culture and Context in Foreign Policy, based on readings from Valerie M. Hudson 
(ed., 1997); Stephanie Lawson (2006); Lin Yutang (1998 [1935]); and Pál Nyiri and 
Joana Breidenbach (2009), among others. During second semester, I taught a class on 
Theories of Aid, Assistance and Development. Readings in this class included Heinz 
W. Arndt (1989); Colin Leys (1996); John Williamson (2004); excerpts from 
Amartya Sen (1999); and commentaries on Joseph Stiglitz (Friedman 2002). My 
classes were based on student presentations of reading material, followed by guided 
discussion. During both semesters, I also gave lessons on essay writing skills and 
debating. Assessment in both semesters was based on class participation and mid-
semester and end-of-semester essays. I taught six classes of 20 to 30 third- and fourth-
year students across three majors: International Law (two classes); International 
Economics and Trade (two classes); Diplomacy (one class); and one special class of 
external students who had already obtained a degree elsewhere. I taught the same 
students, except for the external students, for both semesters.  
 
I initially expected that teaching in a Party-state system in an institution managed by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would mean I would have considerable restrictions 
placed on what I could teach the students. In fact, I was quite free to teach any subject 
I wanted, and give the students whatever material I chose. However, as I later 
realised, my work and the students’ participation were being constantly monitored.  I 
discovered by chance that classes were recorded when the secretary-manager of the 
staffroom, who spoke no English and with whom I only communicated in Chinese, 
said that she had heard that the English of my fellow teacher, from Germany, was 
better than mine. I asked how she knew this, and she said matter-of-factly that she and 
others had been listening to the recordings. I am not sure I was not more shocked by 
the claim about my language skills than the probably unsurprising revelation that our 
classes were recorded. Although I had initially presumed that I would be under some 
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surveillance and had already been engaging in what Erika Evasdottir describes as 
‘self-directed self control’ (2004, x), I noticed that I increased my own self-
monitoring after I made this discovery. 
 
During my time teaching at CFAU, some students told me that they and their 
classmates had, like Buddy, held “a burning goal” to join the MFA when they applied 
for CFAU. Buddy worked harder than most students to achieve that goal, both in 
class and in his pursuit of extra-curricular activities. He was regularly involved in 
meeting and hosting visiting foreign dignitaries, including African diplomats, and 
American university professors. His efforts during university paid off. In his final 
(fourth) year at university, Buddy sat the extremely competitive public service 
entrance exam and got a job with the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs 
(CPIFA), an organisation dedicated to people-to-people diplomacy. After several 
weeks of compulsory military training, Buddy started working in the Department of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, arranging and hosting forums and visits by foreign 
dignitaries.  
 
Other students, however, were not so fortunate. For example, despite being a bright 
pupil at the top of the class, with a reputation for earnestness, diligence, and a 
conservative stance on most issues, Buddy’s classmate Yellow did not pass the public 
service examination, although he made two attempts. Yellow was always quietly 
confident in his own abilities, and that his views, while more conservative than his 
classmates, were ultimately correct. Yellow firmly believed that Chinese foreign 
policy, like the rest of contemporary Chinese culture, was built on Confucianism, 
although a version of Confucianism that had “adjusted to fit the modern era”. He, like 
most of his classmates, simply presumed that he would be a natural candidate for the 
MFA. Ultimately, however, Yellow’s academic abilities and conservative beliefs 
were not considered appropriate for the MFA. Yellow went on to take a job helping 
Chinese students with their applications for overseas universities, something which 
other students felt that he probably hated, but with the job market being as 
competitive as it was, he really had little choice.  
 
In contrast to Buddy and Yellow, I also taught students like Cello, a young woman in 
the International Economics major from Jilin province, who said from the outset that 
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she had no desire at all to work for the government. Rather, Cello wanted to travel the 
world and write newspaper columns and magazine articles. Cello was a hard-working, 
analytical, curious student, who stood out from her peers for her unconventional and 
sometimes controversial comments in class, for example, about the role of the 
Chinese government in censoring the media. She also made an impression because 
she would occasionally ask me questions in breaks and after class, as she said that she 
could get into trouble if she asked in front of her classmates. She often asked me for 
advice on what to read on topics like political philosophy, as she felt she could not 
ask for that information from her Chinese classmates or teachers. Cello was rather 
unsatisfied with university life at the CFAU, as it was “so small, and so political”, and 
the atmosphere was “not very open,” but rather “pure and conservative, and not very 
tolerant”. A number of other students had made similar complaints, and they, like 
Cello said they wished life at CFAU was “more lively, like at Peking University, 
where students participated in all kinds of different activities”. Cello illustrated this 
with a reference to participating in the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989, quickly 
clarifying that she was not saying that this “was a good thing”. She felt that 
unfortunately students at CFAU were expected to be citizens of the nation first, and 
students second.  
 
Like Cello, Primo was intelligent, insightful, and analytical, and had no desire to 
work for government. A young man from a small village in Heilongjiang province, 
right next to the river that delineates the border between China and Russia, Primo was 
enrolled in the International Law major. My first impression of Primo was when he 
came into the classroom in the first week of semester and reacted with considerable 
shock to how I had moved the chairs and desks from their usual straight columns and 
rows into a circle. He asked hesitantly whether we were going to be doing this every 
week, and seemed rather disappointed when I said yes. He said he had tried moving 
the classroom around like this before, and the results were “quite... interesting”. He 
cheered up later however, saying that he was happy as long as they would not have to 
“recite socialist theory”, or indeed “recite anything at all”. Primo had originally 
chosen ‘Stanley’ as his English name, but subsequently decided it was too old 
fashioned, and changed it to something “more simple and modern”. At the same time 
as holding this desire to appear modern, Primo, like almost all the students, was 
certain that Chinese culture was too ancient and too deeply ingrained for any Chinese 
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person to ever become fully Westernised. Primo also felt that “Western-style 
democracy” would not be suitable for China in the current period, or for a long time 
to come, and that in fact a “Confucian government by gentlemen” model would be 
more appropriate for China. 
 
Of course there were also students in my classes whose primary concerns were about 
simply graduating and getting a good, comfortable job so that they could get married, 
have a child (or two), and live in financial security and comfort. This sometimes 
translated into wanting to get a job in government, but based on motivations of 
lifelong job security rather than a “burning goal” to pursue a career in the Ministry. 
Ricky, for example, a Beijing local in the International Economics major, said he had 
“few dreams” apart from wanting to “live a happy life”, and had no particular career 
ambitions. Ricky was a fun, good-humoured student, but as his English level was not 
as good as his classmates, he preferred to sit in the back corner of the classroom and 
not engage in class discussions. Ricky asked me once when we were having lunch 
with a couple of his classmates where I thought would be best for him to study 
philosophy, as he said he felt that philosophy provided the best way to understand 
anything in the world, including economics. He confessed that he felt rather torn 
because he would soon have to decide whether he wanted to pursue making money or 
what he was really interested in – since there was certainly no money in that. Ricky’s 
friend suggested that he become a professor, but Ricky replied that he had “no 
patience for trying to teach stupid people things that are obvious and easy for him, so 
that wouldn’t be any good”.  
 
Ricky provides a good example of the not insignificant number of my students who 
had enrolled in CFAU for reasons outside of a desire to forge a career in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. These students’ views provided a foil to those of the ambitious 
enthusiasts such as Yellow and Buddy, as well as to the views of the more cynical 
students like Cello and Primo. However, despite the differences in the dreams, 
ambitions, life goals, or degree of openness or cynicism of my students at CFAU, 
they all shared certain fundamental views. Ultimately, all of my students saw 
themselves as being part of the great shared imagined community of ‘we Chinese’, 
with the very particular meanings that entailed. They understood themselves as co-
members of an identity community of ‘Chineseness’ that they could never really 
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leave behind, and which I, or any other foreigner, could never truly comprehend.  
They knew themselves as part of an almost tangible, but at the same time inexplicably 
essential, Chinese culture which stretched back continuously for thousands of years, 
and which continued to shine forward into the future. They saw historical facts clearly 
as facts, with no room for debating the truths of the past or the realities of the present 
which arose from them.  
 
As the students explained, they, the unified Chinese people, had always been peace-
loving and would therefore always be peace-loving. Following the same positivist 
line of argument, they argued that the Japanese had always been imperialist and 
untrustworthy, and would therefore always be so. Likewise, Westerners would always 
desire to maintain their own power at the cost of others, fear China as a threat, and try 
to control China’s ‘peaceful rise’. My students all shared the understanding that the 
relationship between themselves as individuals and the government was different 
from that in ‘the West’, in which society was pitted against the state. My students 
conceived of the state-society relationship in China as akin to a family, in which 
faults were accepted and excused because that is what love of family means. They felt 
that the state was not an object external to themselves, exercising unilateral power 
over them, but was rather like a father, sometimes strict, but always acting in the 
people’s own best interests. If the strict father made a mistake or misjudgement, this 
was to stay within the family, and not to be discussed or examined in any public 
arena. In my students’ social imaginary, they understood their obligation to others as 
following a complex and ever-shifting pattern of give and take, in which the ultimate 
emotional appeal and attachment was to China (Hoffman also discusses this dynamic 
interplay between responsibilities to the self, one’s family and one’s country, 2010, 
Chapter Four, particularly pp. 99-100; see also Fong 2004).  
 
The initial observations I had made based on earlier discussions with Buddy were 
borne out during my time teaching at CFAU, and I became increasingly fascinated by 
the powerful coherence of the students’ belief system. My year at CFAU reiterated 
my earlier impressions that a logic of the national was the central identifying feature 
of students’ worldview. Students’ propensity to explain what, how and why they 
thought and behaved in terms of a national logic was apparent across every class, 
regardless of students’ major, gender, hometown, or career goals. From a background 
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in International Relations, I struggled to reconcile this observation with prevalent IR 
theories about China’s putative rise and role in the world. These perspectives posit 
that China will behave in entirely predictable ways, just as any other country in the 
same situation would. Viewing China as a ‘rising power’, the dominant IR discourses 
presume that it would naturally seek to maximise its own power not only in real 
terms, but more importantly, relative to all other international actors. Anthropology 
provided an ideal means for recognising the role of cultural distinctiveness in national 
interest formation, a factor typically disregarded in Realpolitik analyses of how the 
international system functions. 
 
My research goal was, therefore, to investigate how this national social imaginary had 
been and was continuing to be formed, why my students maintained such loyalty to it, 
and what implications their strongly held worldview had for prevalent understandings 
of China in the international system. To do so, I studied the ‘life world’ of my 
students for the 12 months that I taught them, and have remained in regular contact 
with four of them and sporadic contact with another five since then. I have also 
developed an ongoing friendship with two female CFAU students through my post-
fieldwork employment in Beijing, where they were participating in internship 
programmes, and their views are also taken into account in this research.   
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The China Foreign Affairs University  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The author and two former CFAU students, at the main entrance of CFAU, in front of the 
statue of General Chen Yi, August 2012 
 
The CFAU is a useful example of Foucault’s characterisation of the school as an 
arena for creating the ideal citizen-subject. As the feeder university for the MFA, 
CFAU students are carefully trained to take on the role of foreign policy officials. As 
the website proudly announces on its homepage,  
 
China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) is the only institution of higher 
learning which operates under the guidance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the People’s Republic of China. It aims at preparing high calibre personnel 
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who are competent to discharge their official duties in fluent foreign 
languages in the fields of foreign service, international studies, and 
international business and law. (CFAU n.d.)   
 
The CFAU evolved from the Department of Diplomacy of the Chinese People’s 
University, which was founded in September 1955, at the suggestion of Premier Zhou 
Enlai. The university was established in response to the perceived need for China to 
develop new and capable diplomats to represent its interests internationally. The 
university prides itself on having “earnestly implemented the Party’s guidelines for 
education” in order to “turn out ethically qualified and professionally competent 
personnel for foreign service, namely, ‘Unswerving Loyalty, Mastery of Policies, 
Professional Competency and Observance of Discipline’” (CFAU n.d.). The values 
and capabilities seen as most critical for students to develop in order to be effective 
officials include “patriotism, esprit de corps, principles of socialism, awareness of 
current national conditions, and the fostering of sense of discipline” (CFAU n.d.).  
 
Around 2400 students are enrolled across CFAU’s undergraduate Departments of 
Graduate Studies; Diplomacy; English and International Studies; Foreign Languages, 
International Law; International Economics; and Basic Education. There are also 
around 100 international students, including from various African and Eastern 
European countries. Many CFAU graduates, according to the university website, go 
on to serve in China’s diplomatic corps, or perform other official government roles:  
 
More than 30 have been charged with ministerial responsibilities, more than 
200 have served in the capacity of ambassadors to foreign countries, more 
than 1,000 have been made counsellors in the Chinese embassies abroad or 
directors of governmental departments or agencies other than the Foreign 
Ministry or professors or scholars with senior professional titles”. (CFAU 
n.d.)  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a preferential arrangement for recruiting students 
to its graduate programme, taking around 50 graduates from CFAU each year. As the 
website goes on to proudly state, ‘These alumni have become the backbone force for 
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new China’s diplomacy, foreign affairs and international studies, and have made 
tremendous contributions to China’s cause of diplomacy” (CFAU n.d.). 
 
Unlike some of Beijing’s other important (and older) universities like Beida (Beijing 
or Peking University [PKU]) or Tsinghua (or Qinghua), CFAU is not located on a 
grand old campus. Despite its important role in training future international officials, 
the CFAU’s small campus is situated in the inner west of the city, just outside the 
north-western corner of the second ring road.3 Unlike the elite universities, many taxi 
drivers do not know where it is, and I almost always had to give directions based on 
nearby main roads or subway stations. The main gate is relatively imposing, and has 
the requisite statue of an important political figure in the forecourt in front of the 
Stalinist facade of the main building. The north gate is a different story – coming in 
this way past the unenthusiastic guard, one walks through several rows of apartment 
buildings, with pretty rose gardens between them, in which people, mostly elderly, a 
large number looking after young children, wander about, or sit and chat or play 
checkers. An overpriced fruit stall stands on the left, one of the very few shops on 
campus – the others being several student canteens and a small stationery shop which 
also sells a range of snacks like chocolate cream-filled buns and plastic-wrapped 
frankfurts, which students buy and bring to class for breakfast.  
 
The main building has four stories and is U-shaped, with a smallish and unimpressive 
entrance foyer. The dim space has a large digital noticeboard with weather and date 
details, and a smaller sandwich board at the back of the room which announces, on 
paper posters, if famous international or Chinese scholars are visiting or due to give 
presentations. On the back wall is the school motto, “Unswerving Loyalty, Mastery of 
Policies, Professional Competency and Observance of Discipline”, inscribed into 
marble with gold script.  
 
Along the shiny, slippery, faux-marble corridor leading off to the left of the main 
foyer are the main meeting rooms, with imposing mahogany doors, usually closed. 
The large meeting room was furnished with the ubiquitous overstuffed, square 
armchairs, with lace antimacassars and arm rests, teacups with lids. The whole 
                                                
3 Land in the far north-west of the city has been bought for a new campus, and from mid-2012, first 
and second year students will not be based at the old campus.  
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atmosphere was stilted, stiff and sombre. Also along this corridor were the offices for 
foreign affairs, the waiban (waiguo shiban gongshi: 外国试办公室), in which three or 
four young women worked to coordinate all the foreign teachers that came and went 
each semester, including arranging contracts; accommodation; visas; salaries; 
excursions, such as to the Shanghai Expo; and ‘foreign expert’ events, including a 
formal dinner at the Great Hall of the People at which foreign teachers were thanked 
for their great efforts in building China.  
 
When I first walked in to one of the classrooms at CFAU, I was most immediately 
struck by how shabby the facilities were, apart from the IT podium to the side of the 
teacher’s desk which allowed students and teachers to give Powerpoint presentations. 
The curtains were torn off from the curtain rails, the desks and chairs were dirty 
(several students brought handy wipes with them to clean the desks and chairs before 
they sat down), and the desks and chairs were old, uncomfortable, chipped and 
broken. The classroom offered no fancy whiteboard or electronic teaching devices, 
only a blackboard and broken sticks of chalk which left a heavy layer of chalk dust 
covering everything. At the front of the long, narrow room, sometimes on a slightly 
raised stage, was a bare wooden table and chair for the teacher, which faced rows and 
rows of individual (very occasionally double) wooden tables and wooden chairs. In 
summer, the lack of air-conditioning meant that the rooms were stiflingly hot, and in 
winter, the heating was minimal, so the rooms were very cold.  
 
CFAU is one of the smallest and least well-funded of the Beijing universities. The 
lack of funding is particularly noticeable in comparison with the vast and modern 
training facilities that other ministries enjoy. Students explained that the CFAU 
received far less funding than PKU or Tsinghua, which they believed was because 
their university was not managed by the Ministry of Education. CFAU students had 
access to very few resources for learning and research – at least that they were 
familiar with how to use. Electronic journal databases for non-Chinese journals 
seemed to be non-existent, and students were often unable or at the least very unused 
to using the CNKI (Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure) database of Chinese 
sources. Almost all academic resources – where they were employed at all – in 
student essays came from books that they had free partial access to online. Much 
information was sourced whole from online encyclopaedias. Students used to study at 
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the local McDonald’s as it was open 24 hours a day, whereas their library and study 
rooms were not, so the fast food restaurant provided a quiet place for them to keep 
working when their dorm-mates wanted to go to sleep. Overall, I found it difficult to 
reconcile the CFAU’s poor physical infrastructure with the status of the university as 
the training ground for future elites, government officials and diplomats.  
 
At the CFAU, students studied a range of subjects, including core topics which were 
compulsory regardless of a student’s major, core topics specific to each major, and 
some electives. A large proportion of courses focused on English language skills, as 
English was a particular emphasis of the diplomatic training. Core compulsory 
subjects in first or freshman year included Modern Chinese History; Modern Western 
Culture and History; Protocols and Etiquette; and National Defence Education. As 
sophomores, in second year, students studied China’s Economic Diplomacy and 
Strategy; Modern Chinese Diplomatic History; Marxist Philosophy; and Chinese 
Socialist Theories. All students were also required to undertake two weeks of military 
training. In third and fourth years, the curriculum concentrated more on the electives 
specific to the major, however students were required to study another unit of Chinese 
Socialist Theories. It was also compulsory for all students to undertake a professional 
internship. The division of the curriculum shows that while specialised subjects 
occupied the majority of students’ time, subjects in which they learned the state’s 
ideology and the correct language in which to express it also formed a significant part 
of their education. In contrast, there was little time for students to pursue optional 
subjects. Indeed, students lamented the narrow range of electives available at the 
CFAU compared to other, larger universities.  
 
The Chapters and Their Themes 
 
Using an ethnographic approach, this research shows how an education at the CFAU 
provided students with an intense and explicit training in how to be a ‘good’ Chinese 
diplomat. The following chapter of the thesis (Chapter Two) will introduce the 
literature and theoretical context of the research. In Chapter Three, I examine the 
importance of history as a tool for making the past serve the present in the formation 
of students’ national identity. In this chapter, I aim to move beyond the notion held by 
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many Western and Chinese commentators that understanding China’s past is the key 
to understanding China’s present. While this explanation of Chinese behaviour is not 
without value, China’s relationship with the world cannot be understood by simply 
projecting Chinese history onto the present. This chapter examines the way Chinese 
history is produced and subsequently used in ideas and practice within the social 
imaginary of CFAU students, and how they understand the relationship between the 
past, the present and the future.  
 
Chapter Four investigates how my students at CFAU understood their relationship 
with the state. The chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of the state in the 
Chinese context. It then explores three key pillars considered by the Party-state as 
critical to the wellbeing of the Chinese people and nation: territorial integrity, 
economic growth, and a unifying ideology of integrated Chinese identity. The chapter 
focuses on the third of these pillars, as identifying as part of a greater imagined 
community of Chineseness was an important and recurring theme among my students 
at CFAU. The chapter then examines how the Chinese Party-state presents and 
produces itself, examining in particular how language is used by the state to conduct 
“perlocutionary acts”, that is, using language to produce certain consequential effects 
upon people’s feelings, thoughts and actions (Austin 1962, 101). Situated within a 
Foucauldian understanding of the university as an institution in which the state’s 
power is omni-present and pervasive, the analysis follows Evasdottir’s notion of  
‘obedient autonomy’ (2004). I argue in this chapter that my students adopted what 
Evasdottir terms “self-directed self-control” (2004, x) as the most effective means for 
achieving success within the system in which they operated. 
 
Chapter Five of the thesis looks at how students constructed understandings of 
themselves, outsiders, and obligation and reciprocity in their national logic. Following 
Foucault’s conception of the school as a site to construct ideal citizens, the chapter 
argues that at university, CFAU students learned how to be the kind of person most 
suited to serve as a government official, not just through the subjects taught in the 
curriculum, but also through the structures of university life that regulated their daily 
existence. The chapter focuses on how students lived in their dormitories; how they 
studied in their classrooms and the timetable to which their lives were rigorously 
adhered; the structures of peer monitoring and authority in the class monitor system; 
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and interactions with outsiders. In this chapter I examine how all of these experiences 
taught students to understand themselves in relation to those around them, to whom 
they were obliged, and when, in what ways, and for what purpose. This chapter 
argues that these concepts were normalised through the process of sedimentation until 
ideas of who was included and who was excluded from the group identity of 
Chineseness became unquestioned. Students at CFAU demonstrated a distinct 
common sense of what degree and what kind of obligation they owed to those around 
them. This logic, based on a concentric circles model of social obligation, extended 
into discussions about how they understood China’s relationships with other 
countries. 
 
Chapter Six draws on the observations of the three preceding chapters, and the 
students’ discussions, presentations, essays and exam papers, to present their views 
and perceptions of China’s role in the world. The chapter looks at how the students 
used discourses of nationalism in terms of history, relations of power, and notions of 
insiders and outsiders in their understandings of where China is situated in the 
international context, and what they believed China’s role should be. In this chapter I 
analyse my CFAU students’ understandings of China’s role in the world in order to 
argue that their interpretations have come about as a result of the processes of 
sedimentation in creating ‘the logic of the national’ that is discussed in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five. 
 
The concluding chapter synthesises the main themes discussed in the thesis and 
examines the implications of the findings for existing Western perspectives on 
China’s role in the world. Fundamentally, I find that my CFAU students understood 
China to be a peaceful, internally-focused state with no will to power as Realists 
presume. I argue that this ideology is not simply a thin facade of training over the top 
of deeper, more Realist goals, but that this national identity was so deeply embedded 
in CFAU students’ social imaginary that they could not imagine the world, and 
China’s role within it, in any other way. While mainstream IR scholars tend to see 
identity as a distraction, I argue that it is a central issue that frames Chinese elites’ 
approaches to foreign policy and international relations (see also Callahan 2010, 13). 
Through the Constructivist approach to International Relations theory, I hope this 
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research will be able to add new perspectives to existing debates about China and its 
role in the world.  
 
A Broader Context 
 
The findings from my fieldwork at CFAU were complemented by and contextualised 
within other experiences investigating China’s international behaviour and local and 
international responses to it, both in China and overseas. For example, I spent six 
months between September 2009 and March 2010 working part time and in an unpaid 
capacity at the International Poverty Reduction Centre of China (IPRCC) in Beijing, 
with the aim of seeing what ideas and perceptions operated within a Chinese 
institution with a specific international poverty reduction mandate. The IPRCC is a 
relatively new organisation, jointly established in December 2004 by the Chinese 
Government State Council, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
and other international organisations. The IPRCC falls under the management of the 
State Council’s Leading Group on Poverty Reduction4 and is understood to have been 
the personal project of President Hu Jintao.  
 
According to the website, “The IPRCC is designed to provide a platform for 
knowledge sharing, information exchange and international collaboration in the areas 
of poverty reduction and development. Specifically, the Centre’s work is focused on 
four key areas: research, exchange, training and cooperation” (IPRCC n.d.). One of 
the IPRCC’s chief roles is to improve dialogue about poverty reduction between 
China and other nations in the Global South. In my time at IPRCC, I had the 
opportunity to see how educated Chinese people with a specific interest in the field of 
development saw and understood the world, and to see how well this matched, or, to 
what extent and in what ways it differed from, the understandings of the students at 
the CFAU. For the most part, I was struck with the similarity in perspectives. 
 
In addition to this time at IPRCC, I have also conducted two research trips to the area 
of a Chinese mine development in Madang province, Papua New Guinea, to try and 
                                                
4 The Leading Group on Poverty Reduction (LGOP) is one of an unknown number of supra-ministerial 
bodies established on an ad-hoc basis to coordinate among several agencies and provide the central 
government with advice around policy direction. The LGOP is responsible for economic development 
in poor areas of China.  
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gain more of an understanding of how Chinese actors overseas understand their own 
as well as China’s broader role internationally. The first visit was in August 2008 and 
the second in October 2010. My aim was to meet with Chinese white-collar workers 
at the state-owned enterprise (SOE) China Metallurgical Corporation (MCC). I 
wanted to better understand how these individuals conceptualised their roles as 
implementing agents of Chinese overseas economic development projects, and 
compare their notions with those of my Chinese students at CFAU, and employees at 
IPRCC.  
 
From the discussions and meetings I had in PNG, I learned a great deal about how the 
actors in Chinese overseas development projects understood their role within the 
greater discourse of international relations. It appeared to me that the less individuals’ 
activities were linked with the state, the less they identified themselves and their role 
overseas in terms of a national discourse, demonstrating Hobsbawm’s hypothesis that 
national consciousness develops unevenly (1992, 12). I observed a particularly 
noticeable difference between the CFAU students and Chinese entrepreneurs overseas 
in their manner of speaking about their relationship with the Chinese nation-state. The 
private entrepreneurs I spoke with in Port Moresby demonstrated no particular 
allegiance to China, and I got no sense that they had at any time viewed the world 
through a national lens in the same way that my CFAU students did.  
 
Unlike the CFAU students and employees at IPRCC, and to some extent the 
employees of MCC, the Chinese private entrepreneurs in PNG understood themselves 
first and foremost as businesspeople. Their allegiance and affection, expressed as the 
purpose of their business in PNG, was to their family members back home. They 
rarely, if ever, spoke of their presence in PNG in terms of a larger national logic of 
‘Chineseness’. As one female Chinese entrepreneur who had been in PNG for 30 
years put it to me: “Actually, Chinese people from different provinces doing business 
here don’t trust each other. And the old Chinese don’t trust the new Chinese. There is 
no loyalty between different types of Chinese”.5 The MCC employees, however, 
occupied a middle ground. While they identified their purpose in PNG as being part 
of a broader Chinese effort, their rhetoric seemed more pragmatic than CFAU 
                                                
5 Prominent Chinese entrepreneur, in a meeting at her office in Port Moresby, July 2008 
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students and IPRCC officials. This difference between individuals who have been 
trained to represent the state and those who have not suggests that the subjectification 
through the content and style of education and the practices of everyday life at CFAU 
is quite specific.  
 
During the course of my research, I also met with Chinese scholars and researchers 
from think tanks such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO), the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations 
(CICIR), and the China Development Research Foundation (CDRF). I interviewed a 
number of academics both within CFAU and from a range of other universities, 
including Fudan, Renmin, and Tsinghua. Additionally, I interviewed officials from 
Western bilateral and multilateral government and non-government agencies to gain 
insights into how they understood China’s overseas activities. This group included 
high-level Australian Government representatives from AusAID and Treasury in 
PNG and Cambodia, as well as a number of embassies and bilateral and multilateral 
aid agencies in Beijing, for example, representatives from AusAID; the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID); and a high-level representative of 
the UN’s World Food Programme in Beijing.  
 
From mid-2011, I undertook a full-time internship at the UNDP in Beijing, in the area 
of South-South cooperation. This position provided me with an opportunity to meet 
with officials from diverse Chinese ministries, including the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST). While the discussions at the meetings I attended and 
correspondence I entered into are confidential, and I will keep the participants 
anonymous, getting to know the people within the system at least a little has been 
extremely helpful in this research. These interactions confirmed my observations at 
CFAU that national-level officials, particularly those with a role in China’s 
international interactions, are trained to prioritise the Chinese nation-state as the 
central and most fundamental guiding principle. This training, as I saw at CFAU, is so 
comprehensive that the national logic has become internalised as ‘doxa’ among those 
government elites with international responsibilities. 
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These activities over the course of my PhD are not the primary focus of this thesis, 
which specifically investigates the ideas and perceptions of the students I taught 
during my year working at the CFAU. However, the experiences I had and the 
knowledge I gained without doubt have given me a broader and deeper contextual 
framework in which to better understand my primary fieldwork at CFAU.  
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Chapter Two – 
CFAU Students and National Logic: What, how and why? 
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical approach my research employs to analyse the 
national logic so prevalent among the CFAU students in my study. In order to provide 
new insights into the existing debates around China’s involvement in international 
affairs, this thesis turns to the analytical potential provided by political anthropology, 
particularly the anthropology of the state. It uses an anthropological approach to 
interrogate the beliefs, ideas and values that constituted a coherent worldview among 
my Chinese students at CFAU as they were being trained to become China’s future 
foreign policy officials. I begin with an overview of the dominant debates in 
politically influential English-language International Relations (IR) literature to 
establish the prevailing scholarly understanding of China’s role in the world that 
provides the context and rationale for this research. The majority of Western analysis 
of China’s global behaviour tends to overlook the cultural context within which 
politics is both enacted and interpreted. Misunderstandings about the actors, 
modalities and processes of Chinese foreign policy underpin a perspective known in 
China as the ‘China threat theory’.  
 
Having set out the conventional wisdom within politically influential academic 
literature on China’s role in the world, I then introduce the theoretical approach I take 
in this research, political anthropology, and more specifically, the anthropology of the 
state. An approach informed by the anthropology of the state allows new insights into 
the issues. While dominant approaches to IR theory assume that the structure of the 
system dictates state interests and behaviour, the Constructivist IR school posits that 
‘people and ideas matter’. This approach to understanding international relations 
provides space for investigating how people come to hold certain worldviews as 
undisputable, and particular actions or behaviour as viable or inconceivable. These 
are questions to which an anthropological approach can provide insights. I argue that 
applying an anthropological analysis of how future diplomats are produced through 
university training provides insights into how China acts in the world and can 
therefore be of value to IR scholars, commentators, and foreign policy actors.  
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The Myth of the China Threat: The dominant debates on China’s role 
in the world 
 
International attention to China’s growing role in the global system has increased 
over the past decade or so.6 Since the early 1990s, when China’s economy started 
growing at an astounding speed, an increasing amount of literature has been 
concerned about the decline of the West and the concomitant rise of China. These 
discussions have been particularly prevalent since the third round of the high profile 
Ministerial-level Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in 2006. 
At the Forum, the attention of the international development community was drawn to 
China’s increasingly high-visibility presence in Africa. The financial crisis of 2008 
further cemented concerns about China’s rise by upsetting the West’s certainty 
around formerly prevalent economic and political norms exemplified by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. As Callahan points out, it is  “commonsense now to say that the 
world is in the midst of a grand shift of power from the West to the East” (2012, 33).   
 
A common theme of the burgeoning ‘China’s rise’ literature is whether to understand 
China’s increasing importance in international affairs as a threat or an opportunity for 
the system itself, for international security, and for power relations overall. Much of 
this China as threat or opportunity debate is predicated on whether an increasingly 
powerful China is likely to destabilise regional and global security and broader 
international norms in the near future (e.g. Roy, 1996). One idea in particular has 
gained considerable ground in the collective imaginary of the West. This is that the 
United States’ role as sole superpower may be replaced by a system in which China 
also holds considerable power (e.g. Garrett, 2010) or in which China and the US 
represent a ‘G2’ (e.g. Steinfeld, 2010). In these visions, the US is often represented as 
little more than a customer and borrower of Beijing. 
 
As far as international political relations are concerned, one implication of following 
either the ‘threat’ or the ‘opportunity’ perspective is the tendency to adopt either a 
                                                
6 See, for example, Callahan 2005; Chen and Feffer 2009; Dittmer and Yu (eds.) 2010; Foot and 
Walter 2011; Friedman 2009; Horner 2009; Ikenberry 2008; Jacques 2009; Jenkins 2008; Johnston 
2008; Kang 2007; Larus 2005; Mearsheimer 2005, 2006, 2010; Shambaugh 2011; Yang 2006; and 
Zhou 2008. For an alternative perspective, see Yee 2011, xvii and 306. 
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‘hawkish’ (such as that proposed by Mearsheimer and Ikenberry) or alternatively 
more conciliatory approach (e.g. Shambaugh) in which deeper mutual understanding 
can identify the best way for ‘managing’ China. While these two positions diverge in 
their understanding of the extent to which China’s rise poses a threat, the assumptions 
underlying both are firstly that China is inevitably ‘rising’, that is, becoming 
economically stronger; secondly, that this economic strength will naturally translate 
into a desire for corresponding increases in political power; and thirdly, that this 
transformation needs to be managed by existing powers in such a way as best protects 
their interests. As such, many authors focus on technical approaches for how 
particular countries or regions should best ‘deal with’ or ‘manage’ China’s apparently 
inevitable rise: for example, in relation to the US (Christensen 2006); Australia (e.g. 
White 2005 or Tubeliwicz 2010); the United Kingdom (UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2010); the European Union (Men, Jing and Barton, 2011); 
East Asia (Ross 2006), Japan (Mochizuki 2007); India (Bhattacharya 2005); and 
Africa (e.g. Michel and Beuret 2009; Raine 2009). The United States’ Congressional 
Research Service has conducted inquiries into ‘Comparing Global Influence:  China’s 
and US Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World’ 
(CRS 2008) and the implications of Chinese foreign aid activities in Africa, Latin 
America and Asia (CRS 2009). The Australian government, likewise, has established 
a Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee to investigate the 
implications of China’s emergence for Australia (Australian Senate 2006). 
 
These ‘technicalised’ debates in which ‘what to do about China’ has become the 
central problematic are by no means purely theoretical. Popular opinion around the 
Western world often echoes this question, and can have powerful political 
implications. The debates around China being a “responsible stakeholder” in the 
international system, a phrase coined by former World Bank head Robert Zoellick in 
2005, is an excellent illustration. Media and political leaders alike have taken up this 
call, with the emphasis firmly on how the goal can be achieved and little reflection on 
what it means. Journalists around the world readily perpetuate the ‘rise and manage’ 
problematic, further legitimising the assumptions. 
 
The theoretical foundation on which much of the ‘China rise’ literature is premised is 
the positivist approach to International Relations theory represented by the Realist 
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and Liberal Institutionalist schools.7 Realism in particular has considerable influence 
in foreign policy making in many status quo powers, particularly the United States. 
Like much of the broader literature, positivist approaches to IR theory tend to accept 
China’s rise as inevitable. High profile scholars and commentators such as William 
Overholt (1994); Michael Brown (et al. 2000); G. John Ikenberry (2008); John 
Mearsheimer (2005, 2006, 2010) and Nicholas Kristof (1993) have argued for some 
time that China’s economic strength means it is destined to become a major political 
power by the second decade of the twenty-first century. Scholars in this field then 
concentrate on analysing the implications of China’s rise. While some scholars argue 
that China’s increasing role in the world offers the best hope for transforming 
authoritarian China into a democracy (e.g. Overholt 1994), many see China’s rise as 
posing an unavoidable threat to US global power; the stability of the international 
system as it stands; and liberal democratic norms around the world. Ikenberry argues 
that China’s rise will inevitably bring the United States’ unipolar moment to an end 
(2008). Mearsheimer states quite plainly that as all states are rational actors with the 
fundamental goal to survive, China simply cannot rise peacefully (2005, 2006, 2010). 
Indeed, he argues that “intense security competition” will inevitably arise between 
China and the US because China, for security reasons, will want to be the dominant 
power in Asia, and achieving this will require pushing the US out (2010). 
 
These analyses are drawn from a particular understanding of how the international 
system operates; what nation-states are; what interests they seek to achieve; and how 
they interact in order to achieve them. In the positivist conceptualisations, territorially 
bounded nation-states are taken as the basic unit of analysis – what Wimmer and 
Schiller describe as “methodological nationalism” (2003). Each state is understood to 
exist in discrete distinction from other nation-states, and the ultimate interest of each 
is a function of the anarchic system in which it operates, that is, the pursuit of 
increased power relative to other states. As such, any given nation-state will have a 
                                                
7 This thesis focuses on the literature in the West, however, the phenomenon of China’s rise has also 
been the subject of considerable discussion in Chinese academic circles, for example, Yan, Xuetong 
(2001); Ding, Sheng (2008) and Liu, Mingfu (2010).  For an analysis of the trend over the past two 
decades of seeking Chinese-style solutions to global questions of international politics and its theories, 
see Cunningham-Cross (2012). Cunningham-Cross particularly focuses on the seeming tension 
between Yan Xuetong’s realist position of the universal applicability of international relations theory, 
and his substantial work utilising ancient Chinese thought or ‘traditional culture’ as the basis for a 
‘Chinese school’ of international relations theory. 
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priori interests due to its position in the international system. Realists therefore see 
any rising state as an inherent threat to existing relations of power, as its interests will 
by definition be expansion and increasing foreign influence. 
 
Liberal Institutionalism accepts the same fundamental assumptions about the anarchic 
state of the international system, the primacy of the nation-state as an international 
actor, and the will to power. However, it concludes that deep webs of interlinkages 
can develop, through, for example, international trade, which create enough 
interdependencies to counter the threat of hostility Realists take for granted. Despite 
the focus on interlinkages, the Liberal Institutionalist analytical approach remains 
within a framework which does not question what a nation-state is or how it comes to 
exist. Like Realism, issues of what constitutes a nation, a state, a citizen, a bureaucrat, 
politics or culture are rarely interrogated. This limits the ability of both Liberal 
Institutionalism and Realism to sufficiently account for learning and the role and 
influence of social or cultural norms. 
 
The current dominance of positivist approaches means that there has been little 
examination of shifts in China’s priorities and behaviour in relation to the 
leadership’s interpretations of changes to domestic and external circumstances. An 
exception to this is the attention devoted to China’s history. As is discussed in 
Chapter Three, much Chinese and Western scholarly analysis is focused on how 
China’s past helps to explain its current international behaviour. However, China’s 
history is often used to support an existing position within the analytical framework 
established by positivist IR theory. For example, in Martin Jacques’ 2009 monograph 
When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New 
Global Order, the author analyses China’s past to argue that contemporary China is 
the product of its uniquely long and continuous history. Jacques concludes that 
convergence with the West is impossible. Callahan criticises this conclusion as being 
drawn from a “thin” understanding of history and tradition in which “history is looted 
for episodes and ideas that support the ‘China’s rise/the fall of the West’ thesis in 
ways that are remarkably similar to official writings in the PRC” (2012, 36).  
 
Based on positivist understandings of how the international system works, the 
tendency of many Western commentators is to try and understand Chinese foreign 
28 
 
 
policy and behaviour within the power-maximising paradigm they consider as 
universally applicable. Analyses of local philosophy, culture or history are considered 
irrelevant, there is little reflection of subjectivity, and cultural lenses through which 
they themselves are analysing and critiquing tend to be dismissed. For example, 
Mearsheimer asserts that serious analysts of China should not pay any attention to 
people who employ a methodology of “talking to people” (2010). However, his 
Realist position overlooks the critical point that politics occurs in culturally inflected 
way (Spencer 2007, 5-6), and is analysed and understood though a cultural lens. Like 
politics, policy ideas and ultimately policy decisions are never free from social 
contexts. Rather, they “begin in social relations in institutions and expert 
communities, travel with undisclosed baggage and get unravelled as they are 
translated into the different interests of social/institutional worlds and local politics in 
ways that generate complex and unintended effects” (Mosse 2011, 3). 
 
As Hasenclever et al. explain,  
 
Rationalist … explanations of international regimes are at best incomplete and 
need to be supplemented or even supplanted by a mode of analysis which 
focuses on the way the ‘distribution of knowledge’ constitutes the identities, 
and shapes the preferences as well as the perceived options, of state actors. 
(1997, 136) 
 
More recently, Vivien A. Schmidt has called for an increased emphasis on the role of 
ideas in understanding political action, and the dynamics of continuity and change 
(2008). Ultimately, the positivist approach of the prevalent and influential Realist and 
Liberal Institutionalist schools obscures the complex array of actors and agents, and 
the various views, perspectives and interests which underpin China’s role in the 
world. 
 
In contrast, Constructivist approaches to IR theory allow for these elements to be 
considered in analyses of global processes, and thereby have richer explanatory 
potential. Constructivist IR scholars argue that “anarchy is what states make of it” 
(Wendt, 1992), and that ideas matter (e.g. Adler 1997; Barnett 2001; and Reus-Smit 
2002). Constructivism focuses on the dynamics of knowledge, ideology, identities, 
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and communication, thereby providing useful insights into the workings of the 
international system. Constructivists argue that relations among states are affected by 
“perception, misperception, the capacity to process information, and learning” 
(Haggard and Simmons, 1987, 510).  
 
Like the mainstream Realist approach, Constructivism is not homogenous. Some 
Constructivist scholars, whom Hasenclever terms ‘weak,’ position their analysis as 
complementary to rationalist accounts. They conceive states as rational actors, but 
seek greater consideration for the impact of knowledge that is ‘irreducible to material 
structures’ (Hasenclever, et al., 1997, 138). ‘Strong’ Constructivists, positing an 
alternative to the dominant theories about how the international system functions, 
argue that knowledge must be considered at a more fundamental level: shaping the 
identities of states and their self-understanding in relation to other social actors. 
According to this approach, international behaviour is not simply a function of  an 
external structure which dictates what principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures are available to states. Rather, it is “the product of an ongoing process of 
community self-interpretation and self-definition in response to changing context” 
(Neufeld, 1993, 55).  
 
I argue that the Constructivist approach can be productively paired with political 
anthropology, more particularly an anthropology of the state, as a means of enriching 
the positivist Realist and Liberal Institutionalist approaches currently dominant in 
explaining and interpreting China’s global activities.  
 
The View from Below: Studying up, political anthropology and the 
anthropology of the state 
 
Thirty years ago, Laura Nader called for anthropologists to ‘study up’, that is, to study 
“the colonisers rather than the colonised, the culture of power rather than the culture 
of the powerless, the culture of affluence rather than the culture of poverty” (1972, 
289). When she wrote ‘Studying Up’, she noted that literature based on fieldwork in 
the United States was “relatively abundant” when it came to studying the poor, 
minority ethnic groups, and the disadvantaged, but little existed on the middle class, 
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and very little first-hand fieldwork had been done that focused on the upper classes 
(ibid., 289). Nader referred to an “urgency” to study power anthropologically to better 
understand those “who shape attitudes and actually control institutional structures” as 
a means of enhancing quality of life (ibid., 284). She argued that the insights gained 
from studying up (not instead of but at the same time as studying ‘down’ and 
‘sideways’) have broad and resounding implications for humanity. This was 
particularly true for questions about change and resistance to change, and 
bureaucratic and institutional conservatism, far more so than the “conservatism of 
peasantry” (ibid., 289). Indeed, Nader warned of serious consequences of not 
studying up, as well as in other directions, particularly in terms of developing 
adequate theory and description. By refocusing the research question to examine 
those “who have responsibility by virtue of being delegated power, then the questions 
change” (ibid., 290). For example, if anthropologists acknowledge that “groups and 
institutions not physically present in the tribal area influence the behaviour of the 
people in it” rather than focusing on a unit or community as bounded and discrete 
(Mitchell 1966), we can better understand to what extent external determinants affect 
social structures and behaviours, and poverty and affluence. We can also see how 
much they are “determined by cultural transmission within the group” (Nader 1972, 
292), or the interaction between the two.  
  
Nader’s call at the time was a controversial one. As she noted, although good reasons 
existed for studying up, there were also significant obstacles, including a prevailing 
attitude of disdain towards conducting fieldwork at home, as well as practical 
problems of accessing those in power. Despite a shift in attitudes so that fieldwork at 
home has become increasingly acceptable, George Marcus and Michael Fischer 
argued in 1986 that Nader’s appeal remained substantially unrealised when they 
wrote of the need for a critical analysis of processes of power and domination over a 
decade later. More recently, Hugh Gusterson argued that developments in 
anthropology, including the permutation of Marxist and feminist perspectives, and the 
infusion of Foucault’s theories of power, have provided new theoretical tools for 
studying up (1997). Indeed, Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat argued that Foucault 
helped reinvent the anthropological study of politics in the 1990s which had until then 
been “steeped in an ahistorical mode of analysis” of “kinship, sacrifice and ritual in 
‘primitive societies’” (2006, 296). While not representative of a major turn in 
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anthropology, some significant studies of power and governance have been 
undertaken in recent years: for example, Bruno Latour’s study of scientific 
institutions in France (1996); Frank Pieke’s research into the training of Communist 
cadres in Chinese Party Schools (2009a, b); Brenda Chalfin’s work on Ghanaian 
customs service officials (2010); and Evasdottir’s study of Chinese archaeologists to 
introduce a new ‘obedient autonomy’ approach to conceptualising the dynamics of 
social relations among intellectuals in the Chinese danwei system (2005).  
 
Political Anthropology  
 
This research applies Nader’s upward gaze to the study of the processes and practices 
of power in the subjectification of my students at CFAU, using the approaches 
provided by political anthropology.  This section will outline some of the classical 
perspectives on the state as a sovereign actor, as despite coming under considerable 
criticism from dependency theorists and globalisation scholars, among others, this 
understanding continues to inform much of the debate in international relations and 
international politics.8 The chapter will then present anthropological perspectives on 
the state, and how these can be used as an analytical tool to better understand how and 
why CFAU students are socialised into a national logic, and with what implications. 
 
Classical understandings of the state 
 
The tendency within International Relations to theorise states as individual, rational 
actors in the pursuit of power reflects a broader approach across most dominant 
branches of political science (Humphrey 2004, 418). The international system of 
states, established with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, provides the fundamental 
notions for classical perspectives of the modern state in international politics. These 
include the Weberian understanding that a (successful) state has the “monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1991 [1919], 78) and 
that public authorities are able to “exercise effective control within the borders of 
their own polity” (Krasner 1999, 4). In addition to these internal characteristics of a 
                                                
8 This view of the state as a sovereign actor in a Westphalian system also underpins the long-held 
Chinese notion of respect for sovereignty, territoriality, and the commitment to non-interference, as set 
out in the mid-1950s by Premier Zhou Enlai in the Five Principles of Co-existence.   
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sovereign state, external aspects such as recognition by other states which are 
themselves sovereign entities (Lake 2003, 205) and the ability to prevent external 
actors from interfering in domestic affairs are critical (Krasner 1999, 4). In this 
system, when these conditions are met, all states, regardless of size, are considered to 
be formally equal and independent actors in the international system (Lake 2003, 
306). Understanding the state in this way discounts the role of people and ideas, 
processes and change, and fixes it as an eternal entity, “a force to be resisted, with 
more or less heroism, by the plucky subjects of our field research” (Spencer 2007, 
102).  
 
Dependency theory, arising in the early 1970s largely as a response to modernisation 
theory, critiqued the practical reality of this notion of sovereign equality. Dependency 
theorists argued that less developed countries (or those of the ‘Third World’, or more 
recently ‘Global South’) were trapped in an association of dependency in relation to 
the economically advanced Western countries (Menzel 1993, 209ff). The dependency 
perspective lost some of its explanatory strength in the face of the economic success 
of the ‘East Asian Tigers’ before the financial crisis of 1997. It was also criticised for 
trivialising complex processes of interaction and domination, as well as lacking a 
sophisticated discussion of different local settings (Luig 2002, 76).  
 
Globalisation theories of the 1990s posited that the entire system of nation states was 
being eroded and undermined by rapidly increasing transnational flows of money, 
goods, and people. For example, Susan Strange argued that: 
 
The authority of the governments of all states, large and small, strong or 
weak, has been weakened as a result of technological and financial change and 
of the accelerated integration of national economies into one single global 
market economy”.9 (1996, 14) 
 
Anthropologists such as Arjun Appadurai, drawing on Benedict Anderson’s (2006 
[1983]) notion of imagined communities, claimed that new “imagined worlds” were 
                                                
9 Despite her concern about the demise of the state, Strange can be considered as a Realist IR scholar in 
that her concerns regard the nature of power – where it lies, what is its nature, and who benefits. 
However she moves out of traditional Realist IR theory in her concern that IR as a discipline is in need 
of new approaches, methodologies, and indeed, an entirely new ontology (Cox 2007, 366-67). 
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being created by global flows, which were able to “subvert the legitimacy of the 
territorial boundaries of nation states” (1996, 8, 33). However, sociologist Peter 
Evans observed that strong and capable states are essential for global flows to occur 
effectively, and that in fact, open domestic economies and extensions of the state 
apparatus often go side by side, and that state eclipse is neither a necessary nor likely 
outcome of globalisation (1997, 68). Similarly, Aihwa Ong noted that state 
governments are able to be more creative in their responses to these challenges than is 
widely thought, and thus able to “maintain strategic controls over resources, 
populations and sovereignty” (1999, 21). 
 
As Robert H. Jackson argues, certain scholars within IR theory argue that some states 
lack the internal institutions and structures to be considered fully-fledged states 
(1990). These scholars utilise the term ‘quasi-states’ to describe post-colonial entities 
which consisted “not of self-standing structures with domestic foundations – like 
separate buildings – but of territorial jurisdictions supported from above by 
international law and material aid” (ibid., 5). These quasi-states have been granted the 
right to self-determination by the international community and hence posses juridical 
sovereignty. But this authority “is a mere ‘negative sovereignty’ since these states 
clearly lack empirical statehood” (ibid., 529).  
 
Many key Chinese scholars of international relations are also strong proponents of the 
Westphalian model in that they assume the immutability and universality of 
territorially distinct sovereign states as their basic unit of analysis.10 This commitment 
to the state is in line with the Chinese government’s official position, clearly 
                                                
10 Some of my students at CFAU noted that there had been four models for the international system 
over the past few centuries: the Westphalia, Vienna, Versailles and Yalta. As Summer from the 
International Economics major wrote in her mid-semester essay,  “Successful models for international 
system, such as Westphalia, can keep the world peaceful for a long time. It is the result of a suitable 
model, which fitted the situation of the countries in Europe at that time. Big powers kept balance and 
most countries got their benefits. The failure of the Washington-Versailles model, which pushed 
Germany to the edge of sheer precipice, is the most important reason for the outbreak of the Second 
World War. Even the Westphalia System was replaced by the Vienna Model for the reason that the 
countries in Europe had changed a lot. There should be a new model for the international system. The 
last model, the Yalta System, was suitable for the structure of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union declared the end of the Cold War. Russia is not as powerful as the Soviet Union was, given its 
weak domestic economy. It is more important that Russia is no longer an enemy to the United States. 
Although the United States is the only super-power, it has some problems. It acted as the leader of the 
whole world and launched wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. And during the financial crisis, 
the US suffers from economic recession. It is the right time that a new model should replace the Yalta 
System”. 
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articulated in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Eight Principles of 
Foreign aid. Central tenets of both of these proclamations are respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Despite this official position, a tension exists in Chinese 
debates of international relations (see Callahan 2012 for a review). The hyper-Realist 
obsession with state-bound territoriality and sovereignty co-exists with a deeply held 
belief that a Chinese approach to international relations offers a new and distinct 
approach to understanding the world, based on China’s own unique history and 
culture – a presumption that most Western Realists would find difficult to accept. For 
example, tianxia (天下), usually translated as ‘all under heaven’, is common in many 
prominent Chinese IR scholars’ conception of the world. As Elena Barabantseva 
notes, tianxia is often invoked as the concept that best represents China’s traditional 
worldview (2009, 131), forming the foundation of the popular argument that China’s 
behaviour on the world stage cannot be understood solely by applying Western 
concepts and principles (see for example Shih 1993; Zhao 2005 and 2006). Chinese 
proponents of this perspective posit that uniquely Chinese understandings of global 
affairs can offer an alternative model to the largely dysfunctional organisation of the 
world today. Yan Xuetong from Tsinghua University is a good example of this 
approach. Yan is a self-professed Realist who also argues that China’s behaviour in 
the world should be governed by its own historical traditions (Yan 2011).  
 
Anthropological approaches to the state  
 
From an anthropological perspective that studies the practices of the state in day-to-
day life, the clear entities imagined by positivist approaches to IR are revealed to be 
fragile, held together not in fact but by convention and shared belief. Jonathan 
Spencer argues that despite its apparent absurdity, the very question of what we even 
mean by ‘the state’ needs to be anthropologists’ starting point (2007, 101). Political 
anthropology offers an approach to understanding the state that does not gloss over or 
ignore the processes of power and politics, or differences in values and history. Nor 
does it presume that those differences are fixed, impermeable, or simply and clearly 
cut along lines drawn on a map. Instead, the anthropological approach grapples with 
the problematic of how to define something that is so often taken for granted. For 
example, Spencer notes the difficulty of pinning down a definition, and asks whether 
it is a matter of scale – in that states are huge, translocal institutions, and 
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anthropologists are by definition minitiarists – or if the indeterminacy inherent to the 
concept itself makes it “good for dreaming” but resistant to neatly defining (2007, 
101). This section will outline what an anthropological approach to understanding 
politics and the state looks like, and how these theoretical tools can be usefully 
applied to understanding how the CFAU students in my study are socialised into a 
particular nationalist logic and social imaginary. 
 
Several scholars from within political anthropology have observed that it is only 
recently that the modern nation-state has re-emerged as a major concern for 
anthropologists (Bierschenk 2009; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Spencer 2007). 
According to Spencer, for example, in the late 1980s, concerns with power and 
politics “moved back to the centre of the anthropological argument”, following global 
political developments such as the resurgence of ethnic and religious conflicts across 
various parts of the world in the post-Cold War era (Spencer 2007, 3). In addition, 
this theoretical move was reinvigorated by Marxist and feminist theories, and the 
insights of Foucault. Before the 1980s, classical political anthropology had tended to 
understand politics as “calculated instrumentality”, a “certain mode of conduct, either 
conceived in a positive light – ‘judicious, expedient, skillfully contrived’ – or more 
negatively, ‘scheming, crafty, cunning’ – rather than as linked to the ‘science and art 
of government’ and the state” (ibid., 15).11  While a “spectacularly successful” 
approach in the short term, in the long run it became “predictably banal and un-
anthropological”, as after a while very different locales and field sites began to look 
the same, simply as variants of a “single theme of political strategising” (ibid., 15).  
 
Additionally, this emphasis on ‘small-p politics’ assumed field sites in which 
societies were without or unrelated to states, and in which understanding people was 
seen to have little to do with broader structures and processes of power. The lack of 
attention to the role of state power in people’s lives became an increasingly difficult 
position to justify during the era of decolonisation after the Second World War. In 
recent years, established forms of social organisation, including those associated with 
the nation and state, have increasingly become the subject of scholarly study (Skey 
2011, 4). The increasing importance of the role of the state is also prominent in the 
                                                
11 Citing the Oxford English Dictionary definitions of ‘politics’ (OED, s.v. politic B.3 pl. and A.2) 
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work of other political scientists (e.g. Migdal 2001; Schlichte and Migdal 2005), who 
advocate for a ‘state-in-society’ approach.  
 
The recent emergence of a “self-conscious anthropology of the state” (Bierschenk 
2009) provides an alternative paradigm for theorising how the state comes into being, 
how it is constructed in relation to its presumed opposite, civil society, and how the 
state comes to assume its position of supreme authority (Sharma and Gupta eds. 2006, 
9). As Sharma and Gupta suggest, the disciplinary distinctiveness of an anthropology 
of the state approach to understanding power and politics can provide insights and 
contributions that go beyond that of philosophers, political scientists, sociologists or 
historians in several ways: through focusing on everyday practices; foregrounding 
cultural differences; and utilising a micro-level ethnographic approach.  
 
Firstly, a focus on “multi-layered, contradictory, translocal” and “pluri-centered and 
fluid” everyday practices shows how the often taken-for-granted boundary between 
state and society is constructed, contested and deconstructed (Sharma and Gupta 
2006, 6, 10). Complementary to this attention to everyday practices when studying 
the state is the focus on the representational practices of the state itself. The “public 
cultural representations and performance of statehood” (ibid., 18) can often obscure 
the porous and nebulous nature of the boundary of the state, and “successfully 
represent [the state] as coherent and singular” (ibid., 10), as having clear boundaries, 
and as forming the ultimate manifestation of society.  
 
The second way in which an anthropology of the state can enlighten, according to 
Sharma and Gupta, is by foregrounding “the role of cultural difference in forming and 
informing states” (ibid., 10). States are not assumed to be naturally occurring entities, 
but understood as “cultural artefacts” (ibid., 5), with a “deeply cultural nature” (ibid., 
6), and as the “effects of cultural processes” (ibid., 10).  An anthropological approach 
to understanding the state takes into account the images and cultural representations 
of the state as they circulate through the public sphere through newspapers, 
government reports, and “ceremonial rituals” like military parades, all of which 
influence people’s perceptions of “what the state is” (ibid., 18). Representations of the 
state, particularly in the form of “organisational charts, official seals and photographs 
of state leaders”, all common at CFAU, lend an air of order and coherence to the 
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organisation of the state, obscuring any inconsistencies or messiness endemic to the 
daily workings of the state (ibid., 19). 
 
Thirdly and lastly, Sharma and Gupta suggest that an anthropological approach to the 
state could offer new insights because of the way it is based on ethnographic 
methodology as a means of critical political engagement. The anthropology of the 
state is constituted by a micro-level perspective and a focus on “everyday practices 
and representations (of particular bureaucrats) as modes through which the state 
comes into being (ibid., 27)” and bases its insights on institutional ethnographies of 
specific state bureaucracies, inquiries into the micro-politics and daily practices of 
these institutions, and a quest to understand their relation to the public (elite, 
subaltern, or both) that they serve (ibid., 27).  
 
One of the key questions an anthropology of the state addresses is the boundary 
between the political and the social. How my CFAU students perceived this border is 
explored in more detail in Chapter Four when I examine their relationships with the 
Chinese Party-state. Timothy Mitchell argues that instead of perceiving the boundary 
between the two as predetermined, it is better understood as a “structural effect” of 
complex social practices. As such, the state “should not be examined as an actual 
structure, but as the powerful metaphysical effect of practices that make such 
structures appear to exist. In fact, the nation-state is arguably the paramount structural 
effect of the modern social world” (1991, 94). As Mitchell explains it, this ongoing 
making and remaking of the boundaries is part of a wider pattern of modern 
disciplinary power, and the resultant ‘state-effect’ is just one instance of a wider 
production of ‘abstraction’, as is, for example, ‘the economy’ (ibid., 91). Following 
Foucault, Mitchell suggests that what we refer to as ‘the state’ is in fact of secondary 
importance to understanding the pervasive modes of discipline, regulation and 
surveillance that characterise modern forms of power. The state itself, particularly the 
illusion of a separate, bounded entity that stands discrete from society, is rather an 
effect of these disciplinary practices – indeed the illusion itself holds the practices 
together. Mitchell argues that identifying the problems arising from the empirical 
separation of ‘the state’ from ‘society’ is not particularly challenging (ibid., 90). What 
is of more interest is the impermanent nature and shifting location of the nebulous 
boundary between society and the state. While this boundary “never marks a real 
38 
 
 
exterior”, it all the same has very real effects and implications, being “itself a 
mechanism that generates resources of power” in the way that it is able to exclude and 
include particular topics and activities from being considered as the explicit 
responsibility of the state (ibid., 90).  
 
Building on the idea that the borderline between state and society is nebulous and 
inconstant, Joel Migdal and Klaus Schlichte propose the notion of state-in-society as a 
means to conceptualise the relationship and border between the state and society 
(2005). Frank Pieke however argues that even this remains insufficient, and suggests 
instead that the state is society (2004, 533). He argues that the starting point of 
investigation and analysis should be the processes of power, the “shifting and 
changing sediment of social action” (ibid., 533). By studying these, which will be 
discussed in more detail shortly, rather than merely focusing on “a set of institutions 
existing in society”, we can move beyond the debate of whether any putative ‘state’ 
does or does not exist separately from and above ‘society’. Rather the focus can be on 
how the state constitutes itself, and to what extent and how the state exists in various 
circumstances can “be treated as an empirical question rather than as a matter of 
principled debate” (ibid., 534).  
 
Further, the anthropology of the state also offers a useful analytical distinction 
between the state as a bundle of practices, or state-as-system, and the state-as-idea. 
This conception did not originally emanate from within the discipline of 
anthropology, but rather can be found in the work of French philosopher Louis 
Althusser (1971, 135–139; among other early political geographers). After being 
taken up by British sociologist Philip Abrams (1988 [1977]), an Althusserian model 
was then used by political scientists like Mitchell to criticise the assumption, 
widespread in his own discipline, that the political was “clearly distinguishable from 
its social environment” (1991, 80). 
Spencer describes the notion of state-as-system as a complex set of practices, 
institutions and procedures (2007, 99), or what Abrams called an “apparatus” or 
“palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure centred in government and 
more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any given society” (1988 [1977] 82). 
The world as it is now does involve borders, frontiers, checkpoints, and other sites at 
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which we encounter the very tangible delineations of states. In going about our daily 
lives we are constantly, albeit subtly, reminded that we exist in a nation-state of our 
very own that has a distinct boundary with other nation-states. Our postage stamps, 
banking transactions, road rules, electricity, water and gas services, all depend on a 
state system. Indeed despite not being able to quite pin down what they are, nations 
and states are real enough to be considered worth going to war and dying for (Billig 
1995). We are also reminded constantly that that our daily lives are “steeped in 
power” (Butler and Spivak, 2007, 9) in that we are able to access medical and health 
services, education, police and legal protection, and other benefits of the state to 
which only people of ‘our’ nationality are entitled.  
The anthropology of the state has less to say about the analytical concept of state-as-
idea. This is perhaps because so far the epistemic structures and programs of the 
discipline, like in the social sciences overall, have been shaped by the contemporary 
Western experience of state-formation in which state/society relations of power, 
rather than nationalism, has been the central problematic (Wimmer and Schiller 2003, 
577). While approaches such as Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system theory and 
Marxist political economy focus on the transnational, these views remained 
heterodox, and have not shaped the social science program, which as a result has 
tended to focus on the operations of state power (ibid., 577). However, the distinction 
between the state as an ideological symbol and vehicle for the political imagination 
and the state as a palpable apparatus is also helpful when asking how nation and 
nationalism relate to the state. It is often difficult to separate the state-as-idea from the 
nation, particularly in China where the Party-state has been explicitly promoting the 
conflation of the two.  The way in which my students at CFAU conceived of the state-
as-idea was virtually indistinguishable from the idea of the nation as an imagined 
community of idea and practice (Anderson 1983). Distinguishing between state-as-
system or apparatus, and state-as-idea as aligned with the concept of nation, allows an 
even deeper analysis of how the nation-state is constructed, etched, experienced, 
adored and loathed. Moving beyond analytical categories, the distinction also helps to 
explain why my students could on the one hand be critical of the daily functions and 
processes of the state-as-system, for example, corrupt officials, traffic, or pollution, 
while still maintaining such loyalty to the state-as-idea. 
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Like the definition of ‘state’, while the term ‘nation’ may seem at first blush to be 
self-evident, as Walter Bagehot as early as 1887 and Eric Hobsbawm (1992), 
Benedict Anderson (2000 [1983]), Ernest Gellner (1983) and others have noted, it is a 
notoriously slippery concept: “We know what it is when you do not ask us, but we 
cannot very quickly explain or define it” (Bagehot 1887, 20-21). However, “the last 
two centuries of the human history of planet Earth are incomprehensible without 
some understanding of the term” (Hobsbawm 1992, 1). Indeed, “nation-ness is the 
most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson, 2000 
[1983], 3). However, attempts to establish common criteria for what constitutes ‘a 
nation’, or definitions of ‘nationalism’, have proven fruitless. Theorists usually turn to 
language, common territory, common history, or some other common cultural traits to 
define it. For example, Joseph Stalin’s well-known definition runs: “A nation is a 
historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture” (1934 [1912]). 
However, objective criteria are themselves “fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous, and as 
useless for purposes of the traveller’s orientation as cloud-shapes are compared to 
landmarks” (Hobsbawm 1992, 6). Hugh Seton-Watson notes that he has been “driven 
to the conclusion that no ‘scientific definition’ of the nation can be devised; yet the 
phenomenon has existed and exists” (1977, 5). But if objective criteria cannot be 
established, can subjective grounds prove more effective? A subjective approach also 
appears unhelpful, as defining a nation according to “its members’ consciousness of 
belonging to it is tautological and provides only an a posteriori guide to what a nation 
is” (Hobsbawm 1992, 8). Hobsbawm concludes that neither objective nor subjective 
definitions are satisfactory, and recommends a position of agnosticism. This very 
ambiguity, he argues, is what makes the idea of the nation so ideal for propaganda 
(ibid., 6), as will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
Anderson, similarly, prefers to understand the term ‘nation’ as having “multiple 
significations”, and ‘nation-ness’ and ‘nationality’ as “cultural artefacts of a particular 
kind, that have come into historical being through certain processes, and whose 
meanings have changed over time” (1983, 4). Anderson describes the nation as an 
‘imagined community’ in which a national imagination comes to exist, that is, a sense 
of identity that is collectively imagined by all those going to the same kinds of school, 
viewing or listening to the same media, visiting the same museums, and in other ways 
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developing and sharing the same mental map of what it means to be part of a 
particular ‘nation’. Anderson argues that there is thus nothing immanent or original 
about the nation – it is a construct, similar everywhere, only using different symbols. 
However, each nation always considers itself as being unique and antique, creating its 
own narrative about where it comes from, what it represents now, and what its vision 
of the future is. By ‘imagined’ Anderson means not so much that it is an invented or 
fabricated community, but rather an entirely real sense of connection to other people 
who the individual citizen has never seen (1983, 6-7). State-as-system, state-as-idea, 
and nation may well all be constructions, ongoing processes that continuously 
produce and reproduce the world as a world of nation-states (Skey 2011, 10), not 
unlike ‘the economy’ in its representation as “a nonmaterial totality that seems to 
exist apart from the material world of society” (Mitchell 1991, 91). However, their 
effects and implications are real and natural to those within them – indeed in 1951 
Hannah Arendt struggled to find a mode of belonging that could be rigorously non-
national (1994 [1951]).  
  
Real as their effects may be, this research is founded on the understanding that neither 
‘the state’ nor ‘the nation’ are primary or unchanging entities, thanks to the 
developments in political anthropology and the anthropology of the state. Both are 
historically, culturally and politically contingent, and rely on “artefact, invention and 
social engineering” (Hobsbawm 1992, 10) to be produced. What Spencer suggests, 
therefore, is a recognition of the cogency of the idea of the state as an ideological 
power, and, like Pieke, treating that in itself as a compelling object of analysis 
(Spencer 2007, 105). It is in this regard that the recent emergence of a “self-conscious 
anthropology of the state” (Bierschenk 2009) is a useful tool for theorising what the 
state is, what the nation is, and how they exist in relation to society. 
 
The Social Imaginary of Chineseness 
 
In this thesis I utilise a range of theoretical insights to understand the coherent set of 
views shared among my CFAU students, that is, “what enables, through making sense 
of, the practices of society” (Taylor 2004, 2, emphasis added). My assumption that 
the CFAU is an arena of discipline and subjectification comes from Foucault’s work 
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on the roles of institutions in governance (1975, 1991). The way in which I 
understand the quotidian activities and arrangements of students’ lives as creating 
state-centred agents is drawn from Bourdieu’s notion of a theory of practice, habitus 
and doxa (1977) and Charles Taylor’s concept of a ‘social imaginary’ (2004). How 
these notions become ‘reality’ for people, in this case, how students learn the primary 
loyalty to a national logic, is explored through concepts such as Michael Billig’s 
‘banal nationalism’ (1995), and Edmund Husserl’s exploration of ‘sedimentation’ to 
create a Lebenswelt, or ‘life-world’ (1970 [1936]). 
 
Pieke discusses how cadre training at Party schools in China takes place in an “anti-
structural”’ environment separated from normal life as a means to facilitate students’ 
forgetting about “their position, rank and normal obligations and privileges of family 
and work” (2009a, 37). In a similar way, living and studying at CFAU removes 
students from wider ‘normal’ life and produces citizens who see it as being for their 
own good to align themselves politically, morally, and socially with the Chinese 
national identity and who therefore do so by their own will. Utilising Foucault’s 
model of the state and its disciplinary power allows a deeper and clearer 
understanding of the subjectification mechanisms at work at CFAU and how they 
function. Foucault’s study of the panopticon, a prison surveillance and control system 
initially proposed by Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century, illustrates the 
relationship between practice and state control, in the way that order and discipline 
are internally and reflexively enforced. The state does not operate as a force external 
to and acting on ‘society’ or ‘people’ who are clearly delineated as separate from its 
power. Rather, state power is generated, manifested and maintained through the 
process of subjectification, that is, the meticulous organisation of space and time 
which serves to internalise the political order, such that, as Pieke describes, the “state 
is society” (2004, 533).  
 
As Andrew Kipnis observes, Foucault’s concept of governmentality (1991) is useful 
for “almost any anthropologist wishing to develop an anthropological vantage on 
governing, ‘the state’, or policy” (2008, 277). Paraphrased as “the conduct of 
conduct” (Dean and Hindiss, 1998, 2), the theory of governmentality allows a shift 
from the presumption that only elite state agents exercise power over others to an 
understanding that governing is carried out by everyone who attempts the conduct of 
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conduct: “To govern means to act on the actions of subjects who retain the capacity to 
act otherwise” (Li 2007, 17). Tania Murray Li posits that governmentality, 
ascertaining “the well-being of populations at large” is distinct from Foucault’s 
concept of ‘discipline’, that which “seeks to reform designated groups through 
detailed supervision in confined quarters (prisons, asylums, schools)” (2007, 5).  I 
argue, however, that these two processes are both present and necessary in the 
subjectification of students at CFAU. Through the disciplinary nature of the 
university environment, governmentality’s education of desires and configuring of 
habits, aspirations and beliefs are enacted. The detailed supervision and management 
of students’ daily lives in their confined campus quarters allows conditions to be set 
“artificially so arranging things so that people, following only their own self-interest, 
will do as they ought” (Scott, 1995).  
 
In his theory of governmentality, Foucault differentiates between the purpose of 
government, the conduct of conduct, and that of sovereignty, which is to confirm and 
extend the power of the sovereign, with absolute authority to command, punish, 
deprive and bestow. In contemporary China, the state combines the sovereign-like 
Party with administrative governance apparatuses. The Party-state’s continued 
sovereignty, its legitimacy to hold might and authority, is “best confirmed – and 
secured – by ensuring the well-being of the population and augmenting its prosperity” 
(Li 2007, 12). Discipline in education institutions like CFAU ensures that the 
constructed and subjectified individual student learns that it is in his or her own 
interest to serve the broader well-being of the population, which in turn perpetuates 
state power and legitimacy. Of course, wherever there is power and subjectification, 
there exists the opportunity for resistance, as the three concepts are inextricably 
linked. Bourdieu’s theories of habitus, practice, and doxa provide a useful way to 
illustrate how CFAU students cannot simply be understood as power’s passive 
objects. Evasdottir’s conception of obedient autonomy (2004) and Sherry Ortner’s 
arguments regarding ‘ethnographic refusal’ (1995) are also key to understanding 
students’ relationship with power, as will be explored in Chapter Four. 
 
A critical component of the process of the subjectification of my students at CFAU 
was the discipline of being deeply, constantly and intensely immersed in their 
controlled and structured university environment. The aspects of everyday life they 
44 
 
 
practiced (de Certeau 1984) ultimately served to create individuals who knew not 
only the desirable facts about the world and their role within it, but also how to 
behave and respond ‘appropriately’ in a range of circumstances. Bourdieu conceives 
of ‘practices’, a person’s acts or behaviours, as being produced by an individual’s 
‘habitus’, the system of “durable, transposable dispositions” (1977, 72). The habitus 
enables “agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations” (ibid., 72), 
although Bourdieu does not elaborate on how habitus leads to practices. Habitus 
incorporates a ‘practical sense’ or a ‘feel for the game’, a sense of what behaviour is 
appropriate in certain circumstances, based on doxa, the core values and principles 
which are taken for granted. As a result of the dispositions that form people’s habitus, 
therefore, individuals tend to act in socially and culturally similar ways to those of the 
past, because habitus shapes understanding of the possibilities for action. Practices, 
therefore, are always socially informed.  
 
Habitus is acquired through an individual’s social and cultural experiences, but that is 
not to say that the idea is a structuralist one in which only external factors matter in 
accounting for behaviour. Indeed Bourdieu directly argues against this “grandiose and 
desperate undertaking of the anthropologist, armed with fine positivist courage” 
(1977, 73), rejecting both structuralist and individualist/phenomenologist approaches 
in favour of a more complex explanation of human behaviour. The concept of habitus 
alone cannot provide a full account of practice. Habitus is formed, and in turn 
influences behaviour, only in concrete social contexts or ‘cultural fields’, that is, 
particular sites of cultural practice which render certain ways of thinking and acting 
as acceptable. In this way, Bourdieu allows for the influence of social and cultural 
structures on individual behaviour, while at the same time leaving open the possibility 
that individuals may act otherwise than in accordance with the dictates of those 
structures. Individuals remain free to behave in different and unpredicted ways, and 
will do so in response to changing external conditions, be they economic, social, 
political or otherwise. Additionally, the cultural field itself is a site of continuous 
contestation and negotiation, and is therefore not a fixed or static entity, but is in a 
constant state of flux. Despite these opportunities for change and new ideas, however, 
Bourdieu argues that cultural fields generally reproduce existing patterns and 
processes of power, tending to perpetuate the dominant power relations.  
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Not dissimilar to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as a means of understanding 
behaviour and action is Taylor’s notion of ‘the social imaginary’ (2004). Rather than 
the aloof and detached intellectual schemas or social theories people may entertain 
when they have the luxury to reflect on their existence, the social imaginary is how 
ordinary people imagine or understand “their social existence, how they fit together 
with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that 
are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations” on a quotidian, mundane basis (Taylor 2004, 23). A social imaginary 
comes to exist through a complicated dialectic of ideas and practices. The relationship 
between ideas and practice is not uni-linear, but rather mutually constitutive, with the 
former at times perhaps having more influence, and at other times, the latter. Indeed,  
 
The only general rule in history is that there is no general rule identifying one 
order of motivation as always the driving force. Ideas always come in history 
wrapped up in certain practices… But the motivations that drive toward the 
adoption and spread of these packages may be varied; indeed, it is not even 
clear that we have a typology of such motivations (economic vs. political vs. 
ideal, etc.) that is valid throughout human history. (Taylor 2004, 33) 
 
According to Taylor, the social imaginary allows and similarly disallows certain ways 
of thinking and acting. Our understandings of the world delimit and define what we 
see as threats or opportunities, and what we conceive of as being appropriate or 
outrageous responses. A given group in society which shares a social imaginary, 
similar to what Foucault might understand as an ‘epistemic community’, has available 
at its disposal a repertoire of common actions and ideas with which all are familiar. 
The repertoire is based on “an implicit map of social space” (Taylor 2004, 25) 
covering the understandings required to carry off particular actions, knowing how and 
when and who to speak to and under what circumstances, and so on. Taylor gives the 
example of organising a demonstration: first, the decision to do so means that this act 
is in our repertoire, and is deemed acceptable. We know what to do, and where the 
limits lie, “we understand the ritual” (ibid., 26). The act makes sense in the wider 
context of the world as we know it, in which we see ourselves as having certain 
relations with others, including with power, that makes it acceptable to address them 
in this way rather than another, say, petitioning the central government. It also makes 
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sense according to certain understandings of history, in the narrative of how we 
became who we are now (ibid., 25). 
 
Chinese Nationalism 
 
As set out in Chapter One, my students at CFAU demonstrated a strong propensity to 
identify with a national logic. The question then arises as to why my students 
continued to ultimately align themselves with the official narrative of the national 
given the wide range of associations with which they could identify. Nationalism 
should not be misunderstood as simply one form of identity that can be chosen over 
any other by people as rational actors making rational choices about what serves their 
interests best. The ‘imploding’ of categories such as nationalism runs the risk, as 
historian Prasenjit Duara has observed, of resembling positivist, rational choice 
theory, resting on the notion of the maximisation of individual or group utility (1995, 
8). 12  Duara argues that nationalism occupies “a privileged position within the 
representational network as the master identity that subsumes or organises other 
identifications, it exists only as one among others, and is changeable, interchangeable, 
conflicted, or harmonised with them” (ibid., 8). As Herzfeld observes, national 
identity, once created, “subordinates smaller identities – kin group, village, religion – 
to the encompassing collective good” (1992, 35). For my CFAU students, aligning 
with a national logic was doxa, an ideological consciousness in which nations, 
national identification, and national homelands appeared to be utterly natural. The 
world of nations was understood by my students to be an innate moral order, a means 
of understanding the entire world (Billig 1995, 10). 
 
It has been more than twenty years since the Chinese government’s post-Tiananmen 
‘patriotic turn’ put analysing Chinese nationalism back on the international academic 
agenda (Hughes 2011, 601). The past decade in particular has seen considerable 
scholarly attention dedicated to nationalism in China and the fundamental 
understandings of what the Chinese nation means that underpin it (e.g. Callahan 
                                                
12 Duara goes on to say that in his view, “utility is itself defined by a discourse, and even more 
importantly, it is ofen confounded by the play of multiple discourses or representations that constitute 
the individual or group.” I follow the position he takes in his book that “instances of multiplicity, 
changeability, and ambiguity will be encountered in the representations of the self, which is often 
mediated or disguised by the polysemic quality of language” (1995, p. 8). 
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2012; Diamant 2009; Fong 2004; Guo 2004; Gries 2004; Hughes 2010; Nyiri et al. 
2010; Xu 2011; Zhao 2004, 2005; and Zheng 2005). Despite this, in much of the 
debate, little or no investigation has been made into the complex relations between 
state-as-idea and state-as-system, and consequently loyalty to the one is understood as 
interchangeable with loyalty to the other (Guo 2004). However, significant challenges 
have been made in China to both the official configuration of the nation and the 
state’s monopoly on the right to name the nation since 1989. Therefore, a deeper 
analysis of Chinese nationalism is required, which examines disjunctions between the 
people and the state, and the relationship of each to the nation (Guo 2004). 
 
The period since 2008 has been distinguished by a continuing rise of popular 
nationalism in China. Pressure on the government to be more decisive in standing up 
to what is seen as foreign ‘bullying’ has been increasing, from the army, other 
establishment nationalists, and the population at large. For example Michael Swaine 
notes that in 2009 alone, China officially criticised US economic policy; questioned 
the dollar’s status as the international reserve currency; imposed greater constraints 
on foreign companies in China; discriminated in favour of China’s ‘national 
champion’ firms; increased the amount of cyber-attacks on foreign firms, as well as 
responded strongly to Western complaints on the issue; took a more activist stance at 
international economic meetings such as the G-20; defied US pressure to devalue the 
Renminbi; took an “obstructionist and insulting stance” at the UN Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen; and resisted UN Security Council sanctions against Iran 
for its nuclear activities (2010, 3). These actions were followed in 2010 by the very 
high-profile incident between Japan and China in waters off the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands in which Japanese coast guards arrested a Chinese fishing boat skipper who 
was accused of ramming their boats for patrolling in “Chinese waters”. China also 
applied economic sanctions, including suspending the export of rare earth minerals 
and suspending Chinese tourist visits to Japan. The publication and popularity of 
works such as Wolf Totem by Jiang Rong (2004), Unhappy China by Song Xiaojun 
and colleagues (2009); China’s Maritime Rights by Zhang Wenmu (2009); and China 
Dream by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) colonel and professor at the China 
National Defence University Liu Mingfu (2010) echo this trend of rising popular 
nationalism in China (Hughes 2010; see Callahan 2012 for an analysis of these 
publications).   
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Since Chinese nationalism became a topic of renewed interest, there have been a 
number of theories proposed about how to best characterise its current form/s; 
understand its origins, and analyse its political implications. A differentiation exists in 
Western scholarship between those who see Chinese nationalism as ‘primordial’ and 
timeless (e.g. Fong 2004, 631-58 and Gries 2001, 25-43), and those who understand it 
as ‘constructivist’, or state-manipulated (e.g. Guo 2004 and Zhao 1998, 290-91).  
 
Scholars such as Peter Hays Gries and Vanessa Fong argue that the foundation of 
Chinese nationalism is the belief that the Chinese nation-state is ‘primordial’, that is, 
that it has always-existed. Certainly, Chinese official narratives present the nation and 
the state as mutually constitutive and timeless. As Ann Anagnost richly depicts, the 
key element represented in the official Chinese ‘nationscape’ as embodied in the 
“Splendid China” model in Shenzhen is the “totality of the nation in time and space.” 
The Chinese nation is presented “as a total concept, a timeless essence” (Anagnost 
1993, 586). Pal Nyiri et al. describe the primordialist approach to analysing Chinese 
nationalism as tending “to focus on the historical grievances from which anti-Western 
and anti-Japanese sentiments are believed to spring” (2010, 26). For example, Fong 
argues that the nationalist protests following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade in 1999 were an expression of ‘filial nationalism’. That is, because of their 
belief in the timelessness of the Chinese state, Chinese youth were naturally shocked 
and disappointed by China’s apparently inferior position within the community of 
nations. They felt they had to love the nation as they loved their parents – despite of, 
and perhaps because of, these imperfections (Fong 2004). The primordial approach to 
understanding nationalism in China also forms the foundation of what other scholars 
see as a change that has taken place in recent years in which nationalism is now more 
positive, based on national pride (Zheng 2005).  
 
Alongside the primordialist approach, the other major line of Western analyses of 
Chinese nationalism “focuses instead on the relationship of Chinese nationalism to 
the state and to the various élites that stoke and direct this nationalism” (Nyiri et al. 
2010, 26-27). Nyiri et al. argue that both these approaches “focus on nationalism as a 
belief system, whether genuinely held or imposed and manipulated”, but neither has 
“paid sufficient attention to the framing of nationalism within popular culture”. As 
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such, both are ultimately insufficient to explain the spread of nationalism among a 
cohort of young people known in China as the ‘post-1980 generation’ (80-hou: 八零后) 
(Nyiri et al. 2010, 26).  
 
Regardless of which approach to understanding Chinese nationalism Chinese and 
non-Chinese scholars take, most agree that it remains a powerful force in China and is 
still used by the state as a means to legitimise Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, 
particularly after the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square (Zhao 2004).13 In a later work, 
Zhao Suisheng also argues that the state can and does exploit grass-roots nationalist 
sentiment, and when it does so, it is generally in a pragmatic way, tempered by 
diplomatic prudence (Zhao 2005). In a similar vein, Chen Zhimin posits that 
nationalism is a key driving force shaping Chinese foreign policy over the past 
century, and this is set to continue in a more positive form as China increasingly 
integrates itself into the globalised world (Chen 2006). However, the question arises 
as to whether the state will be able to continue to rein in nationalist sentiment or 
whether it will begin to “accelerate out of control” (Zhao 2005).  
 
Insofar as the CFAU students in my study were concerned, the term ‘nationalism’ had 
rather negative connotations of being inwardly-focused, angry, and irrational. It was 
conceived of as quite different from patriotism, which was considered to be more 
positive and outward-looking (more on this in Chapter Four). Despite this semantic 
distinction, my students shared a deep ‘logic of national thinking’ in which they 
believed that self-identifying as part of a national group in a day-to-day way was a 
perfectly sensible ontological position, and not just reserved for those loud and 
obvious individuals wearing their country’s flag around their shoulders generally 
characterised as ‘nationalists’ (Skey 2011, 5).  
 
This tendency is not unique to China. As work by Michael Skey suggests, the 
unthinking acceptance of ideas such as that the world is divided into clearly 
identifiable and mutually exclusive nation-states; that each person belongs to one of 
                                                
13 Neil Diamant however questions the very existence of the growth in Chinese nationalism that tends 
to be taken for granted by Western analysts. He focuses on the “deep horizontal comradeship” element 
of Anderson’s definition of nationalism, and argues that China has not seen a great increase in the 
phenomenon in recent years (2009). 
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those nation-states; and that an individual’s nationality has some influence on how 
they think and behave, is extremely commonplace (2011, 5). However, some analysts 
describe attachment to the state in China as akin to ‘statism’ (guojia zhuyi: 国家主义) – 
that is, the worship of the state, as distinct from nationalism (minzu zhuyi: 民族主义). 
For example, Xu Jilin argues that since the turn of this century, there has been a 
strong trend of ‘statism’ in China’s intellectual world, privileging the state as central; 
and positing that enhancing state prosperity and capacity is the core objective of 
modernity (2011). The state is seen to represent the fundamental interests of the 
people and hold the highest sovereignty – it is supreme, indivisible and non-
transferable (Kelly 2011).  
 
The idea of the nation-state as an object of religious-style devotion has also been 
explored by Michael Herzfeld, who discusses the phenomenon of ‘nation-statism’, 
noting that “nationalism certainly exhibits an enormous capacity to worship itself in 
the form of a code: language, manners, dress, art, morals” (1992, 34). Herzfeld 
applies Durkheim’s famous argument about religion as society worshipping itself 
(1915) to the nation, and suggests that this thesis may indeed work even better for 
nationalism than it does for religion. Herzfeld goes on to argue that a Durkheimian 
view of nation-statism allows the rationality of “bureaucratic identity management” to 
be treated “as a refraction of the sacralised national order” (1992, 35). In this way, 
once national identity is created, it becomes “both a moral fact and a collective 
representation in the clearest Durkheimian sense” (ibid., 35).  
 
How and Why a National Logic? 
 
In addition to allowing a move away from discussions about whether the state does or 
does not exist outside of society, the anthropology of the state also offers insights into 
why it is that the concept of the nation-state, rather than any other, so powerfully 
captivates political and moral imaginations (Skey 2011; Spencer 2007) – as it has 
done among the CFAU students at the centre of my research. Why has being 
‘Chinese’ above all else become ‘common sense’? This thesis will examine why 
national logic remained in the realm of the undisputed for my students at CFAU, 
despite opportunities for them to imagine the world and their role in it in other ways. I 
51 
 
 
ask how we can theorise the continuity and ongoing production of national identity 
among the students at CFAU and how we can understand why a national form of 
identification, one allegiance among many that the students can draw on, is invoked 
in certain circumstances, and for what purposes.  
 
In order to ask why my students aligned themselves with official discourses of being 
Chinese requires some understanding of why the logic of the national in general holds 
such appeal. One of the ways in which the anthropology of the state can serve as a 
useful analytical tool is by providing a means to understand this kind of attachment 
through a focus on the ways in which the nation and the state-as-idea are both literally 
and discursively flagged on a daily basis (Billig 1995, 93). Michael Billig proposes 
the notion of ‘banal nationalism’ as a means to understand how certain dimensions of 
national discourse are employed to create a very real social imaginary. In Billig’s 
conceptualisation, ‘nationalism’ is brought back from the extremes and peripheries, 
and away from special occasions, to be understood as something in which we all 
participate. For example, the media, corporate interests and civil society organisations 
routinely address audiences in a national way, like dividing the news into ‘national’ 
and ‘world’, or campaigns to ‘buy Australian made’ (e.g. Higgins 2004; Madianou 
2005; and Yumul and Özkirimli 2000). 
 
Skey argues that the overarching answer to the question of ‘why nationalism’ is 
actually quite simple: because it matters, and it does so in two key ways (2011, 35). 
Firstly, practical benefits arise from being classified as a national citizen in an 
established, democratic nation-state which would entitle the individual to certain 
political and welfare rights, as well as familiarity with a whole range of social and 
institutional arrangements that orient the individual and allow him or her to engage in 
the activities of daily life with relative ease. These benefits would include the 
education system, health system, media, ways of doing business, and legal 
frameworks. By identifying and being identified with a particular nationality, an 
individual can far more easily undertake the countless activities that constitute 
everyday life with relative ease (Skey 2011, 6).  
 
In addition to the material benefits provided by identifying with the national, an 
individual also gains psychological benefits, as research over the past two decades 
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suggests (see for example Carey 1989; Giddens 1990; Kertzer 1988; and Misztal 
1996). Everyday language, habits and social organisation, often framed in national 
terms, can underpin an ongoing and relatively settled sense of place and identity 
(Skey 2011, 6). Understandings of how established discursive frameworks of the 
national provide individuals with a sense of security, and therefore further explain the 
ongoing significance of national identification, can usefully draw on the work of 
Anthony Giddens’ concept of ‘ontological security’ (1990, 92). This concept “refers 
to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity 
and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action” 
(ibid., 92). That is to say, the repetition of everyday practices – in this case, 
particularly those pertaining to and reliant on the idea of the nation as an organising 
principle – generate a sense of familiarity and comfort. Individuals are able to feel 
that they can rely on things that they understand today being similarly 
comprehensible tomorrow, and thereby being negotiable in the same familiar ways. 
As Giddens notes, the “predictable routines and encounters” of “ordinary day-to-day 
social life” underpin a sense of ontological security (ibid., 64). Skey posits five key 
elements as underpinning a sense of ontological security arising from identifying with 
the national, namely, spatiality, temporality; culture; power/politics; and 
ourselves/outsiders (2011, 11, 24).14  
 
The first element, the notion of space, is important to building a sense of group 
identity both materially and psychologically. The concept of territory in particular has 
long been acknowledged as a means of providing both a physical base for sustaining 
social life and managing the physical environment through the repetition of particular 
material features, as well as a secure and familiar psychological space (Hopkins and 
Dixon 2006). While territorial boundaries are, of course, historical constructs, the 
implications and consequences of their construction are very real indeed, particularly 
in the realm of power and politics by virtue of their ability to define zones of 
inclusion and exclusion. As I observed in a great number of cases, my students 
reacted with great emotion and passion to perceived threats to or questions about 
China’s ‘territorial integrity’; the concepts of space and territoriality are critical to 
understanding the nationalistic tenor of their perceptions and worldviews.  
                                                
14 Skey refers to the fifth element as self/other, but as my Chinese students so often used the 
terminology of “ourselves” and “outsiders” I will follow their usage. 
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Daily practices around time also enhance a sense of psychological security. As 
Eviatar Zerubavel observes, “the temporal structure of our environment … adds a 
strong touch of predictability to the world around us, thus enhancing our cognitive 
well-being” (1981, 12). Psychological research suggests that a “perceived collective 
continuity” (Sani et al. 2007) is highly associated with a sense of social well-being, 
pride, and, often, a feeling of ‘symbolic immortality’ – that is, a feeling of 
transcendence in relation to death through belonging to a group with a long and 
continuous history (Anderson 1991, 10-12; Sani et al. 2009).  
 
The third element of national discourse Skey identifies as creating a sense of 
ontological security is culture and cultural systems, through the way in which they 
generate a sense of meaningful order and stability (2011, 25). As David Kertzer 
argues,  
 
The world out there confronts each individual with an infinite number of 
stimuli, yet no one can deal with all of them. [A degree] of order is … 
provided by the symbol system we learn as members of our culture … Such 
… systems provide us with a shield against terror. (1988, 4) 
 
Shared cultural systems underpin a perception that the nation to which an individual 
understands her- or himself as belonging is a concrete and unified entity, what social 
psychologists such as Condor term ‘entitativity’ (Condor 2006). This term refers to 
the way in which a range of psychological benefits derives from perceiving one’s 
group as a coherent entity. These include self-esteem (Luhtanen and Crocker 1992), 
reduction in uncertainty (Mullin and Hogg 1999), increased confidence in the group’s 
ability to successfully face new challenges (Sacchi et al. 2008) and a willingness to 
stigmatise those outside of the group (Yzerbyt 2004).  
 
The way in which our selves and outsiders are conceptualised is another dimension of 
the ontological security that national discourse provides. These ‘common sense’ 
understandings of who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ must be recognised as being 
constructed understandings which not only marginalise some, but also serve the 
interests of others, whose perceptions of these concepts have so far been under-
researched. In terms of the nation-state, closer study of those in power and their 
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interests in constructing certain understandings of self and outsider allows a clearer 
view of how elite groups go about justifying their dominant status in an environment 
in which increasing pressures challenge their legitimacy (Kaufmann 2004). These 
conceptualisations of inclusion and exclusion lead into the critical role which 
institutions of power play in organising, managing and promoting the acceptance of 
national frameworks. Institutions are critical for establishing limits, setting normative 
frameworks, and generating hierarchies of knowledge and status that create and 
exclude alternatives.  
 
In examining how and why CFAU students adhered so strongly to a national logic to 
understand the world, it is also useful to reflect on the issue of individual agency. The 
CFAU students in my study were neither disempowered subjects of control and 
manipulation nor rationally calculating agents freely selecting a particular position 
based on an objective analysis of the potential costs and benefits to ontological 
security and material wellbeing. The notion that particular frameworks of 
understanding are “enacted with regularity” points to the role for “individuals in 
perpetuating or challenging already existing discourses, and shaping those of the 
future” (MacDonald 2003, 23). The role for individual agency reflects the important 
point that, borrowing from Kipnis, the ‘governing complex’ does not represent a 
social whole in any functional sense of the term. Instead it can be conceived of as “a 
plethora of potentially interacting and overlapping social practices and imaginaries” 
which demonstrates considerable congruencies (2011, 90-91). The CFAU functioned 
as a governing complex in which students’ daily lives were saturated with mutually 
reinforcing practices and ideas. At the same time, spaces existed in which students 
could negotiate their epistemological and ontological positions.  
 
However, for the most part, my students closely aligned themselves with official, 
state-sanctioned narratives. There are a number of possibilities for explaining this 
observation, including that they were simply lying to me as the outsider, foreign 
teacher. However I argue that a critical element of my students’ training as diplomats 
at CFAU was the internalisation of the belief that their own best interests were 
aligned with promoting the best interests of the Chinese state. For my students, 
believing was both a personal and professional imperative. They had strong 
incentives to conform with official versions of truth, and, as a result of the conflation 
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of their interests with the state’s, were participating in producing their own 
conformity. For my students, not believing would not provide any benefits.  
 
What students said in class, to me, their foreign teacher and in front of their 
classmates, was not simply a matter of professing whatever opinions they thought 
would make their peers respect them, or help them get good grades. Following Alexei 
Yurchak’s position that articulated views are more than a case of ‘private truths and 
public lies’ (2006), I argue that my students adopted an approach of ‘self-directed 
self-control’ as the most effective means for achieving success within the system in 
which they operated. While students occasionally debated issues situated within the 
realm of opinion, they never disputed the doxa that working within the system was 
the most effective means for enhancing the country and themselves. Students chose to 
align themselves with the prevailing discourses of the state for their own good.  
 
Skey notes that while the notion of flexibility and choice in regard to social categories 
is important, theories that emphasise this aspect, and the ability of individuals to shift 
between different identities according to context and need, deserve scrutiny (2011, 
21). In their privileging of “the psyche of the categorising individual”, these theories 
tend to underplay how much “established social relations and structures constrain 
processes of imagination and identification” (Billig 1995, 68). Billig observes that in 
this way, “identity is understood as an inner response to a motivational need”, a 
calculated and rational response to external factors, rather than as an ongoing and 
complicated process of interaction and negotiation (ibid., 68). 
 
When considering how CFAU students continuously produced social formations, two 
issues need to be taken into consideration: the availability of certain resources, and 
the degree of reflection they undertook as they carried out their lives (Skey 2011, 14). 
Regarding the first aspect, the extent to which an individual student could, in fact, 
produce a ‘social life’ relied on a set of resources that are not only socially constituted 
for the most part, but also often defined and limited by existing social relations. “Our 
languages, cultures, traditions, social roles, and so on are given to us: we are natives 
in this land, not creators of it” (Rothenbuhler 1998, 58). As Billig notes, the 
reproduction and representation of the nation requires a vast and complex set of 
beliefs, habits, assumptions and practices (1995, 6). In this reproduction, space and 
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gaps for disruption and change can be found, but the comfortable normality that 
national logic enjoys in our worldview – indeed as our worldview – in combination 
with the array of minutiae in our daily lives that recreate the national norm, and the 
lack of a linguistic conception to express it in all its banality, makes it very difficult to 
think of an alternative.  
 
This leads to the second point. Following Bourdieu’s idea of ‘the field of doxa’, that 
is, “that which is taken for granted … [or] beyond question” (Bourdieu 1977, 166), it 
is important to note the extent to which many aspects of my students’ social lives 
were lived according to habit, routine, or based on precedent, with little or no 
reflection or critique. While a “universe of discourse (or argument)” exists in which 
people explicitly question and form opinions, outside of that is the “universe of the 
undiscussed (undisputed)” (Bourdieu 1977, 168-169). Because the field of doxa 
consists of “that which is beyond question and which each agent tacitly accords by 
the mere fact of acting in accord with social convention” (ibid., 169), alternative ways 
of understanding or behaving in the world are not so much actively considered and 
adopted or rejected, but simply carried out. Bourdieu’s doxa resonates with 
Foucault’s ‘regimes of truth’, in which societies create historically specific discourses 
of ideas, writings, theoretical foundations and language according to their beliefs, 
values and mores, which come to function as if true (Foucault 1980, 133). These 
“taken-for-granted mental assumptions or modes of procedure that actors normally 
apply without being aware that they are applying them” (Sewell 1992, 22) should not 
be underestimated, as they function as a particularly powerful means of orientating 
people in the world (Skey 2011, 14). The natural, inarticulable, ‘unwaved flag’ of  
‘banal nationalism’ Billig (1995) speaks of is part of the undisputed universe of doxa. 
Until, that is, some form of crisis necessitates the questioning of what had been taken 
for granted, and awakens political consciousness (Bourdieu 1977 169-170). This 
naturalisation of what is and can be known and disputed has implications for the 
maintenance of existing power relations. As Bourdieu notes, the ‘dominant classes’ 
have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa by maintaining the boundary 
between the universe of opinion and the universe of the undisputed so that the 
arbitrariness of that which is taken for granted is not exposed (1977, 169). Arising 
from doxa comes the ‘practical sense’ of what behaviour is appropriate in certain 
circumstances, or habitus, as was discussed in the Introduction.  
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In this way, as these two points suggest, by using analyses of the significance of 
national forms of identification, we can move beyond the idea of CFAU students as 
self-evaluating individuals rationally selecting one particular framework for self 
identity over another. We can also avoid the assumptions of power and resistance that 
have underpinned much of anthropology in recent decades (see for example Ortner, 
1995). 
 
Normalisation Through Sedimentation 
 
One way of understanding the process by which the national logic comes to be seen 
as objective or natural rather than just one possible way of making sense of the world 
is through the concept of sedimentation.15 Originally introduced by Husserl, the 
notion has been more recently utilised in efforts to conceptualise ongoing struggles to 
fix meaning (see for example Laclau 1990b, and Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The term 
does not imply that a particular meaning has become fixed or beyond contestation, 
nor that it cannot be overturned. Rather, the concept draws attention to the way in 
which certain meanings come to be partially fixed to the extent that “the system of 
possible alternatives tends to vanish and the traces of the original contingency to 
fade” (Laclau 1990a, 34). Seeing how some forms of knowledge and practice become 
‘sedimented’ rather than others requires an understanding of both micro and macro 
processes and structures, so as to acknowledge both how particular frameworks are 
rendered normal through daily routines as well as the impact of wider structural 
changes and their potential to undermine and challenge as well as reiterate and 
reinforce established social orders (Skey 2011, 9).  
 
The micro-level realm of daily life is where my students experienced and made sense 
of the world and the other people they encountered (Berger and Luckman 1991, 33; 
Tomlinson 1999, 9). In regard to the repetition of rhythms and routines through which 
their lives became structured and manageable (Young 1997), Skey builds on Umut 
Özkirimli’s work (2005, 175-90), to posit that several key elements have been 
identified as particularly relevant in the process of producing a relatively consistent 
                                                
15 While anthropology has been particularly influenced by insights from Bourdieu and Foucault, IR 
theory and political science have utilised other formulations such as those discussed here from Skey 
and Özkirimli. Ultimately these authors offer similar insights using different terms. 
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and therefore taken-for-granted realm (2011, 11). Firstly, the shared knowledge and 
assumptions expressed through language and social practice provide individuals with 
“the reference schema necessary for [the]…organisation of the surrounding world 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973). At the root of daily interactions is a particular 
linguistic framework and a sophisticated set of conventions and understandings that 
guide their use and interpretation (Berger and Luckmann 1991, 33; Tomlinson 1999, 
51). Following this idea, Garfinkel has analysed the ways in which assumptions of 
what is important to express and what can be left unsaid creates a “real society for 
members” (2004, 53). Participation in rituals and practices also works to create social 
meaning and cohesion (Narvaez 2006, 57). At CFAU, these shared communication 
resources and interactional-level social practices and rituals served to “unite 
participants in a way that promotes order and predictability” (Gergen 2001, 18), 
which in turn created a consistent sense of reality.  
 
Secondly, students’ social practices were located within particular spatial limits, the 
features of which came to form a familiar backdrop against which they could orient 
themselves in relation to other people, and to the norms and values of that particular 
space and time (Skey 2011, 16). Similarly, the temporal settings and regularities 
within which students lived served to create a sense of shared experience and 
community. Not unlike Bourdieu’s or de Certeau’s formulations on practice, 
Zerubavel argues that “sequential structures, fixed durations, standard temporal 
locations and universal forms of recurrence” are the key elements which “contribute 
to establishing and maintaining the normal, temporal world” (1981, xii-xiii). His work 
on “temporal regularity”, which he understands as being “the structuring of social life 
by forcing activities in fairly rigid social patterns,” (ibid., xii-xiii) is a useful tool for 
understanding how certain forms of knowledge and everyday practice are normalised. 
Both temporal and spatial aspects of my students’ everyday life at the CFAU were 
highly controlled and regulated, creating and reiterating a strong sense of shared 
identity and common purpose, as I explore in more detail in Chapter Three.  
 
The fourth element Skey identifies as being salient in the process of producing a 
relatively consistent realm of reality is institutional settings. Henri Lefebvre drew 
early attention to the wider processes through which many aspects of daily life are 
regulated and managed by powerful institutions (1991). Following on from Foucault’s 
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conceptualisation of discipline-as-power, institutions such as hospitals, schools, the 
military, factories and prisons can all be seen as part of a vast network of disciplining 
institutions. Not that the preceding factors are outside of power processes, but the 
institutional aspect in particular brings to the fore that doxa, or the ‘common sense’ 
forms of knowledge described by Schutz and Luckmann (1973), does not simply 
happen to exist, but is the result of ongoing social, political and economic processes 
over time – what Achille Mbembe terms “the banality of power” (2006, 381). 
Bourdieu notes that the drawing of the line between the field of opinion and the field 
of that which is beyond question, doxa, is a fundamental objective at stake in the 
“struggle for the imposition of the dominant systems of classification” (1977, 169). 
As such, it is in the interests of the dominant classes to resist the exposure of “the 
arbitrariness of the taken for granted” and in “defending the integrity of doxa” (ibid., 
169).  Considerable research has suggested the importance of the role of institutions 
in establishing limits, setting normative frameworks, and generating hierarchies of 
knowledge and status, including Philomena Essed (1991), Edward Said (1994), and 
Michael Savage et al. (2005). At the CFAU, as a certain set of institutions, or 
dimensions of national discourse, across a range of domains – social, economic and 
political – were enacted with regularity (Alba 2005, 26), alternatives became 
excluded, or, indeed ‘unthinkable’, following Bourdieu’s notion of doxa. Being 
enacted with regularity as part of the process of sedimentation is important in the way 
it indicates that it was not just external structures that shaped or perpetuated students’ 
national worldview, but that there was a critical role for “individuals in perpetuating 
or challenging already existing discourses, and in shaping those of the future” 
(MacDonald 2003, 23).  
 
Schools and universities like the CFAU inculcate particular forms of knowledge 
about what it means to not only be educated, but also civilised, ‘proper’ members of 
(Chinese) society. In the process, approved and taboo ways of thinking and practices 
are produced, and can eventually, when experienced along with temporal, spatial and 
linguistic ideas and practices, come to be seen as quite natural, rather than a specific 
articulation of a unique set of circumstances. Rather than a simple process of 
‘becoming acclimatised’ to some a priori reality, institutions play a key role in 
normalising and perpetuating many aspects of everyday life (Skey 2011, 17). As Ann 
Swidler writes, “individuals … come to act in culturally informed ways, not because 
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their [values] … are shared, but because they must negotiate the same institutional 
hurdles” (1995, 36). 
 
These ways in which both micro-level practices and understandings of everyday life 
as well as macro-level structures and institutions both play critical and mutually 
reinforcing roles in normalising – sedimenting – particular forms of knowledge and 
practice applies also for the national logic. While other categorisations of identity, 
such as gender, class, age, hometown or socio-economic status, were still relevant, in 
many cases and in certain contexts, my students tended to define themselves in 
national terms. There has been considerable research into how different social groups 
routinely define themselves and others in this way. This ranges from what might be 
presumed could elicit a response in national terms, such as in answering questions 
about identity and belonging (see Condor 2000; Phillips and Smith 2000; and Wodak 
et al. 1999) to more quotidian activities one might not intuitively associate with the 
nation, for example, dancing (Askew 2002), driving (Edensor 2004), queuing (Fox 
2004), and even doing the washing up (Linde-Laursen 1993). 
 
Education for sedimentation 
 
China has a long history of using education as a technique of governing, in the 
Foucauldian sense (Bakken, 2000), which continues into the present day in the 
training of young people to become proper citizens of the Chinese state, through both 
the content of the curriculum and the organisation of the practices of students’ 
everyday lives (Hansen 2012). Børge Bakken describes Chinese education as a 
process of governing in which the main purpose appears to be to produce citizens 
who will unthinkingly follow the models of thought and behaviour put forward by the 
government (2000). The implication of the rote-learning approach in which imitation 
is the key to learning is that imitation becomes the conceptual heart of social order 
(ibid., 127) and consequently, education is as much about ruling as about teaching 
(ibid., 96).  
 
As Kipnis points out, Foucault’s concept of governing, the ‘conduct of conduct’, and 
particularly its focus on how the governing is carried out rather than on who is doing 
the governing, is applicable to an anthropological study of education in several ways. 
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Firstly, while acknowledging that national governments are significant actors, a 
Foucauldian approach rejects a top-down vision of power relations in which a small 
group of elites enacts its will on the rest of society. Governing is rather carried out by 
a range of representatives of the state, including “teacher and parents, by children vis-
à-vis one another, and by everyone vis-à-vis him or herself” (Kipnis 2011, 5). This 
pattern was certainly the case at the CFAU, as this thesis will discuss. Secondly, this 
emphasis on the how of governing allows reflection on specific disciplinary 
techniques, along with manipulations of the wider social environment. Thirdly, the 
production of a governable subject, what some anthropological theorists term 
‘subjectification’ (Foucault 1983, Rabinow 1984), and the types of subjects 
educational techniques are designed to create are usually quite explicitly articulated. 
For example, officials concerned with political education have demanded that 
‘ideological quality’ (sixiang suzhi: 思想素质) should be a key focus of the schooling 
system. This category includes items as diverse as loyalty to the CCP, love of 
country, respect for the law, the ability to resist bourgeois liberalisation, a Marxist 
worldview, and an atheistic worldview, among others (Kipnis 2011, 73). Lastly, while 
political ideology is integral to education, educational policy is at the mercy of a 
diverse range of political goals. Rarely does the state present a clear and united front, 
leading to gaps from which alternative subjectivities can emerge.16  
 
Despite all of the shocking political ruptures China has endured over the twentieth 
century, there are notable continuities in the development of education as a means of 
governing and building the nation. The steady and deliberate spread of basic primary 
school education to every corner of China has allowed the long-held tradition of rote-
learning and memorisation of what the teacher presents as useful knowledge (the 
word ‘to study’, xue: 学, means to imitate a model in a process of internalisation) to 
continue as the main pedagogical method as it has done for centuries (ibid., 22-23, 
91). The Qing dynasty connection between education and official positions also 
remains strong. From the beginning of CCP rule until the early 1990s, tertiary 
graduates were assigned urban government jobs, under the system of compulsory job 
                                                
16 Kipnis also argues that theorists of governmentality who consider applying Foucauldian concepts to 
non-Western contexts as inappropriate base their concerns on incorrect assumptions. Although he 
acknowledges differences between Western and Chinese traditions of writings on governing and 
statecraft, comparisons are not impossible, and Foucauldian analytical tools are indeed highly 
appropriate and illuminating (2011 6-7). 
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assignments.  Even when this system ended, a tertiary qualification was still essential 
for a career in the highly competitive urban public sector. In the case of the CFAU, 
these two factors are explicitly linked, the CFAU being the key source of graduates 
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the Party’s mode of governance has not 
remained unchanged over its recent history. As Pieke, among others, has pointed out, 
both the practice and ethos of administration, as a means of governance, has been 
radically overhauled and modernised in the past two decades, particularly after the 
Tiananmen movement of 1989 (Pieke 2009a, 25). However these reforms should not 
be mistaken for a ‘retreat of the state’, as Lisa Hoffman (2010, 11-13) explains. Pieke 
argues that reforms in public management, the rule of law, strengthening of the non-
state public sector, and social security and fairness by no means indicate a weakening 
of the Party’s commitment to governance (2012, 2009a). Rather, “they have been 
firmly co-opted into a statist corporatist strategy to strengthen and professionalise the 
rule of the Party in line with the requirements of a rapidly developing capitalist 
economy and society” (Pieke 2012, 160). 
 
Governance via almost universal education based on a centrally-approved curriculum 
across China means that rigorous control of CFAU students’ daily lives through 
which national culture becomes sedimented begins at a very young age, and continues 
intensively for years. Children all over the country have their daily habits 
‘standardised’ (guifanhua: 规范化) and learn a homogenised way to solve problems, 
and understand literature, art, social science, science and morality. Teachers must not 
only teach the same lessons from the same curriculum in pursuit of high scores on 
exams, but they are also pressured to use exactly the same ‘correct’ methods for 
teaching this pre-set package of knowledge (Kipnis 2011, 110). Students’ value not 
just as students but also as good and moral people is assessed through nationally 
standardised exams, further increasing the uniformity in what is understood as true 
and good across the country. As Kipnis notes,  
 
The civilising mission in Chinese schools today is a matter of the installation 
of a national culture that includes speaking standardised Mandarin, writing 
proper Chinese characters, and practicing good study habits, proper hygiene, 
proper posture at the desk, and proper forms of politeness in student-teacher 
and student-student interaction”. (ibid., 28) 
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The Chinese government purposefully and increasingly utilises the school curriculum 
as a tool to build a national citizen who believes in unity, patriotism and the Chinese 
nation-state above all else (ibid., 93).  
 
While national identity formation is already universal at a certain level in China, the 
training of those who are expected to play a role in the ruling elite is naturally even 
more intensive. As Pieke observes, the training of Party cadres at specially designated 
cadre schools is a “rapidly moving and actively debated policy area that puts some of 
the fundamental issues and choices that confront the Party in especially sharp relief”. 
Therefore, a study of cadre training “yields a direct insight into how the CCP views 
and acts upon itself” (2009a, 27). And, not unlike conditions at the CFAU, the goal of 
producing the proper cadre at Party schools is achieved not only by the content of 
what is taught, but also “by engineering a transformative experience of seclusion, 
study, reflection, and residence at the school”, in many ways, akin to “undergoing a 
rite of passage” (ibid., 36). 
 
This governance-focused pedagogical approach does not automatically lead to the 
production of unquestioning pro-Party subjects. A number of studies show that 
secondary and tertiary students do not simply accept the view that they should love 
the Party in all its glory and beneficence (Nie 2008; Rosen 1989, 1994). Nevertheless, 
as Kipnis notes and as my own research at CFAU attests, despite the spaces for 
difference that exist, the content and style of teaching across China does have nation-
producing effects (2011, 111). What my students knew of history, science, 
technology, politics, and even what constitutes a good and satisfying life tended to be 
quite uniform. While narratives of Party members as model patriots might be 
questioned, the larger discourse of patriotism was certainly embraced as an ideal.  
 
The Anthropology of the State: What can it add to dominant debates 
about China in international relations? 
 
Recent academic work both within anthropology and across the social sciences has 
developed understandings of how the nation is experienced, embodied and imagined 
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through daily activities, but so far a coherent analytical framework for making sense 
of these processes remains elusive. There have been a growing number of studies 
acknowledging national belonging and identity throughout the late 1990s and early 
2000s. However, much of this literature has tended to focus on those who are 
marginalised or whose relationship with the dominant paradigm of national 
identification is tense and troubled. This focus on the marginalised extends to 
analyses of China. As Pieke observes, “anthropologists have long been inclined to 
view China from the perspective of a state-society dichotomy” (2004, 517). This 
results in an assumption that the state, being outside and above society, exists as a 
separate entity against which ‘the Chinese people’ must attempt to assert their rights 
and resist oppression. The focus on the negative aspects of national belonging derives 
from a vision of the moral order most clearly set out in the new theories of Natural 
Law as they emerged in the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment of the 
eighteenth century, in which the state is understood as the object of humanity’s 
distrust and sometime resistance (Taylor, 2004, 3). However, this understanding of 
state as power set against its people does not account for the complex and multi-
directional interactions and negotiations between people and power in China and 
elsewhere.  
 
Political anthropology is a useful framework for complicating the tendency to 
dichotomise state and society, with its central concerns of the changes and 
continuities in processes of power. It questions rather than accepts what ‘a state’ is, 
how or to what extent the state is external to ‘the people’, and when and where ideas 
of nations, states, and individuals as political subjects and citizens are utilised, by 
whom, and for what ends. As Spencer notes, the power/subject dichotomy is not only 
unconvincing in the way it presumes that we all know what ‘the state’ ‘is’, but also 
vastly oversimplifies the complicated way in which people may find their own 
interests best met by having a stake in the state (2007, 102). While not focusing on 
China, Emma Tarlo’s work in a slum colony in Delhi on memories of the 1970 
Emergency also moves away from the familiar script of biopower and resistance, and 
examines instead the collisions among official plans, local politics, and the tendency 
of the people concerned to act in thoroughly unpredictable ways in response to what 
had been planned for them (Tarlo 2000, 2001, 2003). An excellent example of an 
analysis of the multi-directional interactions between people and power in a China-
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specific context is Evasdottir’s ethnography of the world of Chinese archaeology 
studies, Obedient Autonomy (2004). Utilising a similar argument, Hamilton and 
Zheng argue that the state in China is not ‘an organisation’ that can be understood as 
existing outside of and separate to the individual. Control is not a top-down system 
that manipulates each individual’s actions. Rather, “the means of control is located in 
the institutionalised networks of relationships” (1992, 29). My students at CFAU 
were both within the state and outside of it. At the same time as they were learning a 
state-approved curriculum within a state institution, the ways in which they enacted 
and performed their everyday lives perpetuated and extended the state – to some 
extent, the students themselves are the state.  
 
We can see how it is that a particular discourse, in this case that of the nation, comes 
to be seen as a normal and natural understanding of identity, through a process of 
sedimentation of both macro and micro-level factors, the interplay of which renders 
certain (national) forms of knowledge and practice so deeply embedded into people’s 
everyday lives that they no longer question it. However, while the notion of 
sedimentation provides insights into how certain meanings become naturalised, it 
does not sufficiently account for how any given discourse becomes established over 
any other. In addition to offering an account of how any set of ideas can become 
normalised, the anthropology of the state provides a useful framework for 
understanding how the logic of the national in particular held a place so close to my 
CFAU students’ hearts. The way in which different models of the state were invoked, 
how they were used, and under what circumstances the students brought forth an 
image of the state as an identity marker, or the focus of particular desires, can perhaps 
be better understood through an “ethnographic mapping of the rhetorics” of state-
making, during which language is pressed into the service of the state-as-unitary-
presence (Spencer 2007, 102, drawing on Battaglia’s research on the self [1995]). 
These rhetorical devices can be used across a number of dimensions to create and 
perpetuate a national logic. Özkirimli argues that where and when the dimensions of 
national discourse form part of a mutually reinforcing and stable framework, the 
likelihood that the nation will be viewed as if it was an actually existing entity greatly 
increases (2005, 177-190).  
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Conclusion: We Chinese Students… a social imaginary built on the 
logic of the national  
 
The school is a convenient and well-tested institution that provides authorities 
(educational, political and religious) with a means to create socially appropriate units 
out of people. Foucault’s understanding of schools as arenas for discipline in the 
training of human beings underpins my research focus on CFAU as a site at which 
young Chinese individuals are socialised into a particular nationalist social imaginary. 
The CFAU achieved this subjectification not only through the academic curriculum 
provided, but also by the very way in which it taught students how to live. All 
universities teach the academic knowledge and the organisational and life skills 
thought to be required to make them more professional and competitive in the job 
market (e.g. Hoffman 2010). However universities like CFAU do not only prepare 
Chinese young people for the job market. By virtue of reflecting and embodying the 
institutional norms and constructs of the state, preparing students for an employment 
market also serves the function of simultaneously preparing students for successful 
life as a well-functioning citizen of the Chinese state. In Chinese universities, and the 
CFAU in particular, students are selected on the basis of their already-demonstrated 
ability to abide by social rules – otherwise they would not have been able to pass the 
series of stressful examinations that allow them to enrol.  CFAU students are then 
further immersed in the kinds of behaviours and epistemologies that will allow them 
to responsibly and appropriately work for the Chinese foreign affairs system 
domestically, and represent China internationally. The CFAU does so not only 
through the explicit training it provides but also in the way it structures students’ use 
of time and space. 
 
When circumstances in Europe after the medieval religious wars meant that the old 
“warrior caste” needed to be replaced with “a new service nobility” with a focus on 
being “pleasing and persuasive”, training was required for the elites to fulfil their new 
role (Taylor 2004, 34). A new globalised Chinese citizen was similarly required when 
Deng began the ‘reform and opening up’ (gaige kaifang: 改革开放) period in the late 
1970s. This became even more of a necessity after the instigation of the ‘going out 
strategy’ (zouchuqu zhanlue: 走出去战略) in the mid-1990s. In China’s new position in 
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the international spotlight, the country is regularly called on to play more of a role as 
a ‘responsible stakeholder’. To fulfil these international demands, as well as respond 
to domestic political imperatives, the Chinese state requires government officials who 
are not only intellectually sophisticated but also absolutely loyal to the Chinese 
nation-state. In this case, while not wishing to overemphasise the imperatives of 
structural demands, it would seem that changing material conditions both 
internationally and domestically have given rise to the necessity to create a group of 
officials with a firmly nationalist social imaginary: a “pacified elite” (ibid., 2004, 39). 
As part of the ‘patriotic education campaign’ relentlessly promoted after the 
Tiananmen incident in 1989, my CFAU students also learned the appropriate ways of 
understanding narratives of time and Chinese history, suitable constructions of self 
and other, and the correct relationships between individuals and power. In my 
students’ ‘realm of the undisputed’, placing primary loyalty with the Chinese nation-
state was in their own best interests, so they did it without further thought.  
 
An anthropology of the state approach provides the analytical tools to investigate why 
the logic of the national so effectively captured the imagination of the CFAU students 
in my study. It posits two key possibilities for explaining this phenomenon: 
psychological benefits, that is, the ontological security that comes from identifying as 
part of a national group; and material benefits, such as being able to access healthcare 
and education. However, rational calculations of self-interest cannot fully explain the 
attachment my students at CFAU had to the state (as idea). Power, of course, also had 
a role to play. But the anthropology of the state allows us to move away from the 
classical, Hobbesian notion of the Leviathan, as well as the more recent conception in 
which state-society relations are seen as power and resistance, as based on Western 
Enlightenment ideas of the social contract.  
 
As discussed earlier, studying up through using the analytical tools provided by 
political anthropology offers insights into questions of power, change and resistance.  
For the most part, current studies of Chinese foreign policy tend to be based on 
assumptions from a Realist approach to International Relations, which denies that 
people or ideas have any role in decision-making. Political anthropology in general, 
and the anthropology of the state approach more particularly, allows an analysis of 
what ideas of the nation, the relationships between the state and the people, the 
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institutions of power, and the conceptions of time and space, were held by my CFAU 
students, many of whom are likely to one day be have influential roles in Chinese 
politics. By understanding more about the recurring themes that permeated the 
discourses of the national that underpinned and were so commonly expressed in the 
narratives employed by the students in my study, the conventional wisdom 
surrounding Chinese foreign policy can be examined and reinvigorated.  
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Chapter Three – 
Symbolic Immortality: One Long History of the Chinese Nation 
 
China has a very long history, long enough for our people to form some really deep 
popular opinions. The opinions become habits, buried deep into our heart, our soul. 
      - Chad, International Economics Major 
 
Rather than simply accepting the conventionally held wisdom that we can better 
understand China’s present behaviour in the international system by examining 
China’s history, this chapter argues that history in China is actively used as a tool for 
producing loyalty to the Chinese national vision, and that my students at CFAU 
understand history in this manner. As Anderson contends, although nation-states 
themselves are widely conceded to be new, the “nations to which they give political 
expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide 
into a limitless future” (2006 [1983], 11-12). While teaching at CFAU, I noted that 
my students shared a common vision of the relationship between the past, present and 
future, in which there were four particularly resonant aspects that combined to 
produce a narrative in which the Chinese nation arose from an immemorial past and 
would move smoothly into a limitless future.  
 
First, my students conceived of China’s history as a single, linear trajectory, reaching 
back thousands of years and stretching forward into the future, a continuous and 
unbroken line of unified Chinese culture and civilisation that was the longest in the 
world. This perception of historical depth led to the second point: students saw this 
history as directly underpinning their own, and indeed all Chinese people’s, ideas, 
morals, beliefs and behaviour. As such, students saw Chinese traditions in general, 
but Confucianism in particular, as the fundamental elements on which the present 
social and political order has been built.  
 
Thirdly, students understood this continuing line of history to have been radically 
disrupted due to incursions by Western imperial powers in the mid-1800s. However, 
students felt strongly that the thread of Chinese culture had not been ‘broken’ as it 
had been elsewhere, for example in Africa. In this way, students understood Chinese 
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history and culture to be ‘continuous’ in a way that others were not. This perception 
of continuity led to the fourth point: that the past provided the blueprint for how the 
future would unfold. Following the naturally linear trajectory of time from the past 
into the future, my students felt confident that China would recover its lost dignity 
and fulfill its eternal destiny as the peaceful and harmonious great state that it was 
always meant to be. They believed that the Chinese Communist Party’s victory and 
establishment of the ‘New China’ in 1949 had set China back on its correct path, and 
China was now being restored to its former glory, rightful position, and status in the 
world. In the era of peace and stability that the CCP has ushered in domestically and 
which it is working hard to achieve regionally and globally, students felt that China 
could now re-claim its rightful role as a central and important global actor (for more 
on these discourses see Callahan 2012; Duara 1995; Fong 2004; Gries 2004; Zhao 
2004, and Wang 2012). 
 
History and the Nation: using the past to serve the present, using the 
present to shape the past 
 
Overall, my students at CFAU embodied a blend of the traditional and the 
contemporary. My students came from a diverse set of backgrounds and had a wide 
range of life goals. However, all of them owned a mobile phone, and most also had a 
top-of-the-line laptop computer – female students would decorate these with sparkly 
stickers and dangly ornaments. At the same time that they adopted these trappings of 
modern youth, the majority of my students tended to understand themselves and their 
worldviews in terms of traditional Chinese values, particularly Confucianism. Many 
of the students mentioned the critical importance of traditional Chinese notions such 
as ‘face’ or respecting the elderly in contemporary Chinese culture, and in their own 
lives.17 Coming into class, students would set out on their desks glass jars with hot 
water and various dried flowers and leaves, just as the elderly people playing mah-
jong in the parks would do. Students did not like to drink cold water as a rule, 
especially during winter, as according to traditional Chinese understandings, this 
could make you very ill. Buddy, the lead singer and guitarist in a rock band, was also 
                                                
17 This latter point was usually raised to illustrate a contrast they perceived with Western societies, in 
which aging parents and grandparents were allegedly put in homes and ignored as the younger 
generation focused on their own lives 
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a firm believer in the power of traditional Chinese medicine and dreamed of helping 
his mother, an acupuncturist, travel the world treating elite athletes and cancer 
patients. Even students like Primo, who had previously chosen a different English 
name and then rejected it for something “more modern”, explained that traditional 
Confucian values were at the heart of the moral and ethical codes of what it meant to 
be a contemporary Chinese individual. Just as students explained their own attitudes 
as the product of traditional Chinese values, so did they also describe China’s 
behaviour in the international system as based on ancient Chinese ideas. Their 
perspectives closely reflected China’s own official position, as does the majority of 
Western literature on the topic.  
 
Much Western literature on the subject argues that “one can better understand China’s 
external relations, even today, by turning back the pages of history to ancient times” 
(Kornberg and Faust 2005, 7. See also Dittmer et al. 1993; Fairbank 1968; Guo 2008 
Liu 2004; Mancall 1983; and Scott 2007). For example, John K. Fairbank, in his 
classic work on the Chinese vision of world order, states that “modern China’s 
difficulty of adjustment to the international order of nation-states in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries has come partly from the great tradition of the Chinese world 
order”. Similarly, David Scott argues that “China’s past is very much at play in the 
present, concerning Chinese attitudes and world view on war and peace” (2007, 8). In 
addition to the many Western scholars who take this approach, several prominent 
Chinese scholars also draw causal links between the past and present. For example, in 
2011, Peking University professor Li Anshan wrote of how contemporary Chinese 
foreign policy is fundamentally underpinned by four ancient Confucian notions: 
benevolence (ren: 仁), forbearance (shu: 恕), trustfulness (xin: 信) and equality 
(pingdeng: 平等) (2011, 41-60). Li posits that the link between traditional Chinese 
culture and contemporary policy is critical, as “all foreign policy embodies historical 
tradition, social values as well as political ideology of the nation-state concerned – it 
therefore has a direct linkage with the culture of that country” (ibid., 41). Yan from 
Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua University is well-known for his work on how ancient 
Confucian ideals fundamentally underpin how China sees the world, and his 
argument that they should play even more of an explicit role in China’s overseas 
engagement (e.g. 2011). Overall, the conventional wisdom among many prominent 
Chinese and non-Chinese scholars and analysts is that it is only through knowing 
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China’s history that an observer can truly understand China’s present and predict its 
future behaviour intelligently. 
 
However, history is always political. As Billig notes, “the reproduction of nation-
states depends on a dialectic of collective remembering and forgetting” (1995, 10). 
Political scientist Patricia M. Thornton explains this politics well:  
 
States fashioned histories not merely to preserve those events that must not be 
forgotten but also to obliterate that which should not have occurred. The nexus 
of writing and authority… serves to conceal, to reveal, and above all, to 
reproduce the power of the state in a broad array of documents compiled and 
authorised by central authorities down to the contemporary period. (2007, 16)  
 
Certainly, Chinese Communist Party hagiography is a well-established form designed 
to ensure the past serves the present (see for example Unger 1993, Thornton 2007, 
Wang 2012). Indeed the phrase “using the past to serve the present,” is widely 
ascribed to a letter written by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1964 (guweijinyong, 
yangweizhongyong: 古为今用，洋为中用, ‘use the past to serve the present, use the 
foreign to serve China’).18 China’s efforts to ensure that history is a tool of the present 
are particularly noteworthy. Thornton argues that: 
 
The extraordinary investment of the Chinese state in the production of texts – 
historical, literary, and ritual – arguably is unparalleled in human history… 
The persistent power of the written word as a technique of rule is evident in 
the commitment of successive Chinese regimes to the careful compilation of 
canonical texts and standard histories (zheng shi), as well as the suppression of 
unofficial and alternative accounts. (2007, 15) 
 
Likewise, Wang Zheng argues that while China is not alone in this regard, “Chinese 
people’s historical consciousness and its complex of myth and trauma are the 
dominant ideas in Chinese public rhetoric” (2012, xiii). Because of this politicisation 
                                                
18 While Mao is now understood as the architect of this concept, the idea of ‘using the past to describe 
the present’ in China has a long tradition before Mao. For example, the royalist reformers in the late 
19th century had a very similar slogan. 
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of history, the analysis in this chapter follows Elena Barabantseva’s contention that 
China’s relationship with the world cannot be understood by simply accepting the 
declarations of Party hagiography and projecting Chinese history onto the present 
(2009, 130).  
 
As Duara argues, the tendency to (mis-) conceptualise history as “a transparent 
medium of understanding” has to a large extent precluded an analysis of China’s past 
as “a discourse enabling historical players to deploy its resources to occlude, repress, 
appropriate, and, sometimes, negotiate with other modes of depicting the past, and 
thus, the present and the future” (1995, 5). Duara states that in general, the Chinese 
state uses history in such a way as to “secure for the contested and contingent nation 
the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time” (ibid., 4). Since 
the Republican Revolution of 1911, a linear and teleological narrative of history has 
been hegemonic in China, in which any conflicting narratives are repressed and 
excluded. This approach to China’s past has secured the concept of the Chinese 
nation as a self-contained subject of history, transforming not only perceptions of the 
past, but also present meanings of the nation and the world (ibid., 5-6). Over the last 
two decades, the Chinese Party-state has embarked on a concerted effort to strengthen 
this understanding of Chinese and world history. It has done so by reiterating a 
seamless account of depoliticised predestination, wherein the present is simply a 
natural continuation of the past, and in which the future, also, will simply play out in 
its historical inevitability.   
 
In this account of national history, the Chinese Communist Party is the essential actor 
for the successful facilitation of the vision of a destiny unfolding. A key element 
apparent in current CCP history is that in order to build China’s greatness, the Party 
needs to be at the heart of the political life of the country, representing a unifying 
ideology (Brown 2011, 2). This theme is regularly deployed in Chinese state-owned 
media. For example, as The China Daily noted in an article on how China would best 
achieve human rights: “We must stick to the leadership of the CPC to ensure we go in 
the correct direction and follow the right road…. Ninety years of history indicate only 
the CPC can guarantee the true realisation of human rights in the country” (Wang 
2011). The trope is also evident in political speeches and official pronouncements. 
For example, in Jiang Zemin’s speech celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding 
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of the Communist Party, Jiang clearly enunciates the CCP’s ‘master narrative’ of the 
central role of the Party in overcoming humiliation and division to steer China into a 
successful future: 
 
The comparison of the two periods of 80 years has made the Chinese people 
and all the patriotic forces of the Chinese nation fully aware that it is precisely 
the leadership of the Communist Party of china that has enabled the country to 
materialise the great historical transformation from the most miserable 
circumstances to a situation that promises a bright future. Without the 
Communist Party, there would have been no New China. (Jiang, 1991) 
 
This naturalisation of the Communist Party’s role in history brings to mind the work 
of James Ferguson on the depoliticisation of development in Lesotho (1994). In his 
analysis, Ferguson describes the apparatus of planned development as an ‘anti-politics 
machine’. In a similar way, the ‘technicalisation’ of historical narratives in China 
depoliticises the Communist Party’s place in the Chinese state, and renders things as 
they are as things as they have always been, and will always continue to be.  
 
Rather than add to the existing research into how China’s past affects its perception of 
its role in the world and its present international behaviour, this chapter follows 
Barabantseva’s and Duara’s lines of argument. The analysis of students’ perceptions 
is based on the understanding that contemporary historical narratives appropriate 
dispersed histories according to present needs, and thus, as Duara posits, the present 
shapes the past (1995, 5).  
 
Historical Beliefs: One true (apolitical) history  
 
Despite their diverse backgrounds, my students had notably similar convictions that 
Chinese history as they had learnt it in school and through broader socialisation 
processes was the only true account of knowable facts and events. Indeed, the very 
idea that Chinese history could be in any way constructed or produced was simply 
laughable. When the idea of historical truth as a relative concept arose in one class 
(the Diplomacy major) in which a quiet student named Simon articulated his belief 
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that there may be no ultimate truth, to my surprise, the rest of the class began to 
giggle quietly. When Simon sought to expand on his remark by adding that there are 
only beliefs that are true for each person, the other students began to laugh out loud. 
Another student, Corinne, asked, “What’s the point of us all sitting around like this 
talking about whether there is or isn’t such a thing as a true history”? When a third 
student, the always highly-fashionably dressed Simone, sought to support her 
classmate Simon, and replied that it was important to understand what actually 
constituted ‘truth’ or ‘facts’, the rest of the class collapsed into helpless mirth. While 
most students could quite readily accept that historical accounts of past events in 
other countries, particularly Japan, could be constructed to support political projects, 
they seemed unable to transfer this awareness to their own history. The great majority 
of students were convinced that there was only one truth, which derived from the 
correct account of the facts. This conviction fitted neatly with the oft-cited 
government phrase that genuine knowledge could only be achieved by ‘seeking truth 
from facts’ (shi shi qiu shi: 实事求是).19 Among my students, virtually no one was 
prepared to consider the possibility that Chinese history could be a political construct, 
written in a way that promoted and perpetuated certain understandings of how the 
world was, is and should be.  
 
Their conviction that there was only one true version of history was clearly illustrated 
in classes in which we discussed Japan. Students’ version of the past as doxa within 
the realm of the undisputed was particularly evident when the issue of Sino-Japanese 
relations arose. In these classes, students almost without exception would raise the 
story of how successive Japanese governments rewrote history textbooks to 
promulgate a version of events during the First and Second World Wars and the Sino-
Japanese War different from that set forth in the Chinese narrative – and therefore 
incorrect. My students accepted as fact that the Japanese government supported the 
wholesale revision of history textbooks so that any mention of the Japanese atrocities 
                                                
19 The value of seeking truth from facts is well-established in Chinese ontology, first appearing in the 
Hanshu (Book of Han: 汉书) in AD111. Originally, the term described an attitude toward study and 
research. It became a key element of Maoism, first quoted by Mao during a speech at the Sixth 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1938, in reference to pragmatism. The concept 
was also later promoted by Deng as a central tenet of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, and is 
now used to support the current focus on ‘scientific development’ in which the state is able to 
‘engineer’ sustainable development through ‘tested’ and ‘proven’ methodologies of governance. The 
term was formally added to the CCP’s Constitution at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007.  
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committed against Chinese citizens during these conflicts was omitted. My students 
passionately decried what they saw as this ongoing crime against ‘the real truth’ 
which they believed was the foundation of continued tensions in the Sino-Japanese 
relationship. As Maisie in the International Economics class noted, “another reason 
that China doesn’t like Japan” is that the “Japanese government and people don’t 
admit to history, they change their history books, and this hurts Chinese people a lot. 
They deny it, they say the war is just”.  Students felt strongly that until the Japanese 
government changed the textbooks to reflect ‘the truth’, and apologised sincerely and 
in writing to the Chinese people, relations could never be improved.  
 
In one class in which the issue of Japanese textbooks arose, Harry, who had been 
listening quietly as his classmates criticised Japan’s disregard for historical truth, 
suddenly interjected, “maybe Chinese history books have also been changed by the 
government”. Harry had hardly managed to finish his sentence before the class 
erupted into chaos – some students jeered at Harry’s remark, some laughed, and some 
tried to shout questions at Harry to test his logic. Harry’s classmates were outraged, 
arguing that such a thing simply could not be possible. Echoing the majority of the 
students’ views, Rick wrote in his essay that, “all the Chinese hate Japanese, 
especially when it comes to the Nanking Massacre – in which nearly 340,000 Chinese 
were killed and 80,000 were raped”. Rick went on to note however, that while the 
Chinese people could,   
 
Of course force the Communist government to throw a nuclear bomb on 
Tokyo, but it would be useless. As two neighbouring countries, we both need 
each other for our long-term development in the future. And my evidence 
shows that in the past thirty years, instead of treating each other as enemies, 
the ice is gradually melting and the spring is coming. 
 
Rick concluded his essay on a positive note, saying, “No one will be our enemy 
forever because harmony is always the eternal state that the whole world needs. One 
less enemy also means one more friend”. Harry’s radical suggestion that perhaps 
China changed its textbooks, and Rick’s positive views about a ‘thaw’ with Japan 
were, however, the exception. Most students unquestioningly concurred with the 
perspective put forward by a student from the Diplomacy major, who when 
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discussing why so many Chinese people seemed to hate Japan, said simply that “they 
cannot blame us for not stopping blaming them”.  
 
None of the students in the classes in which the question of historical authenticity was 
raised were aware that in 1995, at the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, 
then Prime Minister of Japan Tomiichi Murayama did indeed make an official verbal 
and written statement proclaiming his and Japan’s “deep remorse” and “heartfelt 
apology”. My students’ apparent lack of awareness of these events reflects official 
Chinese positions. Former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji asserted in 2000 that he had 
never seen a written statement of apology from Japan. When I told students about 
Japan providing a written apology, they seemed sceptical, and one asked me where I 
had sourced this information. Displaying a similar propensity to maintain existing 
beliefs even when offered alternative viewpoints, Harry said that although he was 
aware that “actually the Japanese gave a lot of aid to China, I know I also hate 
Japanese people”. Students’ views of China’s ‘true history’ reflected officially 
sanctioned versions of international relations in which China has been and continues 
to be the victim of other countries’ ruthless pursuit of their own interests. In this way, 
certain views were reiterated and strengthened: specifically, that Japan had always 
been untrustworthy in the past, and therefore, would always be so in the future. 
 
Just as with Japan, discussions of Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang among my CFAU 
students also indicated the emotional depth of the values of the nation as 
communicated by the Party-state, and how despite students’ own observations and 
experiences, these values remain central. Incidents and comments like these 
demonstrated the extent to which, despite being aware of others’ propensity to adjust 
history, my students could remain certain that Chinese history as they knew it was in 
fact the one and only true version of events. These examples of students’ inability or 
unwillingness to apply what they knew of other countries’ use of history as a political 
tool to their own case indicates the strength and coherence of their social imaginary.  
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Symbolic Immortality: Official narratives of Chinese history and 
CFAU students’ views  
 
Stories about the past can be deployed in different ways to create particular kinds of 
national identity. For example, despite the contemporary presentation of Chinese 
history as linear and continuous, this has not always been the narrative chosen by the 
CCP. Unlike in Mao’s time, Chinese politicians of the current era endeavour to 
construct a long and unbroken history that both legitimises the contemporary situation 
and precludes any conception of an alternative future. In both cases, the single 
trajectory means that no other path has been or will be possible. However, throughout 
much of the twentieth century, Chinese political leaders and intellectuals tended to 
view ‘traditional Chinese culture’ with hostility, and as fundamentally incompatible 
with modernity, thereby contributing to the country’s ‘backwardness’ (Pye 1993, 
128). The following section will examine the four key themes I identified in students’ 
understandings of history and explore how they reproduced official Party-state 
discourse.  
 
The first theme: A continuous and linear history – one true China and one true 
Chinese people  
 
The first of the themes that emerged from discussions with my students at CFAU was 
that China as a unified nation-state enjoys a continuous and lengthy history – the 
longest unbroken history in the world. This belief in a unique continuity was critical 
to the pride associated with Chinese history. For example, the China National Tourist 
Office prefaces its operations with the assertion that “China, with a recorded history 
of 5000 years, was one of the world’s earliest civilisations” (Gordon, 2010). What is 
emphasised here and was also key to my students’ understanding is that China has the 
longest continuous civilisation in the world. My students pointed out that while other 
cultures may have existed from the same time, or even earlier, unfortunately their 
cultures had been disrupted beyond recognition by foreign powers. The belief that 
other cultures were not continuous, as China’s was, applies, for example, to cultures 
on the African continent, including the Egyptians. One of the major implications of 
this belief in the long history of one true China was the way in which China was 
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imagined as an eternally constant physical entity. China’s territorial integrity was 
therefore not simply an issue of geo-strategic calculations but an integral part of what 
it meant to be Chinese.  
 
The imagined community of China based on certain mappings of territory was a key 
aspect of the narrative of unified Chineseness that featured regularly in class 
discussions at the CFAU. Andrea explained in her mid-semester essay that any 
meeting “with the Dalai Lama is bound to cause dissatisfaction of the Chinese people, 
affecting … relations” because,  
 
The Dalai Lama is a separatist. He has openly advocated that ‘Tibet is an 
independent country’. When the Dalai Lama visited Britain, he told the press 
that ‘Tibet is the world’s biggest occupied country.’ The Communist Party of 
China and the Chinese government has consistently adhered to the policy of 
reunification of the motherland, national unity and social stability, in both 
words and deeds. Premier Wen Jiabao has said that if the Dalai Lama would 
give up the idea of independence, recognising that Tibet is an inalienable part 
of Chinese territory, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese 
territory, the door is always open to him. But the Dalai Lama, showing no 
remorse, continues his pursuit of division. The Chinese government has 
always advocated social stability, ethnic unity, and the people’s interests 
above everything. Tibet is part of China and Chinese territory, the Tibetan 
people enjoy equal rights protected by the Chinese government, no one has the 
right to split it, nor undermine, the territorial integrity. The Dalai Lama is the 
destroyer of a harmonious society.  
 
Ken expressed similar views in his essay, arguing that, 
 
In these years, we are sorry to see that the Western countries always criticise 
the government of China for not giving enough freedom and human rights to 
people. But when they talk about human rights they always mean the issue of 
Xinjiang and Tibet. As we know, Xinjiang and Tibet are inalienable parts of 
China. There are some radical people who want to separate Xinjiang and Tibet 
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from China. But our government will not let it happen and will punish the 
betrayers of the nation (italics added).  
 
Anthropomorphising comments like Ken’s and Andrea’s were common among my 
students. Emotive language in which the state was imbued with rights or feelings that 
could be betrayed indicated the extent to which unity was a deeply held and 
emotionally resonant aspect of their sense of national identity.  
 
My students also used the motif of the family to convey the indivisible unity of the 
Chinese nation, as exemplified in the proverb ‘the state and the family are the same’ 
(jiaguo tonggou: 家国同构) (see also Fong’s 2004 work on filial nationalism). For 
example, as one student from the Diplomacy major argued in her essay, “the 56 
ethnic groups are always viewed as one family, including the Zang [Tibetan] people. 
For the Chinese, Dalai Lama’s actions suggest that Zang people may leave the family, 
which is unacceptable”. As Andrea went on to say in her essay, “With such context, 
the government’s reactions to Dalai Lama are reasonable”. By conflating family and 
country to such a degree, emotional and unreflective responses to geopolitical issues 
are rendered quite natural. In this way, the Chinese government has a vast pool of 
ready and passionate opinion that it can, for the most part, use to legitimate and 
perpetuate its particular vision of the Chinese nation. 
 
The tendency to describe the Chinese nation as a family ran very deeply among my 
students and was particularly noticeable in discussions of Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang, 
all understood as members of the greater family of China. The issue of Taiwan, for 
example, was usually discussed in terms of a “return to the motherland”. Based on 
this framework for understanding the nation-state as a family, when discussing a 
potential conflict with Taiwan over unity or independence, one student described any 
violence that might ensue as “fratricide”. As Eagle explained in her essay,  
 
It is the common aspiration of the Chinese people as a whole to achieve 
reunification of the country by peaceful means through contacts and 
negotiations. People on both sides of the Straits are Chinese. It would be a 
great tragedy for all if China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty were to be 
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split and its people were to be drawn into a fratricide. Peaceful reunification 
will greatly strengthen the cohesion of the Chinese nation.  
 
Similarly, Ricky argued that “both sides can not live without each other, it’s none of 
other countries’ business, it’s a relationship just like fighting brothers”. As Ricky 
articulated, my students saw issues of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity 
very much as ‘family’ issues, and not anything in which the international community 
had any right to be involved.  
 
In addition to these emotional conflations of the Chinese state with a family, students 
often simultaneously deployed more pragmatic reasons to explain why Taiwan, Tibet 
and Xinjiang were integral parts of a unified China. As Eagle went on to argue in her 
essay, unity “will facilitate Taiwan’s socioeconomic stability and development and 
promote the rejuvenation and prosperity of China as a whole”. Annie, a quiet, 
unassuming girl studying International Law, gave her opinion in class discussion on 
what factors may affect Chinese foreign policy. She argued that reunification with 
Taiwan is a key priority of foreign policy, and that while “we will try to resolve the 
question by peaceful means, we will never give up the possibility of violence”. A 
number of other students also noted that support for the return of Taiwan was one of 
the key motivations for Chinese aid to Africa. As Kerry explained, “now China gives 
a lot of financial aid to African countries, and that’s mostly to get their support to 
recognise Taiwan as part of a unified China”. James from the Diplomacy major 
explained the strong feelings he had about territorial integrity by drawing on a 
farming analogy from the past: 
 
Chinese citizens never want to lose a piece of land, because of their character 
as farmers. In the past, they preferred to be farmers, which was regarded as a 
higher position than a businessman, a worker or even an engineer. In foreign 
affairs, those concerned with anti-secession are seriously treated and territory 
issues are not so easy to make concessions. Moreover, they even treat those 
who leave their land as the ones who were abandoned. 
 
Most of my students at CFAU held views in line with those of Ken and Andrea. 
Despite the intensity and often very emotional nature of these convictions, however, 
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students generally preferred not to describe themselves as ‘nationalists’, a term which 
was seen to have negative associations with violence and narrow-mindedness. 
Overall, students discussed the critical importance of unity and territorial very calmly 
and rationally, preferring to describe themselves as ‘rational nationalists’. 
 
My students’ commitment to ‘rational nationalism’ should be contextualised within 
the broader public sphere in China, as my students’ views are not necessarily 
representative. The ‘rational’ approach to nationalism has been explicitly promoted 
within mainstream media since the pro-China Olympic torch rallies around the world 
in 2008 (see Nyiri et al. 2010). However, within China’s digital spaces there is a great 
deal of contestation about China’s global role, much of it passionately decrying 
China’s ‘weak’ responses to perceived insults. Hughes describes how “whenever 
tensions rise with Washington, Tokyo or Taipei, Chinese internet bulletin boards are 
bombarded by correspondents demanding their government adopt a tougher stance” 
(2006, 1). Nyiri et al. also observe how young people who consider themselves to be 
open-minded and cosmopolitan, and emphasise that they are not acting on behalf of 
the government, use digital spaces to express angry and emotional nationalist 
sentiments. For example, during the Olympic torch relay in 2008, Chinese students in 
France wrote of how they were “ready to die defending the country” against the 
“damned French hairies” (Nyiri et al. 2010, 31). My students had internalised the 
official rhetoric that ‘rational nationalism’ was the desired expression of love for the 
country, but they were well aware of ‘angry nationalism’. They usually discussed it in 
terms of it being a regrettable reality for less-educated others. However, it was 
evident that despite their rhetorical adherence to ‘rational nationalism’ or patriotism, 
anger lay just below the surface for them, also, and arose quickly when issues like 
Tibetan autonomy or Taiwanese independence were raised. In these cases, reactions 
would be swift and emotional, drawing on images of the family, and describing the 
shape of the Chinese state in quite anthropomorphic language. 
 
Despite their rhetorical adherence to ‘rational nationalism’, my students felt that 
Chinese nationalism overall “comes from anger” based on past experiences of 
territorial incursions. In particular, students believed that the events of the Opium 
Wars were the basis of their own sentiments: “During the 1840s, foreigners were 
robbers, using guns to take what they wanted…This is how the sense of nationalism 
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arose, that is, fighting for our country… If we don’t fight back, we will die!” In 
another class, Layla, pointed out that: 
 
Yes, you can say that the basis of Chinese nationalism is sensitivity to other 
countries not respecting us. It is because China has been strong, it has pride 
and face to protect. Emotionally we cannot just accept not being strong, we 
want to protect China, so our desire to protect becomes the source of our 
nationalism.  
 
In her mid-semester essay, Melanie wrote:  
 
It should be pointed out that China’s nationalism and nation-state nationalism 
in the West are not entirely the same. China’s nationalism is produced from 
the perils in the Qing Dynasty; we must resist foreign aggression. 
 
Comments such as these clearly demonstrate the power of the collective national 
identity arising from the conviction that China as a single and sacred territorial entity 
had been brutally abused by Western powers during the ‘Century of Humiliation’.20  
 
My students held a teleological view of Chinese history which reified the physical 
space of China and underpinned their passionate commitment to China’s territorial 
integrity. At the same time, they also imagined being Chinese as being a member of a 
vast de-territorialised cultural community. These two themes wound in and around 
each other to form a single and strongly-held belief in which Chineseness was 
somewhat paradoxically related both to the geographical entity of China and an 
intangible cultural essence (for a discussion on territorial and deterritorialised 
conceptions of the Chinese nation, see Barabantseva 2010, particularly Chapter Four). 
 
Students were not always able to give a succinct articulation of what it meant to be 
culturally Chinese, but they felt very strongly that Chineseness was an inherent 
characteristic, an essential element of themselves that they could not unlearn, and 
                                                
20 The ‘Century of Humiliation’ (bainian guochi: 百年国耻) described the period beginning with the 
first Opium War in 1839 to the Communist’s victory in the Chinese civil war and the founding of the 
New China in 1949. 
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which could never be learned by others. Students were clear that no matter how long 
a Chinese person was outside of China, he or she could never stop being Chinese. 
Fundamental to this was growing up in the Chinese historical tradition. An outsider 
could never become Chinese as he or she would not share this history. As Elena from 
the Economics major noted, “most Chinese feel that foreigners don’t understand us” 
as “we have such a long history, so many things happened, it is very hard for a 
foreigner to understand”.  
 
We discussed the question of how foreigners could not understand Chinese concepts 
in class most thoroughly in the week we read chapter six of Lin Yutang’s book, My 
Country, My People. In this chapter, ‘Social and Political Life’, Lin examines how 
principles of obligation and responsibility inform Chinese politics. The chapter 
discusses the implications of the ‘female triad’ of ‘Face, Fate and Favour’ (1998 
[1935] 190-198). In their presentation on the chapter, Bobby and Simon from the 
fourth year Diplomacy major argued that it is “impossible to destroy the effect of 
face, it still now has important effects in Chinese life”. Lin describes ‘face’ as being 
untranslatable and undefinable:  
 
It is like honour and it is not honour. It cannot be purchased with money, and 
gives a man or woman a material pride. It is hollow and is what men fight for 
and what many women die for. It is invisible and yet by definition exists by 
being shown to the public. (ibid., 195)  
 
My students also strongly believed that face was a critical concept in Chinese culture, 
but one that was difficult to define or translate into English. Face was ascribed 
considerable importance by my students across all classes. For example, a student in 
the International Economics and Trade major argued that in political negotiations, 
“the ruling position of face hasn’t changed, we always try to maintain our own face, 
and at the same time give others face in communication”. My students understood 
that Chinese policy-making in general was very much influenced by the concern to 
save face, in that decisions were often made because “China has her pride and her 
face to protect”. For example, the large amounts of money spent on the 2008 
Olympics and the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the New China in 2009 
were seen as clear cases in which face had driven government behaviour. Another 
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student argued that the amount of money spent on the anniversary celebrations was 
“reasonable because when there is a conflict between economy and dignity, we 
Chinese choose dignity”. 
 
Most students held views similar to Elena’s. However, when Elena was making her 
comments, she was interrupted by a bright and reflexive student named Shane who 
called out that the idea that China was impossible for an outsider to truly understand 
provided “a very convenient excuse for always being on the defensive”. Shane asked 
Elena whether she thought she herself truly understood China. Elena replied that, yes, 
she did. She then hesitated briefly before she finished her sentence with, “at least … 
more than a foreigner”. While Shane questioned Elena’s sense of certainty, he did not 
go so far as to disagree with Elena’s position. This brief exchange reflected the shared 
view among my students that China’s long history and continuous civilisation meant 
that the Chinese people were ‘exceptionally exceptional’ and no outsider could ever 
understand them.  
 
The second theme: The past in the present  
 
The second of the themes that emerged from my discussions with students at CFAU 
was the way in which they understood China’s history to underpin its present, both 
for individuals in their day-to-day lives, and in the way the Chinese state operates. In 
their presentation on the definition of culture in the second week of semester, two 
students argued that China’s long, glorious and peaceful history is the basic 
constitutive component of the contemporary Chinese national character. Just as my 
students understood China’s cultural past and present to be causally related, so too 
were other countries’ past behaviours seen as signifiers of natural cultural tendencies. 
For example, students would tell me things about foreign countries such as, “as we all 
know, Americans have always emphasised freedom of religion”.  
 
This presumption of the inevitable continuity of cultural essence was particularly true 
for Japan. Students believed that Japan’s national character was inherently 
imperialistic and expansionist, and that how the country had behaved in the past 
clearly demonstrated natural tendencies that would naturally underpin its behaviour in 
the present, warranting an ongoing distrust. In discussions of how Japanese culture 
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affects foreign policy, students tended to share the assumption that “once Japan gets 
enough power, it will become an aggressor again”. For example, Primo asked, “do 
you think Japanese nationalism has really changed, or has it just dropped the 
militarism part, just because they can’t act on it right now”? He answered himself by 
saying that to predict how Japan might act in the future, he “would look at its tradition 
of aggression, it’s been aggressive since the seventeenth century... I don’t think that 
its cultural traditions have changed.” The one student who expressed an alternative to 
this position was the presenter, Karen, who had spent some time in Japan, and who 
said she had also used to “hate Japan” before she went there herself. Karen asked, 
“May I predict too?,” before going on to argue that: 
  
There are always some people in Japan who want to interfere in other 
countries’ internal affairs, but that will not actually take place in the near 
future. Militarism used to be popular because of people being illiterate and 
badly educated, but now, it’s a different era, people are educated.  
 
Primo retorted that “they may seem more civilised, but it won’t make any difference. 
We must be cautious about appearances of cultural change”. These essentialised 
views of both China’s and other countries’ histories provided students with a coherent 
framework for explaining behaviour in the present.  
 
We know Confucianism is behind everything… 
 
Within the broader belief that traditional wisdom underpins China’s present and 
future, the relevance of Confucianism for contemporary China was a particularly 
striking theme among my students. Valerie Niquet describes the revitalised use of 
Confucianism and the promotion of ‘Confu-talk’ in domestic and international 
propaganda in recent years (Niquet 2011). My students had internalised this recent 
official rehabilitation of Confucianism in narratives of Chinese past, including in the 
international arena.21  
 
                                                
21 See for example Niquet’s 2011 discussion of state-constructed ‘Confu-talk’; Callahan’s 2012 
examination of how Chinese leaders have recently begun deploying a Confucian vocabulary in their 
foreign policy discourse; and Guo 2003. 
87 
 
 
Although in recent years Confucianism has been enjoying a revival, when Mao 
Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution a key element of the iconoclasm was a 
campaign calling for the total destruction of the feudal thinking and social practices 
associated with the Confucian tradition.  As described in the People’s Daily on 1 
October 1967 (National Day) the “struggle against Confucius, the feudal mummy, 
and thoroughly eradicate…reactionary Confucianism is one of our important tasks in 
the Great Cultural Revolution” (Gardner 2012). During the Cultural Revolution, 
Confucius’ ancestral home was destroyed, and bodies of long-dead descendants were 
exhumed and publicly displayed. The anti-Confucian enmity culminated in the 
“Criticise Lin, Criticise Confucius” campaign of 1973 which attempted to utilise 
Maoist theory to re-interpret Chinese history, by means of which these formerly 
revered figures from the past were attacked.  
 
Although this rupture with the past is no longer representative of the state-sanctioned 
narrative of history, the revival of Confucianism in official Chinese socio-political 
imaginings is by no means a fait accompli. On the one hand, the construction of over 
300 Confucius Institutes around the world since 2004, sponsored by the Chinese 
government,22 suggests that a ‘revival’ of Confucian values is a well-accepted state 
position. The official rhetoric around the Confucius Institutes is that they provide a 
means of sharing Chinese culture and Chinese perspectives with the world. By doing 
so, “misunderstanding and hostility” can be “quenched.” “Once [the world’s people] 
come to know the Chinese people better, they will find out that harmony is an 
essential part of Chinese tradition and a country that values harmony poses absolutely 
no threat to the rest of the world”.23 Most of my students seemed to agree with this 
official position. As one student argued,  
 
                                                
22 Confucius Institutes are overseen by the Office of Chinese Language Council International 
(Hanban), a non-profit organization affiliated with the Ministry of Education and the United Front 
Work Department, itself an agency under the Central Committee of the CCP. Its main function is to 
ensure that various non-CCP groups are supportive of CCP official positions. 
23 Du Ruiqing, Former President of Xi'an International Studies University, quoted in China Daily, cited 
in Don Starr (2009, 66). While other nation-states (such as France, Britain, Germany and Spain) have 
been funding similar cultural and language promotion projects for decades, it is argued that the 
difference between the new Confucius Institutes and other state-backed institutions is that Confucius 
Institutes are established within pre-existing educational institutions, raising suspicions that “these 
institutes are aimed less at fostering interest in China and Chinese culture itself, and more at ensuring 
that such interest is guided along lines approved of by the Chinese party-state” (Churchman, 2011). 
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These overseas Confucius Colleges can promote the education and exchange 
of Chinese language and culture. Through learning China-related subjects, 
foreign students can come to realise the essence of Chinese culture and 
gradually abandon the ‘China threat theory’. 
 
On the other hand, a giant bronze statue of Confucius was removed from in front of 
the National Museum of China on the eastern flank of Tiananmen Square in the 
middle of the night in January 2011, just days after its installation. This suggests a 
lack of consensus within the Chinese Party-state as to the appropriate role Confucian 
teachings should play within China (e.g. Wen Liao, 2011). Despite unfinished debates 
in official circles regarding how appropriate it is to venerate Confucius, my students 
frequently referred to Confucius and Confucian values as the fundamental basis of 
contemporary Chinese morality and social organisation. Indeed, my research shows 
that my students had already internalised the official Confu-talk discourse. “We adore 
the Confucian system”, enthused Hannah, a young woman in the third year 
International Economics major. As is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, my 
students firmly believed that what it meant to be Chinese in the present often hinged 
on what they understood to be traditional Confucian traits such as diligence, 
politeness, honesty, collective thoughts, tolerance, harmony, taking the middle road, 
and avoiding conflict.  
 
As an extension to the understanding that Confucian values formed the basis of 
individual morality, they were also seen to underpin China’s approach to foreign 
policy and international relations. Even Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim prescribing 
correct behaviour in the international system of biding one’s time and hiding one’s 
light behind a bushel was attributed to Confucius. As Maisie noted,  
 
The first typical Confucian idea is Deng’s advice to hide one’s capacities and 
bide one’s time. Dating back to ancient China, many politicians believed in 
this and behaved according to it. It’s very hard to find a Chinese making a 
showy display of his or her capacity.  
 
Following a similar logic, Yellow argued that: 
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China will never be number one, because as Confucius says, one should never 
seek first place; so we will never claim leadership even if we are the most 
powerful, because others will then see us as their rival and enemy, and 
threaten the nation’s security, and that’s not what China wants.  
 
In another class, in a small group discussion, one male student told me that “Chinese 
foreign policy is of course based on Chinese national characteristics, like wanting to 
avoid conflicts”. His friend added, “Yeah, we Chinese prefer harmony”. I asked 
where this preference came from, and the first student replied emphatically, as if it 
were quite obvious, “Confucianism! Confucianism teaches to avoid extremes and to 
take the middle way”. 
 
Many of my students also believed that China had always adhered to an international 
policy of peace which stemmed from Confucian values:  
 
As a nation under the influence of Confucianism from the ancient times, 
China consistently pursues a good-neighbourly and friendly foreign policy, 
and bears no desire for territorial expansion.  
 
Which values in particular constituted Confucian ideology tended to change from one 
individual to the next. For example, one student suggested that: 
 
The basic idea brought up by Confucius in public governance is ‘to rule by 
benevolence’, and ‘harmony should be highly cherished’.  
 
However, his classmate Chad thought that it was Confucian peace and friendship 
ceremonies that most directly underpinned China’s peaceful stance:  
 
As most of us know, every time when a new policy is made, part of the old 
one will remain. That is partly because it is too good to be changed, and partly 
because it is the custom of the country. China has a very long history, long 
enough for our people to form some really deep popular opinions. The 
opinions have become habits, and are buried deep into our hearts, our souls. 
So, as long as the maker of the policy is one of Chinese people, he will never 
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be able to get rid of the accustomed thoughts. For example: China has been a 
country of ceremonies for thousands of years, which makes peace and 
friendship important in our culture, and also affects our foreign policy. ‘The 
arrival of a friend is such a happy thing!’ said Confucius, a famous thinker, 
educator, and statesman in Chinese history. So, in the 21st century, China is 
unlikely to change its attitude toward the maintenance of peace around the 
world.  
 
Another student argued that: 
 
Confucianism, one of the most influential traditions in Chinese history, 
inevitably affects China’s foreign policy. The core idea of Confucianism is 
harmony, which is also tied with kindheartedness and tolerance and 
emphasises the balance between human and nature, interpersonal friendliness 
and international peace, rather than conflicts or wars.  
 
My students cited similar perspectives within Chinese literature as evidence to 
support these views. For example, one student referred to Wang Sheng-Wei’s book, 
China’s Ascendancy: An Opportunity or a Threat (What Every American Should 
Know About China) (2007), and argued that, 
 
The author has concluded that China has always been a country deeply 
committed to peace, harmony, and loving others as they love themselves. This 
concept derives from Confucianism, which still has a profound influence on 
China’s political philosophy.  
 
Despite the enthusiasm for Confucianism over any other possible cultural influence 
on Chinese worldviews, many students did not actually seem to know much detail 
about what Confucianism entailed. Layla summed up a conversation about the topic 
by acknowledging:  
 
Actually, we’re not very sure what Confucianism is, we really only have a 
basic knowledge about him. But though we’re not consciously aware, we still 
know Confucianism is behind everything. 
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Her classmate added that “most Chinese will choose to like Confucianism because it's 
safe, it doesn’t have many risks, and, it’s good for you to behave like this”. These 
comments demonstrate how CFAU students chose to privilege certain schools of 
thought and particular truths and simply discard others when they did not fit neatly 
with the prevailing views.   
 
In addition to Confucianism’s primary role, a small minority of students also noted 
that other belief systems played a role in China’s foreign policy, but were 
comparatively unimportant. As Maisie argued,  
 
Other semi-religions such as Taoism, Legalism24 and so on all have some kind 
of effects on China’s foreign policies making – more or less. Ideas such as 
Zhouyi and the Eight Trigrams25 weigh a lot in Chinese traditional culture. 
But since they are not the major impacting factors, I just leave them out. 
 
My students’ enthusiastic assertions that they “adored Confucius”, and the certainty 
with which they argued that Confucianism was the fundamental root of contemporary 
China, despite admitting that they knew very little about the philosophy, demonstrates 
just how effectively they had internalised the message of Confu-talk via the 
subjectification process.  
 
The importance my students allocated to history in general and Confucianism in 
particular did not mean that they believed that Chinese society and culture had not 
changed at all over time. Many of them felt that there had indeed been significant 
changes in some aspects of China’s culture. For example, as an earnest young woman 
in the International Economics major, Glennis, pointed out when discussing Lin’s My 
Country and My People (1998 [1935]),  
 
I’m worried that foreigners who read this book might get confused about 
China. They may not see the current situation, how things have changed. 
                                                
24 Legalism (fa jia: 法家) is a utilitarian Chinese political philosophy for governing the state which was 
one of the main philosophical currents in the Warring States Period (475BC-221BC). Han Feizi (韓非
子) was one of its leading proponents. 
25 The Zhouyi (周易) or Yijing (易經 ) known in English as ‘The Book of Changes’ is a classic 
Confucian text, but also deeply rooted in Daoist thought. 
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That’s why Western people get the wrong idea, and say China lacks 
democracy. But if you see the 60th anniversary, you can see everyone loves 
our country. Even in my hometown, everybody voluntarily bought a flag. I 
feel very proud of that.  
 
Glennis’ remark exemplifies how students’ conviction of a long and continuous 
culture co-exists with the notion that China has evolved and modernised greatly since 
the Communist Party founded the New China in 1949. Several other students also 
noted that undesirable aspects of Chinese culture had changed since Lin wrote this 
seminal work, including that “while the ruling position of ‘face’ hasn’t changed, the 
role of ‘fate’ in Chinese people’s lives had lost its power a long time ago”. The 
conclusion to this particular class discussion was that “even though we make a lot of 
progress, we still have a long way to go. Mr Lin’s impression given to the outside 
world isn’t good, so our task is to represent a new image of China to the world”. 
 
There were some areas of Chinese culture in which students felt that more change 
was necessary. They were particularly concerned about the existing social system 
leading to elitism and nepotism, which many of them said they had experienced 
themselves when trying to get a job. However, suggestions for change in China were 
only considered acceptable if they came from within China, and not from external 
commentators. And while students did feel that some parts of Chinese culture could 
benefit from change, there was a very strong sense overall that cultural change due to 
the influence of external factors was a negative thing, as it risked diluting the purity 
of what it meant to be Chinese. 
 
The vast majority of my students felt that Confucian values provided a positive moral 
framework for everyday people to live their lives as well as for leaders making 
important decisions. There was however a case in which one student, in an essay 
rather than in a class discussion, put forward some rather different views. James, from 
the Diplomacy major, did not share his classmates’ love of Confucianism. James 
tended to sit up in the back corner of the classroom and sleep through most of the 
classes, but when he woke up (when prompted), he would usually be able to deliver 
thoughtful questions or comments. James wrote in his mid-semester essay that, “At 
the beginning, theories of these Confucian scholars aimed at convincing the kings to 
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follow their ideas on governance. And unfortunately it became a tradition”. When I 
first read this sentence, I thought it must have been a typing mistake, as it was so far 
from the usual expressions of loyalty and love for Confucius. However, I went on to 
read:  
 
However, the essence of Confucianism is pretence. The only and most 
powerful weapon of Confucians is words. Although it is hard to understand 
why wise ancestors chose such a stupid school to respect as the only one, the 
thing happened as it was and the current government has been learning much 
from it. They tried to act more friendly when they found they had to. They 
treated their foreign friends well even though they didn’t know what they 
could gain. They just repeated monotonous words which they thought were 
sufficiently wise.  
 
James’ disaffection with Confucianism provided an example of how discourses of 
disciplinary power designed to subjectify students into citizens of the nation-state 
always left spaces for individual interpretations of the dominant narratives. Despite 
having some of the highest grades in the Diplomacy major, James was also one of the 
least interested in joining the public service, and thus seemed to feel less obliged to 
adopt the official discourses of the nation-state. 
 
The third theme: Chinese immortality disrupted – humiliation and victimhood at 
the hands of the West 
 
The third motif my students at CFAU very commonly deployed was that of the 
‘Century of Humiliation’ (bainian guochi: 百年国耻). Students frequently used this 
motif to describe how China’s long, glorious and unified history of peaceful 
development and harmonious relations with the outside world had been ruptured by 
the shock of Western invasions in the mid-1800s. This theme of humiliation and 
subjugation has been a central element of contemporary Chinese identity for some 
time. As one American commentator put it in 1959,  
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The Chinese have one very broad generalisation about their own history: they 
think in terms of ‘up to the Opium war’ and ‘after the Opium war’; in other 
words, a century of humiliation and weakness to be expunged. (Harris 1959, 
162) 
 
During the Mao era, the narrative of humiliation was not the primary ideological tool 
or source of legitimacy. During this time, class rather than nationality was the 
foundation of political identity (Wang 2012, 87). Indeed, between 1947 and 1990 
there were no books on the subject of ‘national humiliation’; published in China 
(Callahan 2006). Since the Patriotic Education campaign of the early 1990s, however, 
official discourse across many fields has been firmly predicated on a victimisation 
narrative that lays the blame for China’s suffering firmly at the feet of the West 
(Wang, 2012, 102). For example, history textbooks today divide Chinese history into 
before and after the Opium Wars. Visitors both Chinese and other to historic sites are 
reminded of these events by signage at prominent tourist sites – part of the patriotic 
education campaign as set out in the 1991 ‘Notice about Conducting Education of 
Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively Historical Relics’. 
In 1995, 100 sites were selected as ‘national-level demonstration bases’ for patriotic 
education, forty of which are sites commemorating China’s past conflicts or wars 
with foreign countries. There are now more than ten thousand such sites (Wang 2012, 
105-107). The cities of Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing bore the brunt of the Allied 
Forces’ incursions in the 1800s, and public sites such as the Old Summer Palace in 
Beijing almost without exception display signs – in English and Chinese – to remind 
the visitor how glorious the site had been before the Allied Forces destroyed it.26 
Likewise, the Shanghai Expo website notes that: 
 
Since 1840, Western powers have intermittently invaded this huge but 
weakened country, nearly eliminating China. But China is a country with a 
legacy of talent. Confucianists believed in cultivating their moral character 
                                                
26 There is no doubt that the Allied Forces of English, French and other Western countries wreaked 
considerable havoc in these Eastern cities. The ruins of the spectacular pleasure garden Yuan Ming 
Yuan (Gardens of Perfect Brightness), or the Old Summer Palace, razed to the ground twice, first in 
1857 and again in 1860, attest to this. However the signs outside these sites explaining their demise do 
not note the events which led up to the sacking, including the torture and murder of French and British 
emissaries who had come to Beijing to negotiate a truce in the Second Opium Wars.  
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and maintaining a well-ordered state. Their bravery protected the country from 
ruination.  
 
Remembering the weaknesses and losses of the past are critical aspects of forging a 
unified national identity in China’s ongoing nation-building project. As Callahan 
points out, understanding China as a ‘pessoptimist’ nation, that is, in which both 
negative and positive are inextricably intertwined in the humiliation narrative, is 
critical to understanding China’s rise and its role in world politics (Callahan 2012, 8-
10). 
 
In many of my classes at CFAU, students were adamant that remembering these 
negative events, and learning about history was the best means “to prevent it 
happening again”. They were convinced that enshrining the memory of past events 
was the only way to regain China’s, and their own, dignity. Despite many students 
feeling that taking a history major at university was “boring” and unlikely to lead to 
the high results many students valued above all else, knowing at least what were 
considered to be the ‘key facts’ of the past was considered essential. As one student 
explained in class, “if we don't know about the past humiliation, we could be too 
naïve. Others might want to hurt us again. To have a sense of history for self-
protection is important”.  
 
The way students interwove this sense of victimisation with the narrative of 
humiliation meant that injustices to the state were conflated with injuries to the 
Chinese people themselves. Students understood criticism of China as both an insult 
to the nation and to Chinese individuals. They quickly became defensive if they 
thought an outsider was criticising China, responding as if it was a personal slight. 
Again, a good example of this tendency was students’ reactions to reading Lin’s 
chapter about Chinese society. Lin strongly criticises the extension of what he calls 
“the family mind” to the state (1998 [1935], 169-208). To see if my students would 
react any differently depending on whether they thought criticism was coming from 
‘inside’ or ‘outside’, I gave the reading without revealing the author’s identity. 
Students’ responses clearly indicated how defensive they were towards outside 
criticism. They told me that “we were so angry when we read it”, but that “we 
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changed our feeling when we realised it was written by a Chinese”. As the often-
cynical young man, Dart, explained it:  
 
Quite a few of us felt offended because we thought it was written by a 
foreigner who didn’t know anything about China, and seemed only to see 
shortcomings. Now we know that it was written by Lin Yutang. If we knew it 
was a Chinese person, we would have had more of an attitude of self-
checking, but not when we thought it was external criticism. Outsiders 
criticising us makes us feel defensive. 
 
When I asked why exactly the same comments would cause anger if they were 
written by an outsider, the students explained that it was because China was like a 
family, in which it is alright to criticise your own parents or siblings, but you would 
always feel protective and defensive if someone else made the same point.  
 
This tendency to explain the state in terms of a family structure was part of a larger 
conceptual framework in which the state does not exist in opposition to the individual 
as it is understood to be in much Western political discourse (as is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Four). Students extended the conflation of state with individual to 
situations outside of China, as the following excerpt from a student essay illustrates. 
Toni was arguing that an auction in France of bronze statues “looted from the Old 
Summer Palace in Beijing” in the 1800s has, 
 
Strained the relationship between China and the French. What both countries’ 
people should do is to improve the relationship and get mutual benefit. But the 
auction of the bronze animal heads has just aggravated the situation.  
 
Although the statues were in the possession of a private individual, not the French 
state, students understood the auction in terms of a national-level incident which 
brought dishonour not just to the individual involved but also to the state of France:  
 
The auction happened in exactly the place which played such an important 
role in the European Renaissance; the place which has an honourable cultural 
tradition; the place which nurtured the great writer Hugo who distinguished 
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right from wrong and fought for justice; the place which is called France. This 
auction can’t bring any honour to the country and the result is exactly the 
opposite. 
 
Emotional understandings of the past in which China as a state and the Chinese 
people themselves were personally humiliated are recurring themes in Chinese 
popular discourse, including within the media. For example, Chinese journalists often 
use the phrase “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people”. This emotionally charged 
response is deployed, with varying degrees of vitriol, when, for example, a foreign 
politician meets with the Dalai Lama. In another case, singer Bob Dylan was warned 
not to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people when he toured China before he had 
even arrived in the country.27 In a similar vein, my Chinese friends and colleagues 
would tend to react with great emotion if they felt that China was being criticised by 
an outsider – even in regard to topics like the weather or the traffic. This prickly 
sensitivity to perceived or real insult created a strong sense of collective identity as all 
slights were offensive to all Chinese people and the Chinese nation-state when 
interpreted through the prism of the great national humiliation. The experience of 
being offended together served to enhance the sense of unity so essential to students’ 
national identity.   
 
Students believed that the past behaviour of certain Western powers meant that China 
had to be constantly on its guard against future threats to it sovereignty. They 
understood that all states, like China, acted on the basis of their own individual and 
immutable cultural characteristics. Because foreigners had once deliberately carved 
up strategic Chinese ports to divide among themselves “like a melon” (guafen: 瓜分) 
for their own gain, foreigners were “fundamentally rapacious, greedy and aggressive” 
as far as international relations were concerned (Kaufman 2010, 15). Therefore, 
Western powers could not help but continue to protect their own power by encircling 
and diminishing China – in whatever way possible. In this worldview, any external 
                                                
27  Recent research into this phenomenon found that an internet search on the phrase: ‘hurt the feelings 
of the Chinese people’ resulted in 17,000 hits, as compared to replacing the ‘Chinese people’ with the 
‘Japanese people’ (the next many hits, at 178) or 17 other possible wordings which came up with zero 
hits (Mair, 2011). In an earlier search on google.cn of the terms ‘humiliation’ or ‘bullying’ (qifu: 起伏) 
and ‘disrespect’ or ‘looking down’ (kanbuqi:看不起), Pal Nyiri (2006) found 623,000 entries with the 
term ‘qifu Zhongguo’ (bullying China) and 521,000 with ‘kanbuqi Zhongguoren’ (looking down on 
Chinese people). 
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criticisms of China could be interpreted simply as a continuation of inevitable 
Western bullying.  
 
In response to the need for unity in the light of the humiliation of the past and the 
understanding that foreign powers were continuing to “bully” China, my students felt 
that it was critically important to fend off “foreign incursions” of all sorts, physical 
and cultural. Students saw being alert to the risk of the dilution of cultural purity as 
key to China re-establishing itself in its rightful role. For example, some students 
argued that China should not celebrate Western festivals, as doing so could be seen as 
a kind of “cultural invasion” which would not only mean losing China’s own culture, 
but could also “weaken our nation”. Students explained that restrictions existed 
around when Japanese cartoons could be shown on television, as they were a form of 
soft power, that is, a means of exporting Japanese values to shape Chinese 
preferences so that Chinese people will want what Japan wants (see Nye 1990). They, 
as well as other foreign cartoons, could not be played during prime time, “mostly to 
prevent Japanese cultural influence”.  
 
The constant reference to the weakness in China’s past may seem peculiar in a 
country whose rise on the world stage is considered by most commentators as an 
indisputable fact. One explanation is that humiliation is a key “part of a narrative of 
loss and redemption” in which the Party is credited with “pulling China out of this 
nadir and into a globally prominent position” (Adcock 2010, 3). The shared sense of 
humiliation allowed my students to retain a vivid sense of national pride at the same 
time as identifying as a country still in transition to developed status. This worldview 
also produced a logic of exceptionalism in which students saw ‘we Chinese’ as 
existing in opposition to the imagined community of indistinguishable Western 
imperial powers. This differentiation from the West simultaneously re-produced an 
affiliation with other developing countries, such as those in Africa, although this 
should not be misunderstood as African countries enjoying hierarchical equality with 
China. Despite calls for an international system based on full sovereign equality in 
which every state enjoys equal sovereign rights, the exceptionalist perspective 
underpinned my students’ belief that China as a nation-state on the world stage was 
fundamentally unlike all others.  
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The fourth theme: Regaining former and rightful world status  
 
The fourth key theme among my students was that China was now at a point where it 
could realise its original and eternal destiny and resume its former position in the 
world. Official discourses explain how this pre-ordained future will unfold in terms of 
China’s past. In the “embellished biography” (Anderson 2006 [1983], 204) of the 
Chinese nation, traditional Chinese cultural elements of harmony and peace are 
presented as the foundations of the Chinese nation which will continue to underpin 
China’s approach to interrelating with the world in the future. Central to these 
narratives is the idea that throughout its history, China has been a peaceful actor on 
the international stage, never using aggressively expansionist tactics to increase its 
empire. The evolution and changing shape and size of the state of China is understood 
to have come about through entirely peaceful means – or, when violent conflict is 
acknowledged to have occurred, it is explained as being because the rulers of China at 
that time were not the peace-loving Han people, but the invader dynasties. In the 
conception of history hegemonic in China, China’s future role in the world is 
therefore understood logically to be a simple extension of these past trends.  
 
The opinions of the students I taught at CFAU echoed this official narrative. The idea 
that in the past China had never acted in anything but a peaceful way on the world 
stage arose often in essays and class discussions. For example, in her mid-semester 
essay, Melanie wrote:  
 
Historically, China has always had a focus on peace. In the prosperous 
Western Han dynasty, they followed pro-peace policies. During the Tang 
period, Princess Wen Cheng, not the army, was sent to Tibet. In the Ming 
dynasty empire, Zheng He’s fleets made seven ocean voyages, not bringing 
aggression, but the gift of great power and dignity. The only exception to this 
peacefulness was the ruling Mongolian Yuan regime. The bloody killing and 
conquering shocked Europe, but history has proven that such a regime in 
China is bound to be short-lived – the Mongolian regime only survived for 97 
years before it was overthrown.  
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Like Melanie, many students deployed the story of fifteenth century sailor Zheng He 
to illustrate how the Chinese people are and have always been harmonious and peace-
loving, and have never instigated conflict. Most students understood that Zheng He 
only ever used his maritime power for diplomacy and trade, and never for invading 
territory. As another student explained,  
 
As the most powerful country in the world at that time, China did not bring 
cannons or colonisation, but friendliness to Africa. Accordingly, they did not 
bring back gold or slaves but giraffe as a symbol of auspice. It is just the same 
today whenever there is a problem.  
 
By drawing on the few historical stories available to them when discussing issues of 
international relations, students reinforced their own and their peers’ existing 
convictions that Chinese culture had always been and would therefore always be 
peace-loving.  
 
The trope of China’s glorious past was fundamental to students’ predictions of how 
China would behave in the international system in the future. Overall, the expectation 
was that China would resume its former position in the global order, and “go back to 
where every country respects us”. As Charity explained,  
 
Because China has always pursued an independent foreign policy of peace, 
China hopes that we can have a long-term peaceful coexistence with other 
countries. And we want to get a peaceful and stable international environment. 
Our country’s implementation of this policy is solemn, sincere and will not 
change in the long-term, because it conforms to Chinese people’s fundamental 
beliefs. Peace-loving Chinese people abhor aggression very much and will 
never impose such suffering on others.  
 
Students were adamant that while China certainly wanted more respect in 
international relations, China “did not want to become number one”, and in no way 
posed any sort of threat to the international system. 
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According to this understanding, traditional Chinese culture explained how any 
Chinese shows of strength were no more than demonstrations of renewed dignity. 
When one student posed the hypothetical question of whether the recent increase in 
military expenditure may have been motivated by a desire for China to be a strong 
military power with genuine deterrent capabilities, her classmates at once argued that 
the issue at stake was actually one of “dignity and face-saving”. Following the same 
line of argument, Charity wrote an essay about the US-India military exercise 
conducted just after China’s 60th Anniversary celebrations in October 2009. The 60th 
Anniversary celebrations were an impressive demonstration of China’s wealth and 
power, and had many Chinese people in tears of emotion. Described in some Western 
media as “a spectacular display of national pride” (Anderson, 2009), over 100,000 
people participated in the country’s largest-ever military parade. Shortly afterwards, 
India and the US began joint military exercises in Uttar Pradesh state involving 320 
US servicemen. Charity argued that the purpose of this exercise was “very clear”, and 
that it was “just a demonstration, a demonstration against China!” However, Charity 
felt that this response was “really not necessary” as, 
 
China’s parade is just the Chinese government wanting to show their country 
as wealthy and strong to their people. China wants to tell their people that our 
country is better now, we are not that sick man of Asia anymore. China has 
made great progress, social progress, Chinese people can live a good life. We 
do not need to constantly fear others’ aggression, the days of the Nanjing 
Massacre will never return again!  
 
She continued emphatically,  
 
China has absolutely no intention of demonstrating our power to the world, 
and we never want to become the world’s hegemon. The Chinese people came 
from a war, we have had so many terrible and horrible experiences during that 
war. So China will not bring ourselves into a war again, or put Chinese people 
into such difficult circumstances. China will not be aggressive or impose this 
kind of pain on other people around the world, because the Chinese people 
love peace, and the Chinese government’s foreign policy of peace will never 
change! 
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Charity’s remarks demonstrate the extent to which students believed that traditional 
Chinese characteristics of peacefulness and harmony would continue to underpin its 
behaviour in the international system in the future.  
 
Like Charity, many other students also argued that because of past experiences of 
invasions, China would never want to experience conflict again:  
 
As a nation that has only recently broke away from foreign intrusion and 
control, China consistently adheres to an independent foreign policy and 
works hard to build a peaceful international environment for its economic and 
social construction. 
 
Students often talked about how China was now ready to resume its rightful role as a 
dignified and peace-loving great nation. This determination to undo the humiliations 
of the past – while at the same time remembering them to prevent them from ever 
happening again – was always linked with the caveat that others had nothing to fear, 
as Chinese culture had always and would always be one of peace and harmony.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the Republican Revolution of 1911, a linear and teleological narrative of 
Chinese history has been hegemonic in China, and secured the concept of the Chinese 
nation as a self-contained subject of history, transforming not only perceptions of the 
past, but also present meanings of the nation and the world (Duara 1995, 5-6). 
Communist Party leaders have historically been determined to “control the messages 
imparted in works of history – to bend those messages in ways favourable to official 
policy lines and to extirpate any manifestation of dissent or opposition” (Unger 1993, 
2). In 1981, a new Party Resolution on its own history was drawn up which largely 
followed the “stereotyped and monotonous” patterns of official history written before 
Mao’s death in 1979 (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2003, 151). Like what came before it, 
official history is motivated by expediency and particularly by the need for unity and 
stability (Barmé 2003, 262). This official nationalist discourse of history has been 
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actively transmitted through education (see for example Callahan 2012; Fong 2004; 
Gries 2004; Guo 2003; Hoffman 2010; and Wang 2012). My research shows how 
much this state-sanctioned discourse was internalised by my CFAU students. 
 
My students demonstrated a strong commitment to the notion that China as a social, 
political, cultural and geographical entity represented an immortal and eternal 
embodiment of some intangible but essential Chineseness. Students understood that 
there was only one true version of Chinese history, in which the past leads directly to 
the present, underpinning their contemporary moral and social imaginary, and then 
stretches forwards into the future. This otherwise seamless trajectory was 
mortifyingly disrupted by foreign incursions beginning in the 1840s. The result of this 
has been an ongoing sense of victimisation and a strong distrust of the intentions of 
the outside world. Equally strong was the belief that it is only through having a stable 
and united country that China can resume her former, and rightful, position as a 
peace-loving, harmony-promoting, and internationally respected nation-state. 
Although many of my students argued that understanding history was critical for 
China to avoid being a victim again in the future, the history my students had 
internalised rarely went beyond this broad and sentimental sketch of certain highly 
selective events and themes. With some exceptions, like James and his views on 
Confucianism, my students’ opinions offered little suggestion that they had reflected 
on history outside of official narratives.  
 
Barabantseva observed that “China’s relationship with the world must be understood 
through the interplay between history and present, and thus through the particular 
uses of history in practice” (2009, 129). How China deals with its past is of interest 
not only to non-Chinese commentators analysing China in the international system, 
but also has implications for international stability and security. This is particularly 
true of the unstable way in which positive and negative emotions and knowledge are 
intermeshed in the ‘pessoptimistic’ national humiliation narrative (Callahan 2010, 27-
28). How history was used in practice among my students at CFAU has implications 
for both China’s own domestic sphere and, thanks to the increasing role China is 
playing in world affairs, the international system. As former US President Clinton 
told a joint sitting of the Australian Parliament as long ago as 1996, “the way [China] 
defines its greatness for the future will help decide whether the next century is one of 
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conflict or cooperation” (Huisken, 2011). Odd Arne Westad argues along similar 
lines, positing that China’s future in the international system could be unstable if 
China in the present uses its historic legacy without coming to terms with it (Westad 
2012, 16).  
 
My CFAU students’ understanding of history gives rise to an ‘us and them’ mode of 
thinking that fits neatly with the official government discourse of an integrated 
identity. The way in which students constantly reproduced a unified ideology of 
Chineseness against the rest of the world, particularly the imagined community of 
‘the West’, meant that they continued to define themselves as ongoing victims of 
external persecution. This victim mentality in turn underpinned fierce emotional 
responses to the issues of Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. Likewise, during discussions 
about Japan, only on a very rare occasion would a student not express his or her 
passionate hatred for that country – always very emotionally, and not at all as a 
simple rhetorical exercise. To the CFAU students I taught, these geographical 
locations did not merely represent accidents of history with potential geo-strategic 
advantages. Discussions about territorial integrity, independence and liberation were 
not framed within a rational interest discourse as the Realist school of International 
Relations theory would posit. On the contrary, these issues were at the very heart of 
my students’ national identity. They are intensely emotional, and the object of fierce 
loyalty and obligation, akin to a familial obligation to supporting one’s own, no 
matter what that individual has done. 
 
Chinese political elites today draw on the victimisation and humiliation discourse as a 
starting point for their views on how China should interact with other nations 
(Callahan 2010, Kaufman, 2010). Discussions among Chinese foreign policy actors 
about the nature of the international system, why nations fail or succeed, the prospects 
for global peace and cooperation, and what China’s role should be, are predicated on 
beliefs that China’s behaviour and attitude on the global stage should and does draw 
on the experiences and lessons from the past. A Realist approach to understanding 
international relations is common among high-profile Chinese foreign policy 
commentators – even many of those who align themselves with the Constructivist 
school build their analyses on the assumption that today’s international system has 
not changed in its essence from the 19th century.  
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For my students, the linear nature of history and China’s subjugation by Western 
powers from the mid-1800s, marking an irrevocable break from its historical destiny, 
is unquestioned. These views of interrupted continuity provided the framework for a 
coherent system of beliefs about how the world works and the dynamics of 
international relations which shaped my students’ perspectives on how China should 
negotiate the international system. The environment in which my students were being 
disciplined and subjectified reinforced the broader social discourses about China’s 
history, and strengthened their existing worldviews, creating a powerfully coherent 
social imaginary. As such, students were not offered the opportunity, and did not 
seek, to genuinely reflect on or critically analyse China’s historical position and its 
role in the international system.  
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Chapter Four: Students and the State 
 
Power is a key dimension of the national logic central to my CFAU students’ 
worldview. Understanding how my students perceived power relations, particularly 
those between people and the state, provides a means for better appreciating how they 
perceive China’s role in international relations. The chapter begins with a discussion 
of the concept of the state in the Chinese context, and how it differs from the Western 
European model. I then investigate how my students at CFAU understood their 
relationship with this particular construction of the state. To do so, I examine three 
key pillars in the Chinese Party-state’s construction of what ‘China’ and ‘being 
Chinese’ means. These are: territorial integrity, economic growth, and a unifying 
ideology of integrated Chinese identity. The chapter focuses on the third of these 
pillars, as identifying as part of a greater imagined community of Chineseness was a 
prevalent theme among my students at CFAU. In this chapter I discuss how my 
students’ views aligned with the Chinese Party-state’s self-representation as an 
extension of the family. The analysis uses Evasdottir’s (2004) notion of obedient 
autonomy and Bourdieu’s (1977) idea of doxa to explain how my students seemed to 
be able to simultaneously agree and disagree with certain orthodoxies.  
 
The State – But not as we know it 
 
Disciplines such as International Relations take the state as their analytical point of 
departure. However, as Spencer argues, an anthropological approach begins by asking 
what we mean by the state, despite the question’s apparent absurdity (2007, 101, 
italics added). What then is ‘the state’ in China, and what differences and similarities 
does it have with its Western European cousin? As set out in Chapter Two, one of the 
analytical foci of the anthropology of the state is how the state is constructed and 
experienced by people, including the semi-permeable boundary between people and 
state. Using this analytical approach allows us to examine the relationship between 
CFAU students and state power that moves away from a presumption of the “feel-
good dystopia” of state versus people (ibid., 111).  
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Recent studies of state-making in China have noted how different the trajectories of 
state-formation between China and Western Europe have been (Thornton 2007, 6; see 
also Pye 1992). As Thornton (2007, 2) explains, the modern Chinese state-making 
process has been very different to that in Western Europe., where states evolved as 
“war machines” (Tilly 1990), focused largely on achieving military goals. Focusing 
on the state’s repressive or coercive capacities results in the presumption that “it is the 
monopolisation of power that produces legitimacy rather than the possibility that the 
monopolisation of legitimacy might in turn produce power” (ibid., 2-3). For example, 
Weberian or Marxist approaches to the state understand it as the entity that holds the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, or as the ruling class’s primary instrument of 
repression. Thornton argues that the Chinese process has been less driven by 
competition for trade and territory, and thus it was less concerned with mobilising 
troops and material resources for war. Rather, modern Chinese leaders’ socio-ethical 
agendas were the primary factor, and Chinese state-making rested more on “the 
recurring need to define and redefine the centre as a moral agent – in fact, the moral 
agent – in modern Chinese history” (Thornton 2007, 2).  
 
Moving away from Weberian and Marxist notions of the state that have arisen from 
the Western European experience allows a view of state power relations beyond the 
state/society dichotomy. The notion of the state as the object of humanity’s distrust 
and resistance prevalent in Western discourses is a philosophically and historically 
specific one, deriving from a vision of moral order based on ideas of Natural Law in 
sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe (Taylor 2004, 3). The contemporary 
Chinese moral order is very different. The Chinese state is not a ‘thing’ that exists 
external to society, brooding and ominous. The fundamental nexus of governance is 
not a “jurisdictional top-down system that controls the actions of every individual 
through the imposition of rules” (Hamilton and Zheng, 1992, 29).  
 
To understand state power in China, we not only need to move beyond the idea that 
the state is outside of society, but also the idea that it is ‘in society’, as Migdal argues 
(2004, 116). Rather, as Pieke prefers to explain it, the state is better viewed as society 
(Pieke 2004, 533, emphasis added), and this is certainly how my CFAU students 
experienced it. By reconceptualising the state in this way, subalterns can be seen as 
having an “authentic, and not merely reactive” response to power (Ortner 1995, 181).  
108 
 
 
As in many other societies, the complexity of the way power works in China means 
that it is difficult to clearly delineate and define terms such as ‘state’, ‘nation’, ‘party’, 
and ‘government’. Certainly, the technologies of power in China are by no means 
well understood by the outside world. Even within China the terms are not clear. The 
issue remains vexed despite the considerable debate attempting to define the 
responsibilities and roles of the Party and the state since the reform process began in 
1978 (Brown 2011, 3).  
 
One of the key difficulties in understanding politics in China is that it is virtually 
impossible to separate the relationship between government administration and the 
politically focused Party system. Indeed, “it is the absence of strict authority 
boundaries or elite boundaries between the Party and non-Party institutions together 
with the primacy of the Party” that has for so many years given “politics in 
communist systems its distinctive character” (Perlmutter and Grande 1976, 778). In 
China, technologies of administrative and political power are not so much parallel and 
intertwined as inextricably interwoven in complicated and unclear ways. ‘The Party’ 
is not parallel to other state and administrative structures, it is rather intrinsically 
interwoven into them to the most local level. There are 41,636 Party Township 
Committees and 780,000 Village Committees monitoring and reporting on people’s 
daily lives (McGregor 2010, vi). Every senior government minister or official is a 
Party member, with a few symbolic exceptions. The Party controls staffing in 
government ministries and agencies through a complicated and opaque appointments 
system and guides them on their political posture and correct policy position through 
committee meetings (ibid., 15).  
 
In Washington or Westminster systems (or, as in Australia, the hybrid ‘Washminster’ 
system), the term ‘the government’ refers to the people whose clearly stated political 
views or ideologies steer the policies of the administrative and bureaucratic sector. In 
China, ‘the government’ could therefore be understood to mean the Chinese 
Communist Party, in that it is the organisation that directs the administration of the 
country. However, the Chinese government is a combination of Party and 
administrative bureaucracy: the Party does not exist outside of the bureaucracy, 
rather, the Party is an inseparable part of it. 
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Given the ongoing debate on the issue, providing categorical distinctions between and 
definitions for these modes of power is outside the purview of this thesis. However, 
for some clarity, in this chapter ‘state-as-system’ is used to refer to the organisations 
of bureaucratic and administrative power including the State Council and its 
departments and ministries, and the processes and practices employed for discipline, 
surveillance and regulation. ‘Nation’ is used to describe the ‘imagined community’ of 
China and being Chinese, the ‘state-as-idea’ as introduced in Chapter Two. The term 
‘Party-state’ is deployed to refer to the intertwined zone in which technologies of 
power are inextricable from the idea of China. 
 
Many non-Chinese observers and commentators, particularly those in the West, tend 
to try and make sense of the Chinese Party-state system through more recognisable 
prisms. However, using familiar nomenclature to describe Chinese political structures 
does not so much clarify as oversimplify and subsume important differences. For 
example, Xi Jinping and his predecessor Hu Jintao are widely described in Western 
discussions as ‘President’, a term associated with a particular set of roles and 
responsibilities. However, the highest position in Chinese politics, which Xi currently 
holds, is as General Secretary of the Communist Party, a role with no direct 
equivalent in Western politics. Simultaneously, he is Chairman of the State Council 
and head of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China. 
Without holding all of these roles simultaneously, an individual cannot be China’s 
Head of State. As Brown points out, the CCP is not simply a political party but rather 
the embodiment and institutionalisation of politics itself in China and “shares very 
few characteristics with political parties in Liberal democracies”. Therefore, “trying 
to see it simply as a political party along the same lines as them creates immediate 
conceptual problems” (Brown 2011, 3). Politics, power, and the relationships among 
the mechanisms of control and the people in China are in many fundamental ways 
simply not comparable to Western notions of the same.  
 
A common misperception in Western commentary that arises from the application of 
Western models to explain Chinese politics is the way in which commentators tend to 
understand reforms in China’s central planning as the ‘retreat of the state’. This 
commentary usually includes a concomitant celebration of the restoration of 
individual agency in which Chinese people will now “have the opportunity to be who 
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they really are” (Hoffman 2010, 11).28 However, contentions that state authority is 
being supplanted by liberal reforms, such as those put forward by Strange (1996), 
overestimate the retreat of the state. As Hoffman argues, changes and reforms should 
be interpreted not so much as “the onset of freedom” but rather as a “different but 
equally present technique of governing adopted by the post-Mao government” (2010, 
12).  
 
One effect of this governmentalisation is the way in which desires are educated, 
habits are configured, and aspirations and beliefs are moulded to align with the goals 
of the state. An increasing number of issues are now in the realm of the disputable in 
which debate is acceptable, such as media censorship. However, these debates tend to 
be about technical questions, the ‘how to’ of running the state. While my students 
generally felt comfortable discussing these subjects, the vast majority tended to adopt 
an orthodox position and agree with the official line, to think and do as they ought, in 
their own self-interest (Li 2007, 5). For example, in a discussion about media 
controls, Cello said that she felt that “our government is way too sensitive, it acts like 
a baby, no, a child of three, it is not mature, it has to see that problems do exist, they 
won’t just disappear”. She had carefully prefaced this remark with, “I’m not anti-
government, this is just a useful suggestion for improving”. Despite this, a classmate 
asked whether her comments meant she would consider herself “anti-government.” 
Cello hastily replied, “no, no! I’m critical of… I’m anti-corrupt government, I’m anti-
manipulative government”. Cello’s remarks show how while some students were 
aware of the way power operated around them, and were prepared to critique this 
control to some extent, they ultimately limited themselves to making their criticisms 
in the form of technicalised suggestions for improvement. At the same time, themes 
particularly fundamental to the Party-state’s construction of China and being Chinese, 
such as the legitimacy of the Party-state system, or the nation-state as a family, 
remained firmly within the realm of doxa.  
 
                                                
28 For debates about the relationship among economic reform (liberalisation), the rise of the public 
sphere, and democratic political movements, see for example Embong (ed.) (2001); Goldman (1995), 
and (1999); Madsen (1993); Pearson (1997); Pun (2005); Saich (1994); and Wakeman (1993). 
However, a number of recent studies have questioned the direct link between economic liberalisation 
and political opposition (such as Wang, 2004), although they tend to use this process, the chances for 
political evolution, and the search for the political “will to act” to frame their analyses, for example 
Pearson (1997, p. 27); and also Goodman (1996). 
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State reforms and an increasingly sophisticated governmentalisation do not equate to 
a rollback of the state, or deny the existence of palpable state power to which CFAU 
students are subject. As Pieke points out, the vertically integrated hierarchical state 
“is much more than a loose configuration of bureaucratic institutions and practices” 
(2004, 532). In China, the Party-state, in both dressed up and flag-waving as well as  
banal, quotidian, intangible ways, exercises demonstrable and daily control over 
people’s lives. However understanding who or what constitutes state power is not as 
simple as pointing a finger at the imposing buildings behind Tiananmen Square that 
house the leadership, or familiarising oneself with the Constitution. While ‘the state’ 
does exist, and it does have obligations to ‘the people’ on which its legitimacy rests, 
the state is not always clearly distinguishable from the Party, the country, the family, 
or indeed, according to the perceptions of many of my students, the individual. 
Conceptualising power as state opposed to the individual underestimates the depth to 
which my students themselves embodied and articulated institutions of social control 
both over themselves as well as over others around them.  
 
The way in which my students understood their relation with state power is 
fundamentally related to the idea of the ‘concentric circle’ model of social relations as 
set out in Chapter Five. In the ‘relationship-based social formation’ which 
characterises Chinese social life, roles, responsibilities, obligations and privileges 
shift constantly according to context (Evasdottir 2004; Fei 1992 [1947]; and Yang 
1994, 296-298). In network-style, mutually interdependent relationships, as was the 
case for students living on campus at CFAU, power is not only transmitted from the 
powerful to the powerless. It is also intricately resisted, reshaped, co-opted, absorbed, 
re-issued, and owned by all actors within the social group. Evasdottir argues that in 
such situations, “the very definitions of concepts such as hierarchy, authority, power 
and autonomy must change” (2004, xi). Power is everywhere, but not only in the 
sense that the state is panoptically watching and controlling the students. The students 
are also watching and controlling their peers, and themselves. This complex inter-
relationship of power is, I argue, a way to understand the concept of ‘state as family’, 
or guojia (国家). In my CFAU students’ social imaginary, their relationship with the 
state was conceived of as analogous to that of a family unit, with the Party-state as 
parent. In this conceptualisation, boundaries between the state and the individual 
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student are extremely nebulous and inconstant. In many ways, the students are the 
state (e.g. Fong’s ‘filial nationalism’ [2004]). 
 
How the Chinese Party-state Defines Itself 
 
Understanding power in China is further complicated because the Party has radically 
transformed the definition of its role over the course of its history, both in and of itself 
as well as in relation to other institutions (Brown 2011, 1). From its foundation in 
1921, the CCP has evolved from being a party of revolution and change, up to the 
founding of the New China (the PRC) in 1949, to one of governance. Having been an 
institution dedicated to the primary cause of class struggle, after Mao’s death the CCP 
entirely transformed its mantra under Deng Xiaoping to promote economic 
productivity as its key performance benchmark. During the nine decades of its 
existence, the CCP has faced some extraordinary challenges that have required it to 
take radical changes in direction, which have then needed to be justified and 
explained. As Pieke notes, “At the heart of the CCP’s strategy lies the fact that it is 
prepared to reinvent itself, while retaining core Leninist principles that guarantee its 
authoritarian leading role over state and society” (2012, 150).  
 
To find new approaches to managing and strengthening the state, Chinese leaders, 
academics, and other political actors have “mined societies of the developed world 
(above all the United States) for clues, ideas, and models – many of them ‘neoliberal’ 
– that may help make China a better place” (ibid., 150). To better suit the 
contemporary purpose, external concepts have been reinvented and reinvigorated 
through a careful blending with Chinese-style socialism and traditional Chinese ideas 
and practices. These adjustments in ideological position are seen not as a revision of 
previous stances, but as theoretically justifiable continuations of a single narrative. 
My students considered this adaptability quite appropriate and even necessary, as, 
according to how they explained Marxism, ideology should be determined by 
society’s material conditions. While the Party has changed ideological tack and 
injected foreign concepts into its lexicon, it has always and consistently deployed 
narratives of longevity and continuity to maintain its legitimacy. In these narratives, 
the Party characterises itself as the entity which unified, pacified and developed China 
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to arrive at where it is today, and as the only means through which China’s recent 
peace and stability can continue into the future.  
 
My students understood that the Party can and should adjust its ideology and role in 
response to changing times, and likewise accepted that the key themes of its 
propaganda messages can, and should, also change. During the Mao era, in the 
context of revolution, propaganda and thought work focused on China’s social 
transformation. However, when Deng instigated radical economic reforms in the late 
1970s after Mao’s death, politicians deemed this approach no longer appropriate, and 
rejected it as destructive and divisive – although what was to replace it was the 
subject of considerable controversy within the Party (Brady 2009, 448). From 1991, 
the Party identified a number of central themes to justify the apparent about face from 
the policies and ideology of the Mao era, and encourage people to embrace the new 
economic order of market liberalism. Indeed, the CCP had an explicit policy to 
“indoctrinate the masses” with economic-related ideology, such as awareness of the 
successes of Deng’s Opening Up and Reform policy, and the importance of science, 
law, competition and efficiency (Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
2011, as cited in Brady 2011, 448).  
 
Today: The three pillars 
 
Today, the CCP presents itself as the guardian of a timeless Chinese state and the 
unified Chinese people. Three key pillars are critical to this construction, namely: 
territorial integrity; economic growth; and a unifying ideology of integrated identity 
(Kallio 2011, 12-13). I will particularly focus on the third pillar as my CFAU students 
very commonly deployed this motif to explain what the Chinese state-as-idea meant 
to them. Following Li, Evasdottir and Hoffman, among others, who discuss recent 
shifts in techniques of governmentality in China, I argue that students can agree or 
disagree with certain technical questions as long as they choose to accept that other 
questions remain in the realm of doxa, undiscussed and undisputed. In this following 
section, I will discuss my students’ understanding of these three pillars of the Party-
state message within this analytical framework.  
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Territorial integrity 
 
For my students, the physical and geographical imagining of China was an essential 
and non-negotiable component of what it meant to be Chinese. The importance of 
territorial integrity in their national identity rested on the central role of events such as 
the Century of Humiliation and the unification of the country after the war with the 
Japanese in narratives of Chinese history. It was clear in class discussions in which 
the topics of Tibet, Taiwan or Xinjiang arose that China’s territorial integrity was a 
deeply held value. Indeed, this was the topic around which nationalist declarations 
most readily arose. The ‘love for country’ (ai guo: 爱国) that is such a prominent trope 
in official discourse is predicated on the idea that China has always been the same 
shape and size as it is now, and this is what constitutes what is ‘rightfully’ China. The 
extent to which the long and proud existence of the Chinese civilisation is linked to 
territorial integrity means that the issue of a separate, autonomous Tibet, for example, 
is not simply a question of practical preference or geo-strategic advantage, but is 
rather a fundamental factor in Chinese national identity. If any one of Tibet, Xinjiang 
or Taiwan were to become an independent state, it would not simply be a physical 
change to mapping, but a deep and psychological loss. It would also signal 
inexcusable failure on the part of the CCP, and represent a serious threat to the 
perception that the Party was a true representative of the Chinese people’s interests 
and values (Kallio 2011, 13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A car parked in a side street of central Beijing, clearly indicating the importance of territorial 
integrity in the Chinese national logic. Photograph taken by the author, March 2011 
 
My students felt that China’s territorial integrity was such an important component of 
what it meant to be Chinese that anger at past and potential territorial incursions had 
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become the foundation of Chinese nationalism. It seemed from class discussions that 
students strongly believed that nationalism in its angry form had developed since the 
Century of Humiliation, based on rage about foreign incursions. There was 
considerable discussion among my students about the different kinds of love for 
country, and which was the “right one”. As they explained, the term ‘nationalism’ 
entailed negative connotations of anger and defensiveness. On the other hand, 
‘patriotism’, like rational nationalism, was understood to hold a different and more 
positive meaning.  
 
Students preferred to describe themselves and their own love of China in ‘rational 
nationalist’ terms. Students argued that anger at incursions into Chinese territory was 
no longer the basis of their own ‘rational’ nationalism. They suggested that while 
anger over territorial disputes may still well form the basis of some people’s Chinese 
nationalism, it should not, because staying angry about “invaders of previous 
centuries” was unhelpful. These students pointed out that “continuous anger won’t 
help, nationalism shouldn’t be presented like this, we should remember the past, but 
we need to move past the anger”.  
 
Their differentiation between a proper, rational love of China and angry nationalism 
neatly reflected government efforts since the early 1990s to promote a positive, 
country loving kind of ‘patriotism’ (Zhao 1998, 290-291).29 As Layla pointed out,  
 
According to Western media, nationalism is a very negative term, so we need 
to be careful how we use the word, and the government needs to be careful 
how it uses the idea. It is not a stable sentiment, it can be dangerous, but … 
we should have love for country, but…love for country doesn’t have to be 
negative. 
 
In response to this remark, the one non-Chinese student in the class, a young Russian 
man, asked Layla whether she thought that nationalism in China might be “unstable” 
because it was founded on anger and humiliation. Buddy argued that actually Chinese 
                                                
29 ‘Patriotism’ is officially understood to mean supporting the political status quo, the Party-state 
system, and the leadership role of the CCP in Chinese society. Zhao (1998, 290-291) argues that since 
1992, CCP leaders have increasingly stressed patriotism (aiguo zhuyi 爱国主义), “loving the state”, 
being the “Communist state”, as a means to give people something to believe in.  
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nationalism “is a little bit exaggerated [by Western media] because the Chinese 
government wants to use patriotism, not nationalism, as its preferred choice”. Another 
student, a thoughtful young woman, Wendy, argued that,  
 
Now the Chinese government suppresses the trend of nationalism because it 
will make people irrational, like during the Olympic years, there was too 
much anger against Westerners. I read a book that says that Chinese people 
never believed in Gandhi’s way of changing the world – they believed no 
violence, no revolution. 
 
Despite their claims to ‘rationality’, when I asked students as a group how they would 
feel if someone suggested that Xinjiang be a separate state, there was no doubt that 
their immediate reaction was very angry indeed. Although my students claimed to 
hold a form of nationalism more well-considered and intellectualised than the ‘angry 
nationalism’ of ‘other people’, it was evident that they held a passionate anger just 
below the surface.  
 
Some students seemed to recognise this tension between the ideal of rational 
nationalism and the existence of very strong anger at the root of their love of China. 
Song posed a question in class about whether it was possible to be a nationalist and 
not be angry. Wendy, replied that yes, it was possible, but it was not at all easy. She 
went on to describe how she had noticed herself becoming angry when she was 
collecting images in preparation for her presentation for class on whether nationalism 
was a factor in foreign policy (based on readings by Gries 2004 and Starr 2001 
[1997]). Below are two of the slides from her presentation, which came with the 
heading “My View”, which she showed to illustrate her argument that nationalism 
was indeed a critical component in Chinese foreign policy. As the examples 
demonstrate, Wendy chose to represent Chinese nationalism with images of China as 
weakened, beaten and humbled; followed by Chinese people adopting powerful 
stances while expressing anti-American sentiments.   
117 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Slide taken from Wendy’s class presentation on Chinese nationalism, November 2009 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Slide taken from Wendy’s class presentation on Chinese nationalism, November 2009 
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Attitudes towards Japan were another lens through which I was able to observe my 
students’ sentiments about territorial integrity. Edward Friedman has argued that 
when Deng came to power in 1977, “anti-Japan nationalism became a great 
legitimating glue to hold the society together” (in an interview with Bernard 
Gwertzman, 2008). However, the Hu administration sought better relations with 
Japan since the early 2000s, and pursued the careful control and management, rather 
than indiscriminate stoking, of anti-Japanese sentiment. Regardless, anti-Japanese 
sentiment remained very strong among my students at CFAU. In a number of my 
classes, when the discussion turned to attitudes towards Japan, students would call out 
their opinions and comments in an unusually unhesitant way. Any student who did 
not express his or her passionate commitment to China’s territorial integrity by 
vehemently loathing Japan was roundly and angrily criticised by his or her class-
mates. Students would only present any apparent interest in the country in terms of 
how it could be used as a lesson to further China’s interests. As far as my students 
were concerned, China’s ongoing troubled relationship with Japan was premised on a 
long and complicated history. It was a particularly intractable situation, as they 
argued, because Japan would not satisfactorily acknowledge the atrocities it 
committed in the Sino-Japanese War.  
 
The strength of my students’ anti-Japanese sentiments and their justification for their 
feelings demonstrated their commitment to the idea of territorial integrity. Their anti-
Japanese fervour was a sentiment that remained squarely in the realm of undisputed 
doxa. Indeed, I got the sense that some of my students were deliberately avoiding 
reflecting on the issue, for fear of reaching a conclusion that did not fit well with the 
prevailing narratives. Students had many opportunities to explore other perspectives 
on the issue of Sino-Japanese history in particular and territorial disputes in general. 
The virtual uniformity in their expressed views illustrates the extent to which they had 
internalised the belief that participating in the nationalist discourse of anti-Japanese 
sentiment was for their own good. 
 
Economic growth 
 
The second pillar of the Party-state’s construction of Chineseness was economic 
growth. Wealth and financial security were regarded by my CFAU students as both 
119 
 
 
prerequisites for and results of social and political stability. Since Deng began the 
Reform and Opening Up process in 1978, the foundational principle of CCP policy 
has been that poverty is the cause of social dissatisfaction and unrest. The strategy 
undertaken to prevent social instability has therefore been to encourage wealth 
acquisition. Deng’s famous saying that “it doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white 
so long as it catches mice”, meaning that how wealth is made is not so important as 
just making it, comes from this time. However, while economic growth has increased 
remarkably in China over the past three decades, it has occurred very unevenly. For 
the most part, the eastern coastal regions of the country have benefited, but far less 
development has been seen in the central and western areas thus far. This is not 
surprising as Deng’s programme was to develop the east first, based on the rationale 
that wealth would ‘trickle down’ from the coastal regions and eventually reach the 
poorest regions and segments of the population. However, the Chinese government 
has recognised that rising levels of inequality are a serious and growing problem. The 
most recent (2011) Five Year Plan has a “pro-poor” approach focusing on smoothing 
out the economic disparities through “human-centred development”. This seems to 
reflect a broadly accepted assumption that if growth slows or stagnates, and the 
existing wealth is not distributed more evenly, the economic discrepancies will 
continue to widen and have the potential to create major unrest (Kallio 2011, 13).30 
 
My students at CFAU argued that widespread poverty, tragic famine and terrifying 
chaos were still prominent in many Chinese people’s memories. They believed that it 
was therefore not surprising that most people’s primary goal in life, including 
themselves, was to enjoy a peaceful life with somewhere secure to live and enough to 
eat. In the first week of class, during self-introductions, many of the students set out 
their life goals in exactly this way. They described their ideal futures in terms of 
getting a job that would allow them to earn enough to have economic security and 
marry well. Cherie, for example, explained that her career goal was “to be an office 
worker, then manager or chairman, to earn lots of money, and then I can just be happy 
every day”. In the same vein, many of the girls described their perfect marriage 
partner as someone who could take care of them financially. As Kathy answered in 
                                                
30 According to the most widely accepted measurement of inequality, the Gini coefficient, China’s 
economic inequalities puts the country into a high-risk category for social unrest.  
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response to a question about her ideal husband, she was looking for someone who 
was: 
 
Not necessarily handsome, but able to be responsible for my family and me. 
He must be between 1.75 and 1.88 metres tall, he must love me and treat me 
very well, and he will need a good economic basis, so he must be more 
educated than me.  
 
It was evident that the government priority of economic wealth as a prerequisite for 
social wellbeing was also important to the CFAU students in their everyday lives. 
 
In addition to this belief in the necessity of wealth and economic stability at a 
personal level, students also discussed how economic growth and strength were 
critical elements of China’s national interests in the international realm. As Primo 
noted in his mid-semester essay,  
 
The national interest of China has been redefined and reshaped. Now, the 
most important components are economic interests and political interests, both 
of which are especially important for China’s national security.  
 
Students saw China’s pursuit of its national interests as occurring both in the domestic 
sphere and internationally, as these two realms were closely interlinked. According to 
students, domestic growth and strength (both economic and psychological) would 
lead to international recognition and dignity, which would in turn bring benefits back 
to China. 
 
Overall, my students tended to accept the proposition that economic growth was 
centrally important to China’s stability, both domestically and internationally, and 
that a strong economy was a fundamental element of China regaining its rightful 
position on the world stage. Students spoke of how China must expand and develop 
its economy in order to “catch up with others” and as a “matter of national pride” to 
show other countries that China was no longer weak, as it had been in the nineteenth 
century when it was “invaded”. Students across all my classes made the same points, 
arguing that “we do place economic development as first priority”, and that a “strong 
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domestic economy helps us become stronger, and gives us the power to defend our 
rights in international society”. Students saw China’s domestic economic strength as a 
critical element in the country’s quest to overcome the Century of Humiliation and 
regain its lost dignity both domestically and in the international arena. Students also 
argued that becoming more economically powerful and taking its place in the world 
would enable China to contribute to global peace, as “in our heart we want to devote 
ourselves to protecting the world”. 
 
At the same time as students saw building China’s economic growth as a means to re-
establish its international dignity, they also saw regional and international stability 
and security as critical to China’s domestic developmental interests. Students broadly 
understood that a peaceful international environment was a prerequisite for China’s 
own continued economic growth. Regional stability was considered particularly 
important for China’s development. Students emphasised the great lengths to which 
China went to ensure that countries geographically close to China did not feel 
threatened by its growing economic power. To this end, students saw China’s 
development assistance to other countries, especially those in China’s immediate 
region, as a means of ensuring broader stability and security, which in turn, would 
secure China’s own domestic interests. As Johnny explained it,  
 
China’s extreme growth might make other countries feel uncomfortable and 
envious. So if China still focuses too much on economic development, it could 
cause instability. The Chinese government is aware of this, and that’s why it 
gives aid to stop other countries feeling threatened by its growth.  
 
Johnny was perfectly correct in his understanding, as within the roughly equal 
distribution of its assistance between Africa and Asia, China does focus its aid on 
countries with which it shares borders.31 However, several China analysts argue that 
China’s efforts to use development assistance to support the economic growth of 
neighbouring countries and thereby create a peaceful and secure regional 
environment, are inchoate at best, if not actually counter-productive (see for example 
Fenby 2012; and Varrall 2012).  
                                                
31 As explained to me in a telephone conversation with a Chinese aid official from the Ministry of 
Commerce, Beijing, June 2012 
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While students seemed to accept the importance of economic growth as a means of 
achieving stability within China, security in the immediate region, and peace on a 
broader global scale, many of them also suggested that there were more direct 
political implications within China itself. For example, the student who commented 
on “economic development as first priority” made the point in the context of a 
discussion about Party legitimacy. Another student remarked that she had read,  
 
An article which said that the difference between China and other countries is 
the CCP. That is, in China, everything serves the Party, the army is the Party’s 
army, the economy is a tool for legitimacy to prove what the Party has done.... 
Well, I guess this makes some sense. We do place economic development as 
first priority, but it is a means to an end, the legitimacy of the Party. 
 
Students considered this situation in which “everything serves the Party” to be 
unproblematic. For example, Benny responded to the above remark by saying, “I 
agree, and I think the ends do justify the means”. Similarly, a student in the other 
International Economics class talked about the importance of economic development, 
as without it, the CCP’s legitimacy would be at risk. In another class on the same 
theme, Ken laughingly said that “if Harry was here, he would say that the media has 
brainwashed us!” I asked Ken if he thought Harry might be right, to which he replied, 
“well, maybe a little bit right…”. These exchanges show that for students, discussing 
Party politics and political motivations for policy behaviour was acceptable. Just as in 
many of the other topics in the realm of the disputable, students largely accepted the 
official discourse and aligned themselves with the orthodox position. In this case, 
while they seemed comfortable in discussing the motivations and implications of 
growth, they all agreed that economic growth was essential for stability, and stability 
was understood in terms of continued CCP leadership. No student ever questioned 
whether stability under the CCP was the ideal social situation, suggesting that this 
was thoroughly within the realm of undisputable doxa.  
 
Integrated identity 
 
Projecting unity and coherence is a core task of state-making anywhere. In China, the 
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state’s projection of itself as a moral actor with the ultimate right to define what 
constitutes Chineseness has played a central role in the state-building process 
(Thornton 2007, 12,14). A unifying ideology is the third pillar of the CCP’s 
construction of the Chinese national identity. According to this ideology of unified 
Chineseness, the Party, the state, the country and the people are all foundational 
elements of an overarching and mutually constitutive common identity, in which if 
one dimension of the whole fails, the entire structure is in danger of collapsing. As 
such, each part of the unified whole relies on the continued existence of all the others. 
A critical element in the CCP’s narrative of its own continuity and ongoing 
legitimacy is engendering a sense that each individual is Chinese above all else, 
sharing a particular and agreed Chinese history, experiencing a certain Chinese 
present, and moving forward into a greater Chinese future (on nationalism as a 
unifying ideology in China, see for example Wang 2012, 119-120). This sense of 
integrated identity underpinned my students’ conception of what it means to be a 
good Chinese citizen. Students explained to me that the essence of this sense of being 
a part of a greater Chinese whole is contained in the Chinese word for country or 
state: guojia    (国家), made up of the character for country (guo:国) and the character 
for family (jia:家 ). For these students, the integrated identity of Chineseness 
transcends ethnic boundaries, and links to the state-sponsored image of a strong, rich 
and unified China. 
 
On many occasions, Chinese friends and colleagues, as well as CFAU students, 
explained to me that the nature of the relationship between the Chinese state and the 
people is fundamentally different from that in the West. For example, while at a 
conference in Papua New Guinea on Asia’s growing role in the Pacific, I was talking 
to a young, male Chinese professor from the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR) who had been sent to the conference to present 
China’s perspective. After a couple of drinks over dinner one night, Professor Wang 
and I began talking about the differences in perspective between China and ‘the West’. 
He raised the topic of Chinese writer Liu Xiaobo winning the Nobel Peace Prize, and 
said that while basically most Chinese people understood that human rights and 
democracy were good and important, pushing the issue “in that way, from the 
outside” would not work: “Doing so just serves to make the Chinese government 
angry and the people upset”. He then asked me whether it was the same when 
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Western countries got criticised by outsiders. I said that when Australian government 
policy was criticised internationally, it generally did not make Australians feel ‘hurt’ 
in our hearts in the same way Chinese people seem to react when China was criticised. 
He asked why, and I said I thought it was probably something to do with the 
separation of the people and the state. He looked extremely interested and said, 
“because, you know, so many people don’t understand things like how the 
relationship between people and state in China is... is…like a family”. I said, “do you 
mean guojia?” A smile lit up Wang’s face, and he said enthusiastically, “yes! Yes, 
exactly!”  
 
My students at CFAU felt very strongly that the idea of guojia, or ‘country-family’ 
expressed the relationship between people and the state in China very well. They 
believed that the term encapsulated a relationship that is different from the traditional 
Western understanding of a social contract between two mutually exclusive, rational, 
self-interested entities. Indeed, one student in the Diplomacy major argued that guojia 
traditionally meant “the whole of society”, that is, “that society is the state, and the 
state is society”. This intermeshing between people and the state arose on several 
occasions in my CFAU classes. For example, in one lesson focused on the role of 
culture in Chinese foreign policy, we discussed what constitutes Chinese culture. The 
reading for the week was ‘Social and Political Life’, chapter six of Lin’s book, My 
Country and My People (1998 [1935]).32 In this chapter, Lin argues that Chinese 
society is based on obligation to family rather than society, and thereby individuals 
seek interests and honour for themselves and their family sometimes at a cost to 
society at a larger level, in the form of corruption and nepotism. From discussing the 
issues raised by the chapter, several points about how the students understood their 
relationship with the state and country as being part of an integrated whole emerged.  
 
Lin’s chapter explained how Chinese society was based on “the family mind” rather 
than “the social mind”. As one student explained, the term ‘family mind’ implied that 
the “family system is the spring for the whole social system, including the 
government”. Other students understood the family mind to mean that just as in a 
                                                
32 As explained in Chapter Three, I had given students the Lin Yutang reading without revealing the 
identity of the author, and the overall reaction was very negative until students discovered that Lin was 
in fact a Chinese writer.  
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family, where relationships mattered more than rules and regulations, so it was in the 
larger ‘family’ of the Chinese nation-state.  In this larger family, the government (not 
clearly defined as being either the Party or the administrative system) took the role of 
parent, and the Chinese people were the children. As such, students explained, “strict 
parenting” was appropriate and also necessary. As one female student observed,  
 
Some parents let their children decide and choose for themselves. The 
government should be.... well, it depends on how old the child is. I mean, if 
they are babies, well of course the parents have to have more control. Chinese 
people are teenagers. We are trying to fight for the ability to be adults, but 
sometimes we are immature, so we need the government to tell us how to 
behave.  
 
Most students tended to agree with this position, saying that, for example, “children, 
the Chinese people, still have to check with their parents, the government, to approve 
things” (e.g. Fong 2004). In another class, Ricky argued that “as Confucius says, if 
the family was well, the country will be well. So, if the leaders treat the country as a 
family, the country will get better”. His friend Ken added,  
 
Controlling the country is just like cooking a meal. The idea is that you can’t 
treat it too ‘luan’, I mean, let it be too chaotic, it has to be more ordered. 
Ricky means the family is the basic unit of society, if one family is stable, 
many families are stable, society is stable. Everyone is related. The 
government is the parent or the chef. 
 
According to this characterisation, students believed that it was right that the 
government, in a parental role, should exercise control over the “immature” people 
for the benefit of society as a whole.  
 
Students’ attitude towards media censorship is a useful illustration of the way in 
which they conceived of society and state as forming a family unit. That the Chinese 
media exercises censorship was a well-accepted fact among my students, however, to 
what extent the government ought to be controlling access to information was hotly 
debated. Most of my students felt that it was appropriate for the government to censor 
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and control the availability of information to protect the Chinese people. Generally, 
students saw media censorship as good parenting, and argued that while perhaps the 
government should move towards less censorship, the transition should be slow and 
careful. For example, in one class in which we were discussing the media, one student 
commented that he hated censorship in any media system. Immediately, his friend 
Ricky joked that “it’s Chinese culture to censor the media, a Chinese characteristic to 
ask the media to stabilise society”. Laura replied that, 
 
Any country has censorship, it’s necessary, it’s fundamental. We need it in 
order to prevent confusion in the mind of the people, to prevent chaos. The 
government needs to control culture via the media to keep things clear. 
 
Ken added rather ominously, “social elites have more experience, they know what 
will happen...”.  
 
Carolyn noted that she thought that government control of online opinions was a good 
thing, as people without proper knowledge could otherwise just say whatever they 
liked and stir up trouble. She felt that it “would be disastrous to be completely open”. 
Several students agreed that lifting government controls over the media too quickly 
would indeed be “disastrous.” Further, students said they felt that government media 
controls are important as, “if anybody can access all the facts all at once, we can’t 
accept them; so the government should open up our access to information slowly”. 
Another student, Sebastian, argued that, 
 
It is very important to dominate [people’s] minds, to make sure their minds go 
along with the mainstream… I think allowing views on the net is a good way 
to let out emotion, but whenever a country can’t dominate people’s minds, 
problems appear. This is the most important thing, because China has such a 
unique context, like its large population, so if everybody thinks the same way, 
the force goes in a straight line, China is more powerful. 
 
At this point, Cello shot back, “that is extremely frightening to me”, to which 
Sebastian responded, “maybe Cello misunderstood me, what I meant was that in a 
larger sense, it is important to stay together, that is how to make China strong”. Like 
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Sebastian, many students saw the censorship of the media as a necessary, if at times 
annoying, means to ensure social unity and stability. These broader social goals were 
considered far more important than any individual’s ability to access the media at 
will.  
 
Despite the general trend among students to adopt the prevailing orthodoxy on issues 
like media censorship, this did not mean that students were not able to express any 
negative views or criticisms at all. I noticed a remarkable difference between the 
students I had taught in Tianjin in 1999 and my CFAU students in 2009-2010 
regarding their willingness to discuss government policy. In 1999, students were 
observably afraid to even mention the topic of media censorship. Over a decade later, 
my students at CFAU were able to express dissatisfaction with the Party-state 
regarding particular topics, as long as they did not go beyond the accepted 
parameters. Another example was how my students quite comfortably railed against 
what they saw as isolated incidences of local corruption. They seemed to regard 
corruption among local officials as a well-known fact. This suspicion extended to 
some higher-level officials – though never to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, who they 
understood as ‘clean’.  
 
Students’ willingness to discuss issues like media censorship and Party corruption 
reflects a new government approach to monitoring and control. For example, in the 
media, the government is no longer as concerned with politically critical content as 
perceived encouragement to translate criticism into real-life action (King et al. 2012). 
This sophisticated system of “controlled flexibility” in the blogosphere aims 
censorship at “curtailing collective action” rather than focusing on expressions of 
political opinion. It does so by focusing on “silencing comments that represent, 
reinforce, or spur social mobilisation, regardless of content” (King et al. 2012).  
 
The approach of controlled flexibility reflects Hoffman’s analysis of new modes of 
governmentality in China. She argues that in this new model, while the state appears 
to be loosening its restrictions, it is rather shifting to an emphasis on self-governance 
in which self-directed self-improvement moves the locus of control from central 
authorities to subjects (2010, 11-13). Pieke makes similar observations about the 
changes in the presence of government in contemporary Chinese society, describing it 
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as “more powerful and resourceful and less direct and invasive” (2012, 149). This 
“flexible authoritarianism” is representative of a sophisticated shifting of the 
mechanisms of governmentality as a means of more effectively maintaining state 
power (Cabestan 2004, 2-7). My students’ negotiation of topics that had formerly 
been in the realm of the undiscussed reflected how extensively they had internalised 
this model of controlled flexibility. 
 
My students’ ability to express views that not so long ago would have been 
unthinkable reflects the Party-state’s sophisticated management of integrated identity. 
Certain technical aspects of how the state should be run are now situated in the realm 
of the debatable. Being aware of and frustrated with government corruption and 
media censorship are just two examples of issues which have been allowed to move 
from the field of doxa into a realm in which students could choose to locate 
themselves somewhere between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. For the most part, my 
students chose to align more closely with the orthodox perspective. However, their 
belief in the importance of unity and coherence remained firmly within the realm of 
the undisputed. It was very difficult for them to conceive of themselves as anything 
other than unchangeably Chinese, and being Chinese as being part of a family in 
which the state was a firm but fair parental figure. Any suggestion to the contrary was 
met with emotional and inarticulate responses, often anger, suggesting the extent to 
which these notions had not been thought about or any position consciously decided 
upon. 
 
The Difference Between “We Chinese” and You, the Rest of the World:  
 
One of the implications of the integrated identity discourse was how students 
conceptualised anything or anyone not Chinese. Because my students did not 
conceive of the state and society as separate, discrete elements, but rather as being 
inextricably linked within a metaphorical family unit, everything and everyone not 
Chinese was simply part of a single imagined community of “outside China”.  
 
I came across this sense of “we Chinese” (women Zhongguoren: 我们中国人) as a 
unique category that “you outsiders” (nimen waiguoren: 你们外国人, you [mostly 
always undifferentiated] foreigners) could never hope to genuinely understand on 
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many occasions during my time in China. During my fieldwork at CFAU, and in 
casual conversations with friends, shopkeepers, hairdressers, taxi drivers, or 
university professors, many new or apparently inexplicably ‘Chinese’ things were 
described (not explained) to me by calling on this trope of difference. Fong found that 
the Chinese citizens in her study “often experienced and discussed the developed 
world as if it were one imagined community” (2011, 6). She describes how her 
Chinese interlocutors contrasted “how things were done in China…by Chinese 
people” with how “foreigners” did things in “foreign countries”, as if all “foreign 
countries were part of one single country, and all the foreigners shared the same 
nationality” (ibid., 6-7).  Similarly, when my friends and students explained how “we 
Chinese” did things, they usually did so with the assumption that I would not be able 
to understand, and they were rather simply demonstrating that how Chinese people 
saw and did things was fundamentally different from the West. For example, when 
travelling by taxi in Beijing, we were almost hit by another car, but the driver did not 
respond at all. I asked him whether he was not angry, and he said, of course he was, 
but that “we Chinese” do not express our anger over something we cannot change. In 
the same way, my students at CFAU would explain their reluctance to do the readings 
I set them and participate in class discussions in terms of  “we Chinese don’t study in 
this way”.  
 
One particularly distinctive example of how ‘the outsider’ could never truly 
understand ‘the Chinese’ was in relation to ‘face’.  The concept came up many times 
in my classes at CFAU, often in relation to how it underpinned political decision-
making, both domestically and in regard to China’s role in the international arena, 
now as well as in the past. In conversations across all the classes in which we 
discussed the concept of face, I noticed a very strong tendency for students to assume 
that because I was a foreigner, I would never be able to understand what face really 
meant. They told me that there was simply no equivalent word in English, and as soon 
as we started to use English words to try and describe the concept, the term lost its 
essential sense.  
 
Students’ epistemological position in which concepts and ideas existed that were 
common only to Chinese people led into discussions about what made a person 
‘Chinese’, whether Chinese people could ever stop being Chinese, and whether 
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outsiders could ever become Chinese. Students considered it possible that people born 
overseas of Chinese parents could become citizens of another country, but that this 
did not equate to them becoming not-Chinese. Students used the term ‘ABCs’ or 
‘BBCs’ to describe individuals with Chinese heritage born overseas. The acronyms 
stand for American/Australian or British-born Chinese, that is, despite being born 
elsewhere, still fundamentally Chinese. Similarly, it was inconceivable to my students 
that foreigners born and raised in China could ever become Chinese. Indeed, the very 
notion met with furrowed brows and confused shaking of heads. My students’ first 
reaction, for the most part, would be to laugh at such an absurd notion. As one student 
explained, “foreigners can’t become Chinese because they believe in God, okay, well, 
even if they don’t believe in God, that idea has too deeply influenced them”. Even if 
an individual was born in China from parents who themselves were born in China, 
students did not believe they could really be considered truly Chinese. When I tried to 
clarify why this was the case, students once again seemed unable to express 
themselves. As when discussing nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment, knowing 
what constituted Chineseness was difficult for students to articulate. The students had 
so internalised the immutability of Chineseness that they simply knew that only 
Chinese people could ever be Chinese, and could never stop being Chinese.  
 
In the preceding section, I argued that the Chinese Party-state represents itself as 
guardian of three key pillars, namely territorial integrity, economic growth, and a 
unifying ideology of integrated Chinese identity. Overall, my students articulated 
views very closely aligned with these official discourses. Rather than a retreat of the 
Chinese state in how and what Chinese people think, I argue that questions not 
deemed existentially fundamental, but rather dealing with the technicalities of how to 
govern better, have been moved from the realm of doxa to the realm of the discussed. 
Despite being open to debate, however, my students tended to err on the side of 
orthodoxy although they had ample access to contending views. It remained in the 
realm of the undisputable that students would resist the orthodox view because of the 
benefits of conforming. For my students, professional and personal success was a 
strong incentive to ensure their beliefs on those issues deemed debatable were 
appropriate. How the Party-state maintained and controlled what was in the universe 
of the disputable and what remained unthinkable required considerable efforts, as the 
next section will discuss.  
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Mass Persuasion:  How the Chinese state presents itself as a technique 
of governance 
 
As Bourdieu argues, every established order tends to produce “the naturalisation of its 
own arbitrariness”, or field of doxa, in which knowledge of the social world comes to 
be seen as self-evident and undisputed (1977, 164). When internalised norms and 
values fit neatly with objective structures and external norms, the “established 
cosmological and political order is perceived not as arbitrary, i.e. as one possible 
order among others, but as a self-evident and natural order which goes without saying 
and therefore goes unquestioned” (ibid., 166). In producing doxa, Bourdieu notes the 
importance of highly stable objective structures which “reproduce themselves in the 
agents’ dispositions”. The more they do so, “the greater the extent of the field of 
doxa, of that which is taken for granted” (ibid., 165-166). Reproduction and 
reduplication in every possible sphere of socialisation helps “the world conform to the 
myth”, so that “between the child and the world” there is nothing that intervenes or 
“disenchants”, but rather the “whole universe of ritual practises, and also of 
discourses, sayings, proverbs” are all structured to concord with the doxa (ibid., 167). 
To be able to create this self-reinforcing universe of truth requires “the dominant 
classes” to very deliberately prevent the exposure of the “abitrariness of the taken for 
granted”. Those in power must diligently toil to “defend the integrity of the doxa” 
(ibid., 169). 
 
Bourdieu’s ideas of how doxa is created and maintained can be complemented by 
more recent work targeted particularly at understanding how the nation is constructed. 
As Ann Anagnost points out, the discourse of ‘the nation’ can be understood as a 
narrative that tries to draw and hold together an otherwise “impossible unity” that 
“must be narrated into being in both time and space” (1997, 2). Likewise, Judith 
Butler writes, “the nation-state can only reiterate its own basis for legitimation by 
literally producing the nation that serves as the basis for its legitimation” (Butler and 
Spivak 2007, 31). In different points of time and space, how the Chinese “national 
community” has been “imagined”, in the words of Benedict Anderson (2006 [1983]), 
has changed remarkably, as have the discourses and practices involved in creating, 
transmitting and perpetuating that imagined entity. The structures and processes of 
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power, the means of communicating ideals, and the contestations and negotiations of 
meaning have seen remarkable and often radical shifts in direction in China over the 
past 60 years. By virtue of the nature of narrative itself, the project of creating an 
imagined nation-state can never be completed. The very performativity of language 
precludes the existence of any fixed meaning of who or what the national community 
is (Anagnost 1997, 3). The gaps and inconsistencies that narratives of nations work so 
hard to bridge over and fill in can always hold the potential to reappear in a moment 
of crisis. In a rapidly changing environment, such as China’s, this potential is very 
real indeed.  
 
The Chinese Communist Party must exert considerable ongoing efforts to “produce 
the nation” across all of the three pillars set out above and clearly articulate the Party-
state ideology and political programme in order to retain the support of the people 
(Brown 2011, 1). There is a long list of institutions whose job it is to analyse these 
very issues, including but not limited to, the Party History Teaching and Research 
Department at the Central Party School; the Party History Research Centre, the Party 
Literature Research Centre and the Party Building Bureau Policy Research Office in 
the Central Committee; the Party Building Research Institute; the General Office in 
the Central Commission and Inspection, CCP; and the Research Office of the 
Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee. However despite all this 
research activity, garnering agreement on a consistent narrative acceptable across all 
the “wings and flanks” of the CCP has been a challenge, both in the current time and 
throughout the Party’s history (Brown 2011, 1).  
 
Considerable skill is required to communicate these shifting messages at the same 
time as maintaining the continuity of the other narratives central to the Party-state’s 
continued relevance. As Brown points out, the Party-state not only has to meet the 
challenges of running the country, but also needs to simultaneously communicate its 
achievements to “an impossibly complex constituency” (2011, 3). The vast 
differences within the Chinese population in geographical location, ethnic identity, 
and increasingly disparate socio-economic levels create considerable difficulties in 
communicating in a way that appeals to the majority of the population. Of late the 
Party has found that the language it has traditionally used to “deliver propaganda 
about economic achievements” has been judged as “stilted and formulaic”, and 
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lacking in emotional appeal. The CCP is reportedly “deeply frustrated at how its 
message is not getting through – not only to the rest of the world, but to many of its 
own people” (ibid., 1). Brown’s research, conducted with David Shambaugh, suggests 
that the Party is looking for a new kind of language with which to capture people’s 
imaginations and reconnect with them (ibid., 3). 
 
This frustration regarding effective communication comes despite concerted efforts to 
build popular support for Party rule through what Brady terms “mass persuasion” 
(2009), particularly after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. Citing internal Party 
documents, Brady argues that the current Chinese government recognises the 
importance of communication – propaganda and thought work – as integral, the “life 
line” (shengmingxian: 生命线 ) of the Party-state. She notes that since 1989, 
considerable resources have been deployed to update CCP ideology so that it better 
matches China’s rapidly changing social and economic environment (ibid., 453). 
Many in the CCP blamed the events of 1989 on too much of a focus on ensuring 
support through performance (economic growth) and neglecting the importance of 
strategic communication – a reaction to the decreased emphasis on ideological control 
after Mao’s death in 1976. In the years following, the CCP began to very deliberately 
adopt a ‘two-handed’ approach, in which both performance-based and persuasion-
based legitimacy were deemed equally important. To strengthen its ability to 
persuade, since 1989 the CCP has deliberately deployed methods of political public 
relations, mass communication, social psychology, and other modern techniques of 
mass persuasion commonly used in Western societies (ibid., 434). As in Mao’s era, 
the Party-state today uses the full range of available resources to transmit its message 
to the Chinese people, working on the theory that the more popular a medium is, the 
more it can “get into their ears, their brains, their hearts” (rue er, ru nao, ru xin: 入耳
入脑入心), as Ding Guang’en, propaganda chief from 1992 to 2002, was fond of 
saying (ibid., 442). All aspects of Chinese popular culture, including films, songs, 
poems, and books, were targeted as part of the patriotic education campaign 
(Callahan 2010, 16; Wang 2012, 108). 
 
The media play an important role in imagining the nation-state and communicating 
what it is to be a proper Chinese. In the 1990s, the Central Propaganda Department 
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designated television as the key tool for domestic and foreign audiences alike, making 
it the preferred medium for presenting propaganda and delivering indications about 
correct attitudes (Landsberger 2010, 567). Three per cent of prime time advertising 
space was required to be allocated for sophisticated, well-made institutional television 
‘partymercials’ in order to support general propaganda themes such as national unity 
or stressing the central and historically inevitable role of the CCP in China’s 
development (ibid., 567). One particularly good example of how television has been 
used to subtly but effectively transmit norms and values is the Beijing TV series, 
“Golden Wedding” (Jin Hun: 金婚). The series allowed viewers to see a highly 
selective version of China’s political history through the lives of a married couple 
(Brady 2009, 442). While in the late 1970s, there was only one television set per 1000 
people in China, by 2007 the rate of television ownership was almost 100 per cent. 
Thanks also to a government project to donate televisions and extend satellite 
coverage to all corners of China, even the most remote communities could watch 
these government-made, normatively-loaded partymercials and prime time soap 
operas.  
 
In addition to how information is managed in the arena of television, far from being a 
means of contesting power, text messaging and the internet have functioned to 
strengthen the Party’s mass communication work. As part of a carefully considered 
response to the Colour Revolutions calling for political change in Eastern Europe, in 
December 2005 the government stepped up its vigilance, and text messaging is now 
monitored closely by 2800 surveillance centres (Brady 2009, 443). The CCP has also 
embraced internet technology and developed a system of controls which it regularly 
updates as part of its vigilant surveillance. Various government agencies, including 
the Ministry of Public Security, the State Council Information Office, and the newly 
established State Internet Information Office, all carry responsibilities for regulating 
the internet in China.  
 
Besides overseeing the content of various forms of media, the Party-state is also 
attentive to the way in which language itself is deployed in official messages to create 
the national imaginary. Since the first days of the People’s Republic of China, and 
well before, Chinese leaders have been acutely sensitive to the power of the word. As 
Thornton argues, “the persistent power of the written word as a technique of rule is 
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evident in the commitment of successive Chinese regimes to the careful compilation 
of canonical texts and standard histories, as well as the suppression of unofficial and 
alternative accounts” (2007, 15). This concern has a long history, for example, in pre-
modern China, political philosophers paid extensive attention to the use of language. 
Confucius argued in the Analects that when names are not correct – and what is said 
is therefore not reasonable – the affairs of state will not culminate in success, and the 
common people will not know how to do what is right. As such, “the Prince is never 
casual in his choice of words” (Confucius).33   
 
The concern with linguistic form in ensuring “the common people know what is 
right” is particularly noticeable in CCP political communications since 1949. Michael 
Schoenhals argues that while the leadership of the CCP agrees on few issues, they 
have achieved a remarkable consensus about the crucial role of ‘perlocutionary acts’34 
in gaining, consolidating and retaining Party legitimacy (1992, 5). Mao was well 
known for choosing his words with extreme care to avoid the dangerous causal 
relationship between “erroneous formulations”, “confused notions” and, ultimately, 
“inappropriate practices”. As he said in 1963, “one single [correct linguistic] 
formulation, and the whole nation will flourish; one single [incorrect] formulation and 
the whole nation will decline. What is referred to here is the transformation of the 
spiritual into the material” (ibid., 6).35 Certain formulations with their associated fixed 
forms are approved as being correct and scientific – referring to their political utility 
in producing the desired results, rather than being scientifically verifiable (ibid., 9). 
Regulations stipulate that synonyms may not replace approved words, should their 
utility be affected. I had first hand experience of the inflexibility of official linguistic 
formulations when editing the English translation of President Hu’s speech at the 
Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP. I was instructed that certain highlighted 
phrases were not to be revised. For example, I was not to make any changes to the 
following passage:  
 
                                                
33 Analects, 12, iii, 5-6 
34 John L. Austin uses this term to describe the intentional use of language to produce consequential 
effects upon the feelings, thoughts and actions of people (1962, 101) 
35 This particular example of how “erroneous formulations” in language ultimately lead to 
“inappropriate practices” comes from the winter of 1978-79, when the CCP leadership reversed its 
previously positive verdict on Mao’s final decade.  
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…thoroughly apply the Scientific Outlook on development, continue to 
emancipate the mind, persist in reform and opening up, pursue development in 
a scientific way, promote social harmony, and strive for new victories in 
building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.  
 
What is critical in the use of words is a certain and carefully considered formalisation 
through what some have termed as a kind of “linguistic impoverishment”, in which 
political language is limited to a selection of options which constitute a restricted 
code for conveying meaning (ibid., 1). British anthropologist Maurice Bloch’s (1975) 
analysis of political oratory in traditional society in Madagascar provides a useful set 
of tools for understanding the importance of how Chinese politicians express 
themselves, as much as what it is they say. As Bloch notes, the formulation of how 
things are said is a far more powerful means of control than simply creating a list of 
taboo topics. The reason that correct formulation is more effective is that “by defining 
and regulating the manner [in which things are expressed] the content is also, albeit 
indirectly, restricted”, and “this type of restriction is…much more powerful than a 
direct one on content, since it goes right through the whole range of political 
responses” (1975, 5). The use of prescribed linguistic formulations (tifa: 提法) is the 
topic of constant and ongoing strategic deliberation in the very highest levels of the 
CCP (Schoenhals 1992, 3; see also Nyiri 2006). 
 
Communication to produce a collective national imaginary requires an audience for 
and by whom it is conjured into being. The effectiveness of the nation-state’s 
message is mediated and negotiated by the audience, rather than having a uniform 
effect on public minds, as Brady’s analysis of propaganda in China has been criticised 
as implying (Reny 2010). The constantly changing environment and new challenges 
require ever more sophisticated and finessed responses – for example, to the issue of 
the increasing gap in socio-economic inequality. Many of my students at the CFAU 
had a sophisticated awareness of the machinations of power and control going on 
around them, particularly media censorship – but for the most part, they seemed to 
choose to align themselves with the orthodox perspective that national unity and 
stability and CCP legitimacy are the most important social goals. For example, most 
of my students knew of at least one proxy server through which they could access 
‘sensitive’ internet information. However, most of those who used proxy servers and 
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VPNs (virtual private networks) to access sites outside of China were not seeking 
information on politics or foreign affairs, but were logging on to social websites such 
as Facebook and YouTube. But even that was rare, given the popularity of the 
Chinese equivalents. Students strongly believed that media censorship was, 
ultimately, valuable in the pursuit of greater social stability.  
 
The CCP leadership is aware of and greatly frustrated by the ongoing difficulty of 
communicating effectively in fast changing times to a rapidly diversifying audience – 
both domestic and international. However, the Party-state-sponsored national logic 
was reflected in the explicit worldview of most of the CFAU students I taught. 
Among that group, Chinese government efforts to create an undisputable realm of 
doxa have been successful.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter opened with the question of how my students at CFAU related with the 
particular construction of the state in the Chinese context. Central to this construction 
was their perception of the relationship between the state and the people. For my 
students, this relationship was not one of dominance and subordination, but rather a 
family in which the Party-state took the role of the omniscient parent.  
 
The Party-state presented itself as the guardian of three key pillars of Chinese 
identity, namely: territorial integrity; stability through economic growth; and an 
integrated identity. My research suggests that these three pillars were unquestioned in 
my students’ social imaginary. The great majority of my students at the CFAU felt 
passionately about the Chinese state and what it meant to be part of the unified 
‘Chinese’ identity. They became angry when these notions were questioned or 
challenged, but were unable to clearly articulate the logic of their opinions, 
suggesting that these beliefs were deeply emotionally ingrained. Where topics were 
open for discussion in the realm of the debatable, students tended to align themselves 
with the orthodoxy.  
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However, there were a number of incidents outside of the classroom in which 
students did express views that went against the prevailing discourses. I noticed a 
discrepancy between what students would express in the classroom and among their 
peers, and what they would say to me directly. Each group generally had at least one 
student who would come up to me in the break or after the lesson to tell me that he or 
she did not agree with the sentiments that were being expressed by his or her 
classmates, but that he or she had not wanted to put forward a different opinion in 
class. For example, Cello spoke to me after class following her outburst about 
manipulative government to tell me that she had wanted to say more, but she felt that 
she would be best to not cause any trouble with her classmates.  
 
After one class, a student lingered, cleaning the blackboard while his classmates 
packed up their books and went to lunch. After the room had emptied, he said that he 
wanted to tell me that he had not agreed with what his classmates had been saying 
about Japan and he was sorry that he had not put forward his point of view in class. 
He was anxious for me to know that this was not because he had not carefully 
considered the issues, but rather because he was afraid of what his classmates might 
say. I asked what he was afraid of. He replied with great sincerity that while perhaps 
nothing negative would happen now, he was scared of what could happen in another 
twenty or thirty years if there was another Cultural Revolution, and his classmates 
remembered him as the one who had disputed Party authority, or disagreed with 
government policy. He said he simply could not take the risk. This confession came 
as quite a shock to me because of the depth of insecurity and fear he seemed to feel. 
These students were illustrative examples of Evasdottir’s notion of obedient 
autonomy, in which success in a system of interdependence such as at CFAU relied 
on participating in self-directed self-control. In this way, the complex and multi-
directional processes of power, the state as society, were experienced and lived in 
students’ daily lives.  
 
On other occasions, some students explicitly acknowledged that they were choosing 
to align with the orthodoxy. For example, I asked two of my students outside of class 
how much they genuinely believed that China had been carved up by Western 
imperialists, and that regaining Taiwan was paramount to China’s national pride. 
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One, a class monitor, replied casually that he believed it to be true “about 8 out of 
10”. He said,  
 
It’s part of the education system, it’s what we’re all taught. The history we’re 
taught is very shallow, it’s just a few dynasties, a few events, a few dates, 
there is never any analysis or deep reflection. In fact, history is not a hot topic 
or major to choose at schools, nobody wants to do it – it doesn’t get you 
anywhere. Nobody really believes that old ‘if you don’t know history you’re 
doomed to repeat it’ line. 
 
As these rare cases suggest, at least some of my CFAU students were ambivalent 
about their relationship with the dominant narratives. Some chose to align themselves 
with the orthodoxy because, as one student said, it was the best thing to do. However, 
none of my students ever went so far as to suggest that problems facing contemporary 
China could have been related to the inherent structure and functioning of the Party-
state system. The majority of students never strayed outside the universe of the 
debatable, the parameters of criticism tolerated by the Party-state as a ‘safety valve’ 
for discontent. Dissatisfaction never went so far as criticising the uppermost levels of 
Party-state power. Critique was limited to individual cases usually at local level, and 
not seen as symptomatic of a more systemically institutionalised phenomenon. 
Ultimately, students seemed to perceive China’s Party-state system as an inevitability 
that remained outside the realm of critique.  
 
Paul Willis’ classic work Learning to Labour addresses how relationships of power 
involve a mixture of both penetrations of power and the limitations on those 
penetrations (1977). Resistance, likewise, has its limits, which derive from culturally 
specific understandings of order, justice, success, and the like (Ortner 1995, 180-181). 
As Yurchak argues in regard to late-socialist Soviet Russia, understanding the 
‘performative’ dimensions of ritualised speech acts is central to moving beyond 
binary understandings of state/people relations as repressive-resistive (2006). What 
can seem to be contradictory views within my students’ social imaginary can be more 
helpfully understood as a “paradoxical mix of alienation and association with the 
ideals and realities of socialist life” (Ganguly 2007, 51). As Perry and Selden also 
point out, Chinese patterns of resistance are “rooted in historic contests and display 
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time-honoured beliefs and behaviours” (2000, 3). Following Bourdieu’s notion of 
doxa as the system of beliefs which are taken for granted to the extent that no other 
possibilities can be even conceived of, it appeared that a conceptual framework for 
thinking critically about the structures and functions of the Party-state was simply not 
a part of students’ perceptual architecture. As Ortner argues, “in a relationship of 
power, the dominant often has something to offer, and sometimes a great deal (though 
always of course at the price of continuing in power). The subordinate thus has many 
grounds for ambivalence about resisting the relationship” (1995, 175).36 Incidents like 
these few outlined above led me to conclude that while most of my students accepted 
the messages with which they had been socialised, there were some who do not – 
however they chose to say nothing at all.  
 
Because of the complex and multi-directional relationship between state power and 
the students at CFAU, students did not simply fully accept the message 
communicated by the state. Rather, they had internalised the utility of self-directed 
self-control, an ambivalence towards resisting power. The reason for doing so is 
neatly explained through what Evasdottir terms ‘obedient autonomy’, that is, getting 
ahead by accepting and working within the confines of power and control (2004). 
While fear of retribution did certainly play some role in students’ reluctance to 
publicly dispute the official doctrine, intimidation was only one of many complex 
elements that explain why CFAU students for the most part made great efforts to 
demonstrate their alignment with the dominant discourses of the state. Equally, or I 
would argue, more importantly, was the complex system of social relations and 
obligations in which students are enmeshed, as will be further outlined in Chapter 
Five. I argue that the way in which my students participated in rather than resisted 
orthodoxy, regardless of whether they genuinely believed it or not, is based on these 
social relations.  
 
Ortner’s (1995) argument that specific cultural factors play an important role in how 
individuals resist or absorb power can elucidate why students tended to align 
themselves with the dominant narratives of the state. One key aspect is the respect a 
civil service career commands. Chinese society has long admired the civil servant as a 
                                                
36 Ortner defines the terms ‘dominant’ and ‘subaltern’ not as single or unitary, but always within 
psychologically ambivalent and socially complex settings (1995, 175). 
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model of what it is to be a good and successful person. In addition, the career is 
considered very secure, with many non-salary perquisites. Being a civil servant also 
allows an individual to participate in a complex network of social and professional 
contacts from which his or her family can perhaps benefit. A fellow teacher (Chinese) 
at the CFAU explained the importance of this network to me when she described how 
angry and perplexed her family and friends were when she announced her decision to 
resign from the civil service and follow a career as an academic instead. When I 
asked why it mattered so much to them, she said that they thought she had been 
extremely selfish in her choice, because while the change might have suited her own 
goals, the new position would do her husband, her daughter, her nieces and her 
nephews no good at all. In her family’s eyes, she had thrown away an opportunity for 
all of them, not just herself. My CFAU students would have been operating under 
similar assumptions from their family members. However, in the contemporary 
Chinese society into which my CFAU students have now graduated it is notoriously 
difficult to gain entrance to a career in the civil service. As in the case of Yellow, 
many students have had to take any job that they can get, at low starting salaries of 
around RMB3000 (approximately USD500) per month, despite their intelligence, 
diligence, and loyalty to the Chinese Party-state.  
 
As Kipnis points out, young people in China today may have a better chance of well-
paid employment if they follow vocational training instead of tertiary studies at 
university (2011, 84-85).  Despite this well-known difficulty, Kipnis describes the 
almost universal desire for young people to enrol in university education across rural 
China (ibid.). He depicts the lengths to which parents will go in order to provide their 
children with the opportunity for tertiary study. Fong portrays a similar phenomenon 
in the desire to study overseas (2011). Even members of the extended family will take 
out loans, or scrimp on their own standards of living, to help send a young person to 
university. The social value of a university education is so high that all such sacrifices 
are deemed worthwhile. In addition to the social status, however, is the expectation 
that the money spent will represent a good investment. Students are all burdened with 
the knowledge of how much their families have given up for them to study at 
university. In the context of obligation and reciprocity outlined in more detail in the 
next chapter, students are in no position to squander the opportunity they have been 
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offered. Rather, they seek the most effective ways to succeed, and, as Evasdottir 
argues, this is often through maintaining the system as it currently exists.  
 
Evasdottir discusses how power relations work in an interdependent environment, that 
is, a context in which “it is taken as a given that a person cannot be (and would not 
desire to be) subjected to a separation from society but is instead always immersed in 
a web of social rules, hierarchies, structures, stereotypes, and norms” (2004, ix). Such 
an environment, as is the case at the CFAU, gives rise to “a self-directed control over 
change that takes effect only through the concerted effort to achieve and maintain a 
discourse of order and immutability” (ibid., x). That is, those hierarchically junior 
individuals seeking to become successful within the system have the most compelling 
incentives to maintain the stability of the system as it stands. Change, where it is 
required or desired at all, comes from participating in rather than challenging or 
resisting this system (ibid., x).  
 
Over the past decades, the Chinese Communist Party has been trying to transform 
itself into a Weberian bureaucratic machine. As Pieke has argued, after the shocking 
revelation in 1989 of just how weakly the state’s vision for China had permeated 
society, the Party began to actively create a Weberian state with a rule-bound 
bureaucracy that had never really existed before. The state building project in China 
is predicated on a process of “selective borrowing and mixing, producing a unique 
and evolving governmental rationality” that Pieke has termed “neo-socialism” (Pieke 
2012, 150). Under this model of government, the communist utopia of the decades up 
until Mao’s death “has been replaced by a technocratic objective of a strong, peaceful, 
and modern China that is almost synonymous with strong, effective, and forward-
looking government” (ibid., 150). Strategic communication, or propaganda, and 
national education have been key elements in achieving this new approach to 
governmentality in China.  
 
The diversity in students’ attitudes towards the notion of guojia; the debates in class 
around topics such as media censorship and control; and the way in which some 
students chose to participate in the mainstream discourses of power despite their 
personal feelings, suggest a relationship between people and power in China that is 
far more complex and nuanced than some commentators on China would allow. 
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While the Chinese Party-state in all its institutionalised forms of coercive power is 
forceful enough, it is the alignment with the idea of the state that “silences protest, 
excuses force and convinces almost all of us that the fate of the victims is just and 
necessary” (Abrams 1988, 81). For most of my students, the national logic was the 
most meaningful and beneficial form of identification. The ambivalent relationship 
my students had with state power brings to mind Ortner’s concept of ‘ethnographic 
refusal’ (1995). Ortner observes that studies of resistance often position subalterns as 
monolithic heroes dedicated to a struggle against power. She writes that “resistance 
studies are thin because they are ethnographically thin: thin on the internal politics of 
dominated groups, thin on the cultural richness of those groups, thin on the 
subjectivity – the intentions, desires, fears, projects – of the actors involved in those 
dramas” (ibid., 190). The understanding that state and society are a priori in clear and 
culturally unspecific relations of power and resistance very much disallows for the 
great complexities in the way the state, the Party, and the people are inextricably 
interrelated in China.  
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Chapter Five – Ourselves and Outsiders: 
Who is Obliged to Whom, and Why? 
 
Chinese people tend to label everything into different groups, including themselves. 
The criteria for classification may vary from one to another, however all will end up 
with two groups, i.e. ‘zijiren’, ourselves, and ‘wairen’, outsiders. For those in the 
category of wairen, he can enjoy the utmost courtesy from the Chinese counterpart, 
yet he will always be carefully guarded against at the same time. Chinese people will 
only entrust zijiren with the deepest secrets.  
      - Candy, Diplomacy Major 
 
This chapter will explore how the quotidian aspects of students’ university lives 
perpetuated their understandings of who constituted insiders and outsiders, and ideas 
of obligation as appropriate to a CFAU student in training to become a proper 
Chinese person and diplomat. It follows from work on how schooling in China 
creates Chinese national citizens by, for example, Mette Halskov Hansen (2012); 
Pieke (2009a; 2009b); and Sum Chun-Yi (2010). The chapter asks how students’ 
national logic interrelated with norms of who should be included and excluded, under 
what circumstances, and what moral responsibilities this interrelationship implied. 
This perspective provides an entry point for explaining how Chinese policy-makers 
understand China’s international role, and allows for a reconceptualisation of China’s 
interests that existing Realist narratives preclude.  
 
One of the key elements of identifying with a national logic is the notion of insiders 
and outsiders, and what social obligations that understanding entails. A sense of 
belonging to a group, and concomitantly knowing that others are outside of the group, 
are important aspects of the ontological security that underpins an ongoing emotional 
attachment to the nation. My students at CFAU came from a wide range of social 
backgrounds and by no means constituted an homogenous group. This chapter argues 
that despite this variation, students shared a notably similar ‘common sense’ of how 
an individual related to others, who was included and excluded, what kind of 
obligation they owed to those around them, and above all, what they owed to the 
state. While studying at CFAU, my students underwent a process of socialisation in 
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which principles of ultimate loyalty to the Chinese nation-state became deeply 
internalised. Consistently and correctly demonstrating this loyalty within social 
relations of close and ongoing interdependence in the regulated parameters of the 
CFAU was not simply a matter of adopting a certain ‘correct’ manner. Rather, as 
modes of association among individuals were constantly shifting, students were 
required to develop a sophisticated ability to negotiate changing audiences and 
situations in order to play the ‘correct’ role. While living on campus, the practices of 
students’ everyday lives were regulated and controlled in ways that sedimented these 
values and norms, and importantly, gave students opportunities to apply their skills in 
negotiating the complex web of social relations and perform their appropriateness 
most correctly.  
 
This chapter analyses how the CFAU students demonstrated the proper ‘self’ by 
playing a role, drawing on Clifford Geertz’s (1983) notion that the self is a cultural 
form based on historically contingent constructs. In his classic analysis of different 
senses of self in Morocco, Bali and Java, Geertz argues that in each case, what is 
supposed to be a human being is quite different. His examination of the Balinese 
sense of self is of particular interest here, in that the conception of a person in that 
setting was defined from the outside, and that public representation was what 
mattered; not dissimilar from the sense of self held by my students at CFAU. Like in 
Geertz’s Balinese studies, at CFAU, “It is dramatis personae, not actors, that endure, 
indeed, it is dramatis personae, not actors, that really exist” (ibid., 62).  
 
Using analytical insights from Bordieu and de Certeau, this chapter explores a key 
mechanism by which the logic of the national was rendered primary within students’ 
social imaginary. As Duara notes, modern nationalism very deliberately seeks to 
appropriate “pre-existing representations into the mode of being of the modern 
nation” (1995, 27). This chapter explores three examples of practices of CFAU 
students’ everyday lives, the regular repetition of which acted to sediment certain 
norms about who they were, how they should conceive of and behave with the people 
around them, and what they owed to whom, and why. The first of these factors was 
the physical use of space, that is, how students lived in their dormitories and how they 
studied in their classrooms. In the student dormitories, privacy was non-existent in 
rooms in which six to eight students shared a space of around 18 square metres. In the 
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university classroom, however, thirty to sixty one- or two-person desks were lined up 
in rows in a long, narrow room, facing the lecturer who taught from behind a wooden 
desk or lectern at the front, sometimes on a raised platform. While the two spatial 
configurations seem to contradict each other, with one creating cohesion and the other 
creating division, in fact they worked together to sediment particular ideas of social 
interaction, reciprocity and obligation. The second example is the controlled use of 
time through strict timetabling. Thirdly, the chapter looks at the class monitoring 
system. Class monitoring operated on structures of peer surveillance and served to 
ensure that social relations, and obligations thereof, were carried out in a framework 
appropriate to a proper Chinese person.  
 
The chapter then goes on to provide two examples in which these norms of social 
obligation played out in practice. The first case is an interview I conducted with a 
Professor at the CFAU. In this interview I was struck by how the interaction was 
shaped by particular understandings of the obligations owed to an outsider. In that 
instance, I was accompanied by a CFAU student who had set up the meeting as a 
means to demonstrate his own value and trustworthiness to me. The meeting proved 
disappointing in terms of gathering the kind of information I had set out to discover. 
However, it served as a valuable learning experience in understanding what was owed 
to whom, and when. The second case is the teacher-student relationship, based on my 
in-class experiences, and student feedback I received about my teaching. It examines 
the struggle I had in negotiating the norms of hierarchy and authority while teaching 
at CFAU. In both these cases, retrospectively applying the concepts of self and other 
and the social obligations they entail that I discuss in this chapter greatly assists in 
explaining circumstances that at the time seemed very difficult to comprehend.  
 
The analysis in this chapter is based on insights from Foucault’s theories of power, 
discipline, and subjectification (1975, 1982, 1983), and Bourdieu’s idea of doxa 
(1977), through which we can better understand how certain truths became 
unquestioned and indeed unquestionable. The chapter also uses insights from 
Evasdottir’s research on obedient autonomy and the audience that matters (2004, 17-
21); Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong’s notion of chaxu geju, (差序格局: differential 
modes of association) (1992 [1947]); and Li Jing’s argument that the Chinese self 
must be seen as relational (guanxi xinde: 关系心得) (Li 2002). These frameworks all 
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help in understanding students’ ideas of what constitutes self and outsider, and what 
obligations these categories entailed. An enhanced awareness of these perspectives 
could nuance the conventional wisdom about how and why Chinese foreign policy 
decision-makers make particular choices.  
 
Social Relations and Obligations: The ever-changing ‘audience that matters’ 
 
Tang Wenfang argues that in China, social relations and care extend only to an inner 
circle of family and close friends, clearly delineated from a vast and amorphous 
outside world to which an individual has no social relation or obligation (2005, 
chapter 5; see also Madge 1977). This sharp distinction between inner and outer 
circles is often explained by referring to Confucian ideology, which emphasises the 
primary importance of family relations as the basis of a social framework in which 
the family is the focal point of all obligation (Fleischer 2011, 303-04). As Fei notes, 
“The person who only sweeps snow from his own door is still regarded as having 
high social ethics” (1992 [1947], 60). Applying this logic in one way can result in 
society as a whole being effectively looked after. As everyone is part of a family, if 
everyone cares for their own family, society will take care of itself. Although as Fei 
and Lin both observe, this logic can have the negative result of making “a man throw 
his refuse outside his neighbour’s door” (Lin 1998 [1935], 180; Fei 1992 [1947], 60). 
While charity and philanthropy exist and have a long tradition in China, support and 
welfare were generally given by extended family, kin and community networks, 
which in many places often constituted one and the same thing (Fleischer 2011, 304).  
 
Social relations in China have undergone profound and radical disjunctures over the 
past 60 years, not least because of the campaign by the Communist regime to replace 
existing networks of obligation with new, revolutionary relations, particularly after 
1949 until the end of the Cultural Revolution (Vogel 1965). However, the importance 
of the concept of the family as the central social unit and resource has never been 
entirely superseded (Fleischer 2011, 305; Yan 1996, 16). What has changed, 
particularly in the case of the students in my study, is the extent to which the Party-
state has been discursively conceptualised as a natural extension of the family unit. 
For my students, being a ‘good Chinese’ meant extending one’s loyalty to family to 
one’s loyalty to China. 
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In the case of the CFAU students that I taught, the university experience built on 
broader existing social, cultural and political discourses that conflated the state with 
the family. This is not a new phenomenon – as Lin observed in 1935,  
 
In the Confucian social and political philosophy we see a direct transition 
from the family, chia [jia] to the state, kuo [guo]… The nearest equivalent to 
the notion of society is then a compound of the two words, kuochia [guojia], 
or ‘state-family’. (1998 [1935], 169)  
 
At CFAU, pre-existing factors that had defined a student’s identity – his or her 
gender, socio-economic background, and regional origin – were unpicked and 
replaced with a new sense of self as a CFAU student in training to represent China in 
the world. Four years of repetition of certain regulated practices of everyday life 
removed each student from his or her pre-existing arrangements of social obligation 
in order to recreate him or her as an individual whose primary loyalty was to the 
Chinese state. This project is also not new, as the goal of creating ‘The New Man’ to 
best serve the needs of the state has been a key aspect of the Communist narrative of 
human malleability and perfectibility for over a century (Cheng 2009). The efficacy 
of these subjectification processes were evident in the way my students deployed the 
concept of guojia, precisely as Lin described it, to explain state-society relations, and 
in how their loyalty to the state was articulated in very familial terms. Just as Fong 
concludes from her research, my students had a strong sense of loyalty to China, 
based on “the idea of an imagined family in which China was identified with a long-
suffering parent who deserved the filial devotion of her children, despite her flaws” 
(2011, 52). These processes served to construct an oppositional conception of 
ourselves and outsiders in which ‘we’ meant being Chinese, and ‘other’ consisted of 
the vast and undifferentiated imagined community of ‘non-China’. 
 
Within this primary level of a national logic of insider-outsider relations, CFAU 
students’ daily interactions among other Chinese were governed by secondary levels 
of inclusion and exclusion. In these quotidian interactions, relations with and 
obligations to others were dependent on complex webs of interactive, overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting responsibilities and roles. As this chapter will set out, the ‘self’ 
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among the CFAU students I taught became inextricably embedded in a network of 
social relationships as a result of the practices of their everyday lives.  
 
My students’ views of insiders and outsiders, and of the obligations that arose from 
these understandings, need to be recognised as products of specific social and 
philosophical circumstances. As is accepted in anthropology, but less so in dominant 
discourses of international relations, conceptions of social relations and obligation are 
culturally and historically specific. As Hamilton and Zheng explain, networks of 
personal obligations in Chinese social structures are defined by relationships in a way 
that is substantially different from those in Anglo-Saxon societies (1992, 25). The 
broader Chinese philosophical trajectory has evolved along different lines from that in 
Western traditions. Recent political and social history in China has reinforced this 
specific philosophical and cultural heritage. For example, the establishment of the 
New China in 1949; the years under Mao, including the Cultural Revolution; the 1989 
repression, and the years since, in which economic growth was offered at the expense 
of both social justice and political freedom, have resulted in a distinct public morality. 
The differing relations and obligations among individuals and between individuals 
and the state are often characterised by very high levels of distrust. 
 
The Chinese saying that one should just sweep the snow from one’s own doorstep can 
be interpreted in many ways, but I have heard it most often used to mean one of two 
things: firstly, that if we all sweep our own doorsteps, all the snow will be cleared and 
all will be well; and/or, there is no need to go poking your ‘broom’ into other people’s 
‘doorsteps’. As Fei observes, the path of obligation “runs from the self to the family, 
from the family to the state” (1992 [1947], 66). Those external to these in-groups are 
considered to be strangers, and the behavioural norms and moral values that apply to 
the in-group are not relevant for those outside these networks (Yan 2009b, 19). Fei 
argues that in the “Chinese system of morality, there is no concept of ‘love’ such as 
that exists in Christianity – universal love without distinctions” (1992 [1947], 76), 
and therefore obligation is also differentiated. Evasdottir’s ideas of obedient 
autonomy and the audience that matters (2004) support Fei’s conclusions. Other 
theorists who follow Fei’s argument include Mark Elvin (1985); Robert E. Hegel and 
Richard C. Hessney (1985); and Hu Hsien Chen (1944). As a point of comparison, a 
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liberal Anglo-Saxon sense of obligation tends to be universal in the way in which 
individuals are encouraged to think of all other people as having the same rights to 
state protection and care in order to fulfil their unique potential.  
 
My observations from living in China suggest that this idea of differentiated 
obligation permeates Chinese world-views from bottom to top. In daily life, not 
becoming involved in your neighbour’s affairs is the norm. Based on a discourse that 
helping others can often lead to you becoming embroiled in their problems leads 
many people to prefer to turn a blind eye to suffering or need,37 and can regularly be 
taken to what many might consider an extreme. In October 2011, for example, a two-
year-old girl was struck by a vehicle in a backstreet of Guangzhou. She was ignored 
by more than a dozen passers-by who walked up to her, around her, and then away 
from her, as she lay critically injured on the road, and she subsequently died from her 
injuries. This event was by no means simply accepted by the broader Chinese 
community as reflecting how things are in China. The shape and reach of Chinese 
morality were intensely debated in media and internet discussions following the event 
(e.g. Levy 2011). Shortly after this incident, pictures of a young girl holding an 
umbrella over a beggar in a rainstorm were released on the internet. Public discussion 
ranged from accusing the girl and the photographer of deliberately staging the event 
for personal status, to many commentators who were palpably relieved that “even in 
our numb society,” “there are still lots of good people, it’s just that sometimes good 
people are afraid to be good people” (Fauna, 2011). Yan writes about the changing 
moral landscape in contemporary China, relating 26 incidences of “extraordinary 
extortion”, including the story of a high school student who helped an injured lady to 
hospital and paid her fees, only to be later blamed for causing the accident that had 
left her injured (2009b). On no occasion in these 26 cases did the police or the judge 
question the argument that if the Samaritan had not been guilty, he or she would not 
                                                
37 Most Chinese people I have spoken to about the matter cite ‘the Nanjing ruling’ of 2006 in which a 
passerby stopped to help an injured person, who then accused the passerby of causing the accident. 
When taken to court in Nanjing, the judge is famously said to have ruled in favour of the plaintiff, 
saying that if the passerby had not been guilty, he would not have stopped to help. The plaintiff was 
made to pay all costs of the injury and the court case (although later this was reduced to ten percent). In 
another incident in 2011, an elderly man slipped and died from an easily preventable cause, and when 
the event was first reported on the internet, 29,892 users of Sina.com wrote comments in which almost 
all said they understood why the onlookers did not help the man, and many admitted that they would 
have done the same if they were there. (Liu 2011; see also Yan 2009, 14 for a discussion of this 
‘Nanjing ruling’). 
151 
 
 
have helped, revealing a strongly held preconception that no one would “go an extra 
mile to help a stranger” (ibid., 14). As Yan argues, a new consensus is emerging, 
albeit unevenly, that “in today’s world it is both unwise and unsafe to help a stranger 
in a public place” (ibid., 11-14; see also Jankowiak 2004; Li 2006; Thelle 2004; and 
Weller 2005 and Wonacott 2004). 
 
The strength of belief in moral obligation only to the ‘in-group’ and not to those 
outside the immediate family was also indicated by my students’ approach to 
volunteering. My research suggested that my CFAU students undertook unpaid 
community activities for more instrumental purposes. There appeared to be little 
sense of social obligation underpinning student participation in community work or 
volunteering. Fleischer argues that volunteering in China (as elsewhere) is framed by 
the government in such a way as that it becomes a technology of power in order to 
nurture self reliant and socially responsible individuals that serve the interests of the 
state (2011). Rather than volunteerism being an expression of an abstract feeling of 
community obligation or altruism, my students perceived it as an addition to a resumé 
that would improve competitiveness in the job market, or a means of seeking some 
kind of purportedly lacking moral framework (ibid., 316). 
 
Modes of association and the role of the ego 
 
There are two key factors in broader Chinese social relations that help explain the 
foundational conceptions of insiders and outsiders, onto which subjectification 
processes at CFAU were reinscribed. The first factor is the “differential modes of 
association” between Western and Chinese societies that Fei describes in his seminal 
work From the Soil: the foundations of Chinese society (1992 [1947]). Fei compares 
Western and Chinese societies and argues that members of Western societies “are 
equivalent, just as all straws in a bundle are alike”. However, in Chinese modes of 
association, social relations are like “ripples formed from a stone thrown into a lake, 
each circle spreading out from the centre becom[ing] more distant and the same time 
more insignificant” (Fei 1992 [1947], 65). As Yang explains it,  
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One’s immediate natal and nuclear family is the strongest kinship tie, 
followed by the extended family and consanguineal relations, and then the 
more distant set of affinal relatives. (1994, 112) 
 
Each individual has more than one set of concentric circle relationships, and while the 
individual is at the centre of every set, in every social circumstance, he or she is faced 
with entirely different social obligations dependent on who else is sharing the 
interaction. As Fei asserts, depending on circumstances, “the Chinese would sacrifice 
their families for their own self-interests, their party for their families’ interests, their 
country for their party’s interests, and the whole world for their country’s interests” 
(1992 [1947], 69). This leads to the second key factor, the way in which each 
individual’s circles of association are interrelated and overlapping, and how “one 
touches different circles in different times and places” (ibid., 63).  
 
In her research following Chinese university students on their journey to become 
archaeologists in an interdependent and bureaucracy-saturated environment, 
Evasdottir follows Fei’s logic in arguing that Chinese social relations are not fixed 
(2004, chapter three). She explains the social system as being unlike the Anglo-Saxon 
model in which orbits of planets, others, are fixed around the central point of the sun, 
the self. In China relations are changeable, because where the actor is positioned in 
the system, either by others or by his or her self, is constantly changing. Every 
individual has many different social roles, such as sister, teacher, mother, daughter, 
and boss, all of which will come to the fore at different times and require different 
obligations. As Taylor explains, a moral position, the knowledge of what is ‘good’, is 
a critical element of the self, and key to understanding it. “Selfhood and the good, or 
in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes” 
(1989, 3).  The moral appropriateness of any behaviour in a network-based society 
like the CFAU is never based on a pre-conceived and abstract or essential sense of 
self, but is always contextually determined. Evasdottir observes from her research 
how this creates an incredibly complex and unpredictable social context, requiring 
considerable skill to navigate successfully.  
 
In opposition to widely-held views of Chinese society as one in which individuals are 
subservient to the greater good, Fei points out that the ego is in fact the most 
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important concern in any situation, and describes Chinese society as ‘egocentric’, as 
opposed to the Western ‘individualistic’ model (1992 [1947], 22-37). While Lin uses 
different terminology, arguing that “the Chinese are a nation of individualists” (1998 
[1935], 169), he makes a similar point, namely, that the needs of the individual are the 
primary motivating factor in behaviour. Lin argues that the tight-knit family unit is 
not the object of individual efforts, but the means to achieving personal benefits: 
“They [the Chinese people] are family-minded, not social-minded, and the family 
mind is only a magnified form of selfishness”. While Lin made that argument well 
before the founding of the New China and the social upheavals that followed, Yan 
Yunxiang has argued more recently along the same lines, stating that: 
 
The individual in modern [Chinese] society seeks her or his interest and 
happiness through the working of the family… they are seeking shunxin 
(satisfaction/happiness) and fangbian (convenience/ freedom) in family life, 
both of which are defined from a personal perspective. (2009a, xxiv) 
 
Where the state is conflated with the family, as it was by my students, loyalty to the 
nation-state and the vision of a unified identity of Chineseness ultimately becomes a 
means to achieve personal benefits. This understanding helps elucidate why my 
students shared a common view that was closely aligned with the official national 
logic. My students faced considerable challenges to achieving progress in a social 
system of such liquidity, so ‘being true to yourself’ by adopting a heterodox position 
on an important issue was not only undesirable but also likely to be disadvantageous.   
 
Implications 
 
Under interdependent conditions in which social relations are not fixed, both one’s 
own role and who constitutes the audience are constantly in flux. Evasdottir posits 
that in such circumstances, one’s reputation in the eyes of an always-shifting other is 
of far more relevance than an individual’s genuine motivation. Therefore, individuals 
are required to judge their obligation according to each specific and individual set of 
circumstances. Evasdottir argues that in the context of Chinese scholarly training in 
particular, true intentions are far less important than being perceived as appropriate by 
those around one at any given time – the audience that matters. Whether a 
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performance is considered successful, that is, whether an individual is deemed as 
being ‘good’, depends on the evaluation of that audience in those circumstances in 
regard to their expectations of how that role should be played. In this situation of 
interdependence, an individual’s reputation in the eyes of an audience is important not 
only because the approval of the audience is the source of one’s identity, but also 
because harm done to a reputation in one instance will almost certainly negatively 
impact chances of success in other situations (Evasdottir 2004, 17-21).  
 
The audience that matters is a particularly useful concept for explaining how Chinese 
students at CFAU behaved under certain circumstances. My CFAU students were 
trained during their time at university to see themselves as individuals whose primary 
loyalty was to the state, and that the pursuit of personal goals should be seen not as 
virtuous in and of itself, but rather as a means to strengthen and support China. Fong 
also notes this tendency in her study of students from Dalian, China, observing that 
there was a strong focus on the responsibility to remain loyal to the Chinese state, 
rather than on the rights of the individual citizens. Indeed, in Fong’s study, one of the 
students’ main motivations for further study was to enhance China’s social, cultural 
and economic standing and to aid China’s integration with the global economy (2011, 
53). Yan and Lin’s observations that seeking benefits for the family is a means for 
obtaining individual happiness suggests that my students’ conflation of the family 
with the nation-state meant that they understood their efforts to think and act in ways 
that benefited China as ultimately advantageous to themselves as individuals. With 
my CFAU students, the national logic of loyalty to China was not simply an end in 
and of itself, but rather a means to secure ontological security, as well as more 
fundamental forms of social and financial benefits.  
 
Fei suggests that in the Chinese pattern of social organisation, there exists “no ethical 
concepts that transcend specific types of human relationships” (1992 [1947], 74). 
Following this logic, I argue that the CFAU students in my study did not hold abstract 
conceptions of moral obligation outside of specific relational contexts, either in the 
ideas or the practices of their everyday lives. Relations between a student’s self and 
any outsider, and therefore the degree of obligation to outsiders, were not governed 
by an abstract notion of what was ‘good’, or a profound conviction of a particular 
personal identity, but were changeable depending on who constituted the ‘other’ in 
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each case, as this chapter will demonstrate. The same value was not ascribed to 
‘genuinely’ being a good person in the same way as it is in more individualistically 
focused social contexts (Evasdottir 2004, 46). A CFAU student’s identity as an 
appropriately behaved person rested not on any internal conviction that he or she 
should strive to meet an abstract concept of virtue that applied at any time and in any 
place, but rather on external validation from other actors in a range of circumstances. 
Therefore, students learned to perform their appropriateness differently in different 
situations.  
 
Time and Space and the National Logic 
 
The structuring of time and space was key to the training through which students 
learned to whom they were obliged, and how they could most effectively negotiate 
their social relationships. Based on the arrangement in which students lived with 
either their immediate classmates, or students from the same major in another class, 
students spent almost every moment of every day with a newly assigned group of 
similarly socially dislocated young people. At CFAU, around 50 per cent of classes 
(depending on year of seniority) were compulsory, and the possible choices for 
elective classes were quite limited due to the small size of the university. As a result, 
students within a particular major had almost exactly the same class schedule as their 
peers. Additionally, as their dorm-mates were taken from the same group, this small 
set of students not only studied, but also ate, slept and relaxed together as well. Their 
compulsory participation in two weeks of military training at the beginning of their 
second year further strengthened their socialisation as national subjects. Evasdottir 
argues that in her study, the combination of these practices and structures “force 
students to see themselves as an interdependent group based on what appears to be an 
incontrovertible, ‘essential’ similarity’” (2004, 51). While the students in Evasdottir’s 
study were grouped together on the basis of age, for my students, the interdependent 
group mentality was based on being a CFAU student in training to officially represent 
the nation. Within this group context, students learned and practiced the skills of 
consenting to the control of their seniors, and of policing each other to enforce 
conformity as strategies to achieve self-interest (ibid., xii). 
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Space 
 
Since the 1990s, anthropology, like other disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, 
geography, and history, has demonstrated a renewed interest in foregrounding the 
spatial dimensions of culture. While descriptions of natural landscapes and conditions 
of everyday life have long been a feature of anthropological studies, the tendency has 
been to treat space as a kind of backdrop to events, rather than seeing it as an essential 
component of socio-cultural theory (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga, eds., 2003, 1). Work 
by Foucault (1975, 1986) notes the relationship between spatial arrangements and 
power, describing architecture as a technology for manifesting the concerns of 
government in order to create a “docile body” (1975, 198). Foucault draws on 
Bentham’s panopticon, in which all individuals must presume they are under 
surveillance at any and all times and thereby become their own controllers. Foucault 
argues that architecture and planning function as strategies of power, including the 
control and surveillance of the body in space. Michel de Certeau addresses a lacuna in 
Foucault’s approach by investigating how people resist power by reappropriating 
space (1984, xiv). For de Certeau, if the strong use power to demarcate territories, 
classify, delineate and divide, then the weak use tactics of mobility and furtive 
movement, manipulating spaces in ways for which they were not designed (Cresswell 
1997, 363).  
 
This section of the chapter will focus on how space was constructed in my students’ 
lived environment at CFAU, and to what extent students used the tactics de Certeau 
describes. I found that CFAU students very rarely, if ever, ‘snuck’ into spaces where 
they should not have been, or used spaces in ways for which they had not been 
designed – far less than I would have expected. This compliance suggests that getting 
ahead through resisting and rebelling was not in the universe of the thinkable for 
students. Instead, they used the rules and norms regulating their lives as a mechanism 
for achieving their own goals.  
 
The student dormitory 
 
The first spatial dimension for creating acceptable social networks that this chapter 
will examine is the dormitory living arrangements at CFAU. Most of my students at 
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CFAU lived on campus, and shared dormitory rooms. Dorm buildings at CFAU were 
strictly enforced as same-sex, with visitors from the opposite sex forbidden to enter 
under any circumstances. Dorm rooms slept six to eight students, in three or four sets 
of bunk beds, and students shared a common bathroom. Each student had a tiny 
workspace, so for the most part they preferred to work in the library, or a special 
study area, or the local McDonald’s, instead. Each dorm room had small cupboards or 
shelves on which students could put their few personal possessions. Students hung 
curtains from makeshift rails to give themselves some semblance of privacy, but for 
four years, this flimsy fabric was all that separated them from their peers. Every 
student knew which of his or her friends stayed up late playing computer games 
instead of studying, or chatting to a boyfriend or girlfriend on their mobile phone or 
computer. They knew if their classmates spent a long time getting ready, doing their 
hair or choosing their clothes, or using special skin creams or medications for 
problems they might have been having. There was simply very little individual 
privacy.  
 
Figure 6: Female dorm for seven students. Photograph taken by a friend of the author, December 2011. 
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When students arrived at the beginning of their first year, they were assigned a room 
and room-mates generally from their own class or within their own major, or another 
similar department. Students had no say at all in deciding the people with whom they 
would share this small space for the next four years. Neither did they have any real 
opportunity to change the arrangements, exceptions being very rare and only in the 
most extreme circumstances. Generally, if a student found his or her living conditions 
intolerable, the only option would be to move out and rent privately, either on 
campus, or further afield.38 Private rental was so much more expensive than staying at 
the dormitory that for most students it was not an option. 
 
How students managed their relationships throughout four years in the same small 
dormitory room with six or seven other people not of their own choosing, with 
virtually no option to change, may be difficult for a Westerner to comprehend. 
Evasdottir’s idea of the audience that matters helps explain how my students at CFAU 
negotiated these circumstances. In a situation of interdependence such as the student 
dormitory, one’s reputation in the eyes of one’s dorm-mates was important, not only 
because the approval of the audience was the source of one’s identity, but also 
because harm done to a reputation in one instance would almost certainly negatively 
impact chances of success in other situations. However, both a student’s own role and 
who constituted the audience were constantly in flux. A student at any given time had 
many different social roles, therefore, whether a performance was considered 
successful depended on the evaluation of the particular audience in regard to their 
expectations of how the role should be played (Evasdottir 2004, 17). 
 
Friendship in Contexts of Interdependence: 
 
Dorm life is a key element for understanding how my students at the CFAU 
understood the relationship between themselves and outsiders. One day after the 
academic year had finished, I had lunch with Rebecca, a senior CFAU student who 
was then balancing her studies with an internship at the United Nations. Rebecca 
                                                
38 The CFAU campus, already small, has a good number of apartments within its grounds, rented by 
people who apparently have nothing to do with the university. Foreign teachers live in the Foreign 
Experts building for free (although they can choose to rent in the private market, but the monthly 
income would barely cover the cost of a ‘decent’ apartment), and while some of the Chinese teachers 
live on campus, generally the more junior level ones, some choose to rent their campus apartment out 
and live with their family in an apartment of their own choosing somewhere close by.  
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explained to me that one reason many students felt dissatisfied with the CFAU was 
not to do with the curriculum or quality of teachers, but because of it being such a 
small university: “the small group of students really limits the opportunities for job 
offers”. When Rebecca first mentioned this, I did not quite understand what she 
meant. She explained:  
 
Actually, university classmates are more like colleagues. The benefits of 
relationships are too important, so what happens at university are not just pure 
friendships… some are, of course, but most are more about potential 
networks. You know, the best way to get a good job is to know a classmate or 
someone from a higher year, or in the alumni, who can introduce you.  
 
This comment caused me to reflect more on how affective relationships like 
friendships among my students were constituted, and how that might contribute to a 
better understanding of their conceptions of themselves and outsiders, and the 
obligations these then entailed. 
 
In anthropological literature, friendship has tended to be considered secondary to the 
question of kinship (Yan 1996, 108). However, in more recent years, interpersonal 
relations of other kinds have become a focus of scholarly attention (Yan 1996, 223). 
Yan notes that after the Communist Revolution in 1949, and even more so after the 
Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, making ‘best friends’ on the basis of sentiment 
and morality began to emerge in China and become a widely accepted social practice 
among Chinese young people (Yan 1996, 108). In her comprehensive exploration of 
social relationships in China, Mayfair Yang talks about the different kinds of 
friendship in Chinese society. She sets out three different categories: ‘heart-to-heart 
friends’ (zhixin pengyou: 知心朋友), friends who use each other (huxiang liyong:互相利
用)，and ‘ordinary friends’ (yiban pengyou: 一般朋友). Yang argues that heart-to-heart 
friendships are rare because they take so long to establish and to build the necessary 
trust, and thus most people tend to have more ‘ordinary friends’, with whom one 
could share a good time; or ‘instrumental friends’, who may be able to help each 
other out if not now, perhaps in the future (1994, 117). Certainly, negotiating 
friendship at CFAU was a complicated task. Fong also noted that many of the young 
people in her research on desires to study overseas cited the complexity of negotiating 
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these social expectations and pressures of friendship as part of their reason for 
wanting to go abroad (2011,185).  
 
While a clear distinction between emotive and instrumental does not make the same 
sense in the context of interdependence (Evasdottir 2004, 17) at the CFAU, I had 
found already that the concept of friendship in the Chinese people I met was not the 
same as my own. In my experiences and observations, the word ‘friend’ (pengyou: 朋
友) is introduced into relationships at a very early stage, quickly and lightly, and in 
many situations in which it would not apply in English, between people who have 
only just become acquainted. I was more than once surprised when my expectations 
of my Chinese friends were not met. In my understanding, we had over time 
developed a true and genuine friendship. In some cases, they had invited me to their 
homes, sometimes even on overnight trips, or to spend Chinese New Year with their 
family. An invitation to spend Chinese New Year is the equivalent of inviting a friend 
to spend Christmas with one’s family in Australia and it is generally considered to be 
a sign of the greatest inclusion and generosity. However, the majority of my Chinese 
friends did not maintain contact when their life circumstances changed. The 
experience of an abrupt cessation of friendship is anecdotally the case for other 
foreigners in China as well. On later reflection I came to believe that there is a 
fundamental difference in what friendship means and what requirements it entails. I 
also observed this in the relationships among students at CFAU. Friendship was, like 
obligation, not an abstract principle that an individual adheres to regardless of 
circumstances, but rather was dependent on roles and social positions. 
 
For example, I had spent time with Buddy socially on numerous occasions before I 
began teaching at CFAU, and then for a brief period afterwards. He had also provided 
me with considerable support and assistance in my research. After graduating from 
CFAU at the end of 2010, Buddy was successful in making it through the arduous 
rounds of tests to be employed as a public servant in Chinese People’s Institute of 
Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), an organisation associated with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Since then, his responses to my emails became briefer and rarer, until six 
months after he began his new job, he stopped writing to me altogether. We met once 
for dinner when I came back to Beijing in late 2011, and while it seemed to me that 
we had a pleasant dinner with open conversation, and agreed to meet again soon, I 
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have not heard from him since. Perhaps my attempts to maintain a relationship in 
circumstances in which he owes more to his new career and life than to me are 
destined to be unsuccessful.  
 
At a small university like the CFAU, the possibilities for developing the kinds of 
networks that would help a student find good internships or work after graduation are 
severely curtailed. Additionally, the university does not have the kind of reputation 
that Peking or Tsinghua Universities enjoy, which can serve as an advantage in job 
applications, though this was not necessarily true for careers in the public service. The 
onus was therefore on students to use every relationship, including friendships, as a 
means to build and enhance career networks. Among CFAU students, friendship did 
not necessarily mean a relationship in which one student would do something for 
another for altruistic purposes, with no expectation of a return favour. On the 
contrary, friendship tended to imply the bringing together of two people who had the 
potential to be mutually helpful. The necessity to understand dorm-mates as potential 
contacts to some extent helps explain why relations in dorm rooms were so smooth, 
or at least seemed to be. Students were acutely aware that their dorm-mates were not 
necessarily heart-to-heart friends, but that these relationships could hold the key to 
wider options for the future after graduation. Although small grievances about where 
someone left their shoes or hung their coat did arise, the complexity of the 
relationship among the students and the importance of behaving appropriately as a 
good and trustworthy person generally over-rode the value of speaking one’s mind.  
 
The classroom 
 
In what appeared to me at first as a stark contrast to the enforced intimacy of the dorm 
rooms, CFAU classrooms were physically arranged in such a way as to separate and 
individualise students during their formal learning time. CFAU classrooms were set 
up so that students’ desks formed straight rows of single or occasionally double units 
facing the teacher, who sat behind a desk or stood behind a podium, which was 
sometimes on a raised platform, at the front of the room. My classes on average had 
around 25 students, and students tended to sit in roughly the same positions each 
week, with the attentive students at the front, and the less involved students in the 
back corner.  
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I was not an experienced teacher, and the idea of conducting a senior level university 
discussion class in this lecture style format was somewhat anathema to me, so in my 
first week, I asked the students to rearrange the classroom furniture so that we were 
all sitting in one large circle. I hoped that in this way we could move beyond the 
lecturer-lectured relationship, and have discussions in which we could all try out new 
ideas, raise and discuss questions, and share knowledge. However, this rearrangement 
caused considerable consternation among my students. In the first class in which I 
tried this approach, students responded with hesitation and confusion, so I helped 
them to move the tables and chairs. The students seemed torn between wanting to 
perform their role as good students by following their new teacher’s instructions, and 
not quite understanding what exactly the new teacher had asked them to do, or why. 
During the rest of the week, in the first lesson with each of the other classes, I made 
the request and observed how the students went about reorganising the room. 
Students’ reluctance and confusion suggested that most of them had never had a class 
in which they sat facing each other and their teacher, and the entire concept was quite 
strange to them.  
 
At the end of the first week’s classes, I was asked several times with some apparent 
anxiety if I was going to ask students to rearrange the furniture every week. I cheerily 
smiled and said yes. Students from three out of my six classes took the time to speak 
to me after class and explain with great respect that perhaps it might not be 
“convenient” for them to do this every week, as it would be necessary to reset the 
classroom to its former order every time. In several of the classes, this reluctance to 
move the furniture into a circle continued throughout the whole year. I would enter 
the classroom every week to find that the students had already sat themselves in their 
neat rows, as if hoping I might not notice and just carry on. Oftentimes, the students 
would move the desks so that they formed two straight parallel lines, in some places 
two or three desks deep, and we would have to start again so that each person was in 
the single layer circle.  
 
Apart from a possibly universal reticence to do any more than necessary at university, 
it seemed evident to me that students were very unclear about the point of the 
exercise. When I asked them why they thought I had wanted them to rearrange their 
classrooms, and what their opinion was of it, several simply shrugged, neither 
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knowing nor really caring. A few students seemed to understand what my goal was, 
and said that they felt that the class had been more interactive and relaxed than their 
other classes. However, despite my assumption that a more interactive and relaxed 
class environment would constitute a positive change, some students thought 
otherwise. The difference in opinion was not just the case for those who would have 
evidently preferred to sit up the back and snooze, or send text messages on their 
mobile phones, or study for an exam in another class. In fact, some of the most 
diligent students felt that the change was not necessarily a positive one. Apart from 
being a departure from their normal study practice with which they naturally felt more 
comfortable, committed students also seemed to have felt that the proper relationship 
between them and the teacher had been distorted (for more on the proper roles of 
university teachers, see Evasdottir 2005, 38-43). They were not able to demonstrate 
their diligence through the accepted practices, such as sitting in the front row, and 
communicating their status by performing the physical behaviours of a good student. 
To do so required the correct spatial context, that is, the teacher in the appropriate 
position in relation to the students. The upset of these physical arrangements 
undermined one of the students’ primary means of performing their role correctly, as 
I will discuss in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
Although delineated and divided in the classroom, and living in cramped dormitories 
with no private space, students rarely, if ever, resisted these technologies of power by 
reappropriating the spaces. Classrooms were always used for study, even when not 
supervised by teachers. When wandering around campus, I mistakenly walked into a 
‘study hall’ in which dozens of students sat silently at their desks, reviewing their 
work. No teacher or other authority figure was present. Likewise, boys were not 
allowed into girls’ dormitories, and vice versa, and students’ boyfriends or girlfriends 
did not sneak into other dormitories. Outsiders like myself were not allowed into any 
dormitory, at any time, and while several students said they would love to show me 
their room, there was simply no question of trying to break the rules. No one could be 
asked; special permission did not exist. No one secretly smoked behind buildings at 
the edges of the campus, and there was little to no chance of stumbling accidentally 
across two young people trying to have a private moment alone.  
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Despite the apparent divergence between the lack of individual space and privacy in 
the dormitory, and the segregation and individuation of the classroom, the two spatial 
arrangements both ultimately served to subjectify each student as a ‘docile body’. The 
spatial configuration of both the dormitory and the classroom were such that students 
were under surveillance at all times, by other students as much as any external figure 
of authority.  Students had internalised the presumption that they were being 
monitored and, as Foucault describes, had therefore become their own controllers.  
However, while students did not resist by using the tactics that de Certeau describes, 
their ‘self-directed self-control’ (Evasdottir 2004) helped them navigate power and 
make choices to achieve success within the system.  
 
The student dormitories at CFAU formed the centrepiece of the spatial dimension of 
students’ everyday lives that constructed their subjectivities as ideal Chinese citizens 
and appropriate civil servants. Shared living in dormitories taught students the value 
of subsuming their own particular individual wishes not so much for the collective 
good, but as a means to perform the role of trustworthy and reliable friend and 
potential future colleague. In addition to the way students negotiated space as a 
technology of governance, students’ repeated interactions with these particular 
landscapes in everyday life created a realm of the known, the embodied, and the 
habitual, which was shared with their peers. The spatial features which students daily 
traversed formed a tangible and reliable presence in which students learned to orient 
themselves in relation to other people, and behave according to the moral norms for 
what was appropriate in given places (Skey 2011, 16). As students coordinated their 
activities and practices across particular locales, they came to recognise each other as 
members of a community with a shared national identity that was being 
simultaneously reinforced in other ways (Auburn and Barnes 2006). The 
(re)production of students’ ‘here’ through their practices of everyday life was 
inextricably linked with the shared experience of time, the ‘now’ (Skey 2011, 16), as 
this next section will discuss. 
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Timetable  
 
The temporal regularities within which students lived their daily lives at CFAU 
created shared experiences and a sense of community that reiterated group 
membership and social obligation. Like space, the control and management of time 
was also a method through which students were subjectified as individuals with a 
primarily national logic. Examining how students’ time was structured deepens 
understanding of how the national was naturalised through everyday practice (Skey 
2011, 17). As Zerubavel argues, “sequential structures, fixed durations, standard 
temporal locations and universal forms of recurrence” are key to “establishing and 
maintaining the normal, temporal world” (1981, xii-xiii).  
 
The schedule for the students at CFAU was tightly packed, and rarely did students 
have time to leave campus to go further afield other than for lunch outside the 
university canteens, or to buy books and more specialized school supplies than 
offered at the small shop on campus. Morning classes at CFAU started at 8.00, 
marked by an electronic bell, and students stumbled in ten to fifteen minutes before 
class began, bleary-eyed and clutching their steamed buns or spongy chocolate and 
cream cakes and hot milk tea. Many of them would have been awake until very late 
the night before, studying, reading, preparing for class, playing computer games, or 
chatting online with friends on the very popular ‘QQ’ service.39 Each class ran for 
100 minutes, made up of two 45-minute sessions with a ten-minute break between. At 
9.40 the bell rang again to signal students to move to their next classroom and next 
class. Lunch began at 11.40 and ran until 13.10 when classes recommenced, and, 
depending on subjects and timetable, in some cases did not finish until 21.30. Most of 
the little spare time available was easily filled with the kinds of activities designed to 
enhance a student’s personal development and ultimate professional employability. 
Choices about how to use spare time most effectively were underpinned by a clear 
understanding that graduation would be a sharp and shocking introduction into a 
world in which these elite students were simply a few among millions of well-
educated jobseekers. As Rebecca told me,  
 
                                                
39 ‘QQ’ is China’s largest online network for instant messaging. 
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During the first two years, due to the tight arrangement of classes, we have 
relatively little spare time. Many of us will spend most of our time on study 
even after the classes or on the weekends.  
 
Although my third- and fourth-year students did not have a full day of classes every 
day, time throughout the day was carefully regimented. While students in junior and 
senior years were not expected to be on campus as much as younger students, they 
were not in a position to enjoy leisure time either: 
 
In the senior year, lives will change significantly. They will spend more time 
on internships and spend less time staying at school. When everyone starts to 
prepare for their next life stage, they will spend large amount of time on 
preparing for graduate school exam, GRE, TOEFL40 or internships and have 
less time on entertainment. Spare time is a squeeze then, too.  
 
When students did set aside the time to enjoy social activities, they liked to “play 
computer games (especially the boys), go shopping, go on dates with their girlfriend 
or boyfriend, hang out with friends, play sports, or sing karaoke at KTV”. Rebecca 
told me that these extra-curricular activities were generally undertaken with 
classmates from within the same major, as they had the same schedule, thus 
reinforcing their sense of collective identity.  
 
Regular extra-curricular activities such as participating in sport tended to be judged in 
terms of utility. As Buddy explained, students asked themselves whether the possible 
advantages for brain development or demonstrating teamwork abilities would be 
worth the time away from the books. Students weighed up whether participating 
would increase the competitive advantage in the search for a job. The risk of an 
accident which could sideline study was also carefully considered. Similarly, editing 
the university newspaper, participating in the university radio station, or taking on 
volunteer work were all weighed up in terms of how good they would look on a CV. 
Some things were considered to have more utility than others. For example, Buddy 
told me that he felt that his participation in the basketball team kept his brain fresh 
                                                
40 GRE and TOEFL are popular English-language tests 
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and alive, and would also serve to demonstrate his ability to work as part of a team on 
his resumé.  
 
As the tight schedule demonstrates, each student spent almost all of his or her waking 
and sleeping hours in structured, regulated activities with the same group of people, 
particularly in the first two years. Students from any given course, say for example, 
International Economics and Trade, which had around 90 students enrolled in the year 
I taught at CFAU, were divided into class groups of around 30. This group attended 
most of their classes together. The people with whom students shared their dorm 
rooms were taken from the same year group, if not from the same class. Variations in 
ethnic background,41  family status, and regional or provincial differences were 
subsumed under the greater identity of being a CFAU student and Chinese national. 
For four years most students, except those few who came from in or around Beijing, 
only saw their families once a year at Spring Festival (Chunjie: 春节).  
 
In the meantime, students’ immediate social and emotional support network was 
made up of their new friends. Their former identities, like being the daughter of the 
bank clerk in a small town in Sichuan or the son of the Vice-Mayor of a large city in 
Guangxi, were unpicked and replaced with the identity of being a student at CFAU. 
However, previous identities were acknowledged and referred to. For example, 
students expected that Harry would be more entrepreneurial than studious because he 
came from Guangzhou (the south-eastern part of China where much of China’s 
economic growth first occurred); and that Ricky would be more laid-back because he 
was from Sichuan.  
 
For the most part, however, the tightly scheduled university model of everybody 
living and learning according to the same repeated rhythms meticulously 
deconstructed and rearranged former ties. It removed students from their former 
orientations in order to recreate them as model Chinese citizens. The individual 
student’s physical self became an object upon which the school as an institution 
inscribed state-approved understandings of insiders and outsiders, loyalties, 
obligations and notions of reciprocity.  
                                                
41 There were in fact few different ethnic groups in my classes; the vast majority of (non-overseas) 
students were Han Chinese, though there were also a handful of Uighur students. 
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Foucault observed that “time penetrates the body, and with it, all the meticulous 
controls of power” (1977, 180). The majority of my students appeared in the 
classroom at least ten minutes before class commenced, and in general venerated 
punctuality. Younger students whose grades depended on results from exams which 
were based on being able to recall what the teacher had taught in class were extremely 
prompt. If students in the final year could avoid coming to class, they would, but this 
was not because they were indulging in idle pastimes. Rather they were desperate to 
find time to participate in career-enhancing activities like internships, or special 
English-language courses, or take external exams that could demonstrate their 
abilities in a number of other fields. Teachers and students alike generally accepted 
that in senior year students would focus on building professional experience, and 
teachers generally did not expect full attendance in the final year. As was true of my 
students’ respect for CFAU’s spatial arrangements, students also tended to comply 
with the complex regulations and rules of time to demonstrate their appropriateness 
and make the most of the system.  
 
As Anderson explains it, repetitions of practice in space and time, that is, “collective 
rituals”, promote “a consciousness of connectedness” of the nation as an imagined 
community (2006 [1983], 56). Likewise, Mitchell argues that the “powerful, 
metaphysical effect of practices” such as the meticulous organisation of space and 
time make the state appear to exist (1991, 94). These ongoing rhythms required 
students to perform appropriate social behaviours at the correct times, drawing them 
together in a contemporary reality in which they knew themselves to be part of a 
shared identity of Chineseness. The regulated repetitions in students’ use of time and 
space also enabled them to feel a sense of ontological security as it provided them 
with a stable and predictable environment in which to achieve their goals. 
 
Peer Surveillance: class monitors  
 
The institutional setting at CFAU was a microcosm of larger Chinese social structures 
of power, control and responsibility. In this environment, students were not simply 
recipients of external power projections, but active participants in an intricate process 
of consenting to, and enabling, a web of power relations. Within this multidirectional 
complexity, students’ behaviour and attitudes were not only controlled by external 
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means imposed upon them such as the regulation of time and space. They were also 
observing and being observed, monitored and policed by their peers to ensure 
conformity to the socialisation process. Through these processes they learned to 
monitor and control their own behaviour so that it would be read as appropriate by 
whoever constituted the audience at any given time. One key aspect of this 
institutional training was the system of class monitors, who were chiefly responsible 
for reporting on and mediating between students and the university authorities.  
 
It was not until some students explained the class monitoring system to me that many 
small moments began to make sense as part of a larger pattern of social organisation. 
For example, in some of the breaks between classes, one student would pass slips of 
paper around, and his or her classmates who had been separated into their neat rows 
of individualised desks would merge in and out of groups, sitting on tables or leaning 
on each other’s shoulders, consulting and whispering. While moments before, the 
teacher-student dynamic had been fixed and formal, within this fifteen-minute period, 
I became entirely redundant and almost actively excluded as students undertook the 
management of their university activities. When I intruded on one group to ask what 
was happening, students provided me with a polite but cursory explanation. Only then 
did I understand that this was an activity for which the class monitor was responsible. 
While I never fully understood quite what was happening, to the best of my 
knowledge, these slips of paper being passed around, scribbled on, and collected, 
were, at different times, for students to cast their vote for spring break locations, best 
student award, or nominations for Party membership.  
 
In addition to organising these events and activities, the class monitor’s primary role 
was to communicate and liaise between teachers, the school administration, and 
students. He or she was responsible for organising events like sports meetings, and 
excursions; noting student attendance and performance in class; attempting to resolve 
conflicts among students in class affairs before they became serious enough to need 
taking to official level; when necessary, reporting any inappropriate behaviour to the 
administration; intervening in personal affairs if they began to affect school work; and 
communicating between the Department Dean, the staff and the students. This final 
role generally involved bringing messages from top to bottom, and was rarely the 
other way around.  
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As well as having a class monitor, every class also had four other student officers 
under the leadership of the monitor who were in charge of different affairs. One was 
responsible for study, class performance, and connections between students and 
teacher; one was for sports and activities; one was for lifestyle, such as collecting 
money to buy school books; and one was for the Communist Youth League, whose 
job it was to find new and ‘develop’ existing Party members.42 How seriously these 
roles were taken depended on each class and the individual characteristics of each 
class monitor and official. Some class monitors and officials were more proactive 
than others, whereas for others, as students explained, “you just forget they have 
official positions”. To some extent, these positions were more symbolic than 
representative of responsibility to any great degree. 
 
Quite soon after CFAU students arrived in first year, elections were held to decide on 
class monitors. Both students and teachers participated in a secret ballot vote to 
choose the students who would be publicly recognised as the leaders among their 
peers. In this way, teachers and students worked together to legitimise and reinforce 
the particular characteristics considered appropriate for maintaining and perpetuating 
structure and order, and those which should be de-valued. Motivations for running for 
the position of class monitor varied, but when I spoke to Rebecca about it, she told 
                                                
42 At CFAU the Youth League holds meetings every Wednesday afternoon. As Yi explained, most 
CFAU students are members of the Youth League – she herself joined in middle school. Yi outlined 
the procedure for becoming a member: “In each class, we elect the first few candidates. They would go 
through some so-called investigation – just asking the opinions of some teachers. Normally no teachers 
would reject it. Then, maybe one semester later, we would have a second-round election for more 
candidates, following the same procedure. New members should be recommended by existing Youth 
League members, who have to write a letter of support. I think most students would be admitted to the 
League before graduating from middle school, or at least before graduating from senior high.” Yi 
contextualised joining the Youth League in terms of not wanting to stand out as different from the 
group by not demonstrating loyalty to the Party: “It’s also the Party thing. It is not really whether we 
want to join or not, it is kind of like you would only not join because you want to be different, or you 
want to cause trouble. It is very easy to join the Youth League, you won’t have any extra obligations, 
except a very small amount of money as a fee. But if you are not a member, it means you are not 
active, you don’t want to be close to the Party, and as a result you will be excluded from all honours, 
scholarships, and other opportunities. So, most students won’t fight to become a member, but they 
wouldn’t refuse it either. The purpose is to show that the youth respect our Party and want to be a Party 
member. Yeah, if you want to be a Party member, you have to join the League first. It is more complex 
and difficult to become a Party member than to be a member of the Youth League”. Rebecca explained 
that at the CFAU it takes around a year to become a Party member, and the process involves 
considerable effort, including writing regular reports on thoughts and behaviours. She noted that by 
third year, about one third of her class were Party members, however when she started at CFAU, only 
about 1 or 2 people had been members. Rebecca believed that over time students chose to join the 
Party because they believe it might be useful when applying for jobs with government, although 
government employees are not officially expected to be Party members.  
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me that she had run for the position “just because I want to build up a closer 
relationship with my classmates and be more engaged in class affairs”. Unfortunately, 
however, Rebecca had not been successful, missing out by one vote, a result which 
she said disappointed and annoyed her greatly at the time. Rebecca also noted that for 
reasons she could not explain, in some cases lots of people vied for the position, 
whereas in others, there was only one candidate.  
 
When I asked Rebecca what qualities students looked for when they voted for class 
monitor, she looked surprised at the question. Actually, she explained, generally 
students who got along well with everyone and seemed to be pro-active would get the 
job. At the beginning of junior (third) year, elections would be held again. Rebecca 
explained that in these junior year re-elections, almost no one wanted to be class 
monitor, as at that time there were too many competing demands on a student’s time 
which outweighed potential benefits to the resumé. However, there would always be 
some students who felt that their resumés lacked the ‘comprehensive experience’ that 
was needed for Masters applications, and they would apply. For the most part, the 
existing class monitors were more than happy to pass the job over to them. At the 
beginning of junior year, in addition to the monitor for each class, a monitor for each 
major was also chosen, who held a more powerful, overarching role, under which the 
class monitors operated. Despite, or perhaps because of there being so many class 
officials, the division of labour was such that each individual’s job was quite small. 
Indeed, Rebecca argued, perhaps just a little bitterly, that really the most important 
thing for them to do was to discuss and arrange the annual spring outing.  
 
In the third year International Economics major, the class monitor, Dan, was an 
outgoing and diligent young man. After semester had ended, we went for dinner with 
a couple of colleagues from other classes in the same major, one of whom, Mark, was 
also the monitor for his class. Over the course of the evening, Dan and Mark told me 
how being class monitor had really been very hard work, and neither of them had 
enjoyed it very much. However, as they described it, neither felt they had had much 
of a choice as their peers and teachers had insisted they take the position. As a result, 
both of them had been class monitor for several terms. As they described it, the job 
was fraught, however, it was considered to have enough advantages to make it worth 
doing, certainly including mentioning it in a resumé or application. 
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Later that year, Dan drafted a letter of recommendation for me to sign for his 
application to a US university. In the letter, Dan described how his role as class 
monitor had rewarded him with far-reaching benefits. He gave an example of what 
skills he had relied on as class monitor, through which, as he put it, he was able to 
capably navigate the ‘natural’ miscommunications between the foreign teacher; the 
Chinese students; and the Chinese university system. Writing the recommendation 
letter on my behalf from what he imagined would be my point of view, he said:  
 
Due to different cultural backgrounds, there were always misunderstandings 
and disagreements between the students and me in the class discussions. Dan 
knew a lot about Western culture and was quick to comprehend. Whenever 
there were misunderstandings he would explain both sides. He could 
understand me immediately and offer his own ideas worthy of further 
discussion. For almost a year, Dan acted as the unofficial coordinator of the 
course and greatly helped me with his exceptional coordinating skills. In the 
middle of the course, I decided to readjust the lecture content but it was a bit 
difficult for students to accept the decision for they had previewed a lot 
according to the original schedule. I first discussed this with Dan and he 
passed the message to the students and came back to my office with some 
feedback from the students and his own advice. After the negotiation, the 
readjustment was finally decided by the whole class and me. Because of Dan’s 
effective coordination, the course was on schedule and I enjoyed the one 
year’s teaching.  
 
I am not sure Dan entirely believed his own glowing report of his role as class 
monitor, but he rightly indicated the delicate line class monitors walked between not 
only the university and the students, but also the students and the teacher. 
 
The expectations around the class monitor role among the students I taught are 
illustrative of a larger theme about how these young Chinese elites were trained to 
think of others. The class monitoring system established an understanding that people 
at the same level, of the same age, and in the same circumstances, were 
simultaneously agents of and for power. An apparently illogical situation existed – 
despite the very close relationships developing from the deliberate creation of a 
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coterie through four years of shared existence, there seemed little real sense of 
camaraderie or loyalty to others among the students I taught. Instead, the way in 
which time and space were regulated served as an extremely effective method of 
institutionalised monitoring.  
 
Rather than forming enduring bonds of friendship, I argue that the four years of close 
proximity at CFAU fostered the abilities to observe and simultaneously knowingly be 
observed, to discipline and at the same time knowingly be disciplined. These are 
critical skills necessary to perform the role of one-within-a-collectivity that is 
essential for achieving the benefits that come from pursuing obedient autonomy in an 
interdependent social system. The apparent absence of critique or resistance to these 
power and control structures did not so much indicate the triumph of power over 
resistance, but rather an acceptance of the utility and benefits that flowed from 
participating in this system. 
 
(Failing to) Apply the Rules: Negotiating claims to authority 
 
Daily repetition of strictly regulated practices of space, time, and learning how to 
observe others, all taught students how to behave appropriately in changing roles 
under conditions of continual observation. This sedimented certain key norms into 
students’ social imaginary about what it meant to be a good CFAU student and 
ultimately, a good Chinese person. In addition to learning to monitor and observe 
themselves and their peers, students learned about their obligations to those 
hierarchically above them. They also learned how to position themselves within the 
hierarchical order through knowing what constituted a legitimate claim to authority, 
and what behaviours were expected of those who had and could exercise authority. 
They learned to practice the skills of performed reliability, respect, trust, and 
usefulness in ways that were comprehensible to others trained within the same 
system.  
 
Evasdottir’s research examines the concept of authority among scholars and 
practitioners of archaeology in China, particularly what it is, and when and how it is 
validly claimed (2004). She posits that a claim to authority arises when an individual, 
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group or organisation has a command over resources, such that the claimant is able to 
choose how, when and to whom resources are distributed. Further, valid claims to 
authority require a certain “quality of performance … that convinces the audience that 
matters that the claim to authority is legitimate” (ibid., 199). Evasdottir goes on to say 
that in this way, claiming authority is a particularly complex and elaborate process of 
ritualised behaviours, as the success of the claim depends not only on the judgments 
of the performance by the audience that matters, but also on the eventual appearance 
of the promised resources (ibid., 198-199). My observations at the CFAU suggest that 
similar ontological stances underpinned the behaviour not only of my students, but 
also of the professors as will be explored more below. 
 
Evasdottir identifies three key strategies through which a Chinese actor venturing into 
a new site can claim authority: through blending, respect, or authoritarian insularity 
(ibid., 200-204). Strategies of blending involve the new arrival acting in every way as 
much like everyone else as possible. The second tactic, respect, often requires the 
actor to appear to use the strategies of blending. However, while the methods that are 
used in this approach aim to show deference and compliment the locals by showing 
interest in their lives, there is no attempt to disguise differences and inherent 
superiority/inferiority. The third strategy, authoritarian insularity, is based on the 
incoming individual’s understanding that all parties already know who is superior in 
the situation. If the ‘superior’ gets his or her ‘hands dirty’, all participants would 
perceive the situation as bizarre. Ultimately, the reliability and trustworthiness of the 
outsider as able to produce the expected resources would come into question. My lack 
of training and understanding in these complicated operations and techniques of 
authority led to misunderstandings and confusion on several occasions. Two 
particularly illustrative examples were my meeting with the CFAU’s Dean of 
Diplomacy before I began teaching at the university, and later, the challenges that 
arose from my approach to managing the classroom.  
 
Meeting the Dean 
 
I met the CFAU’s Dean of Diplomacy, Professor Wu, in mid-2009, before I had 
started teaching at the CFAU. The meeting was remarkable – but not because of the 
new and unique insights about Chinese diplomacy I gleaned, as I had hoped I would. 
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On the contrary, the meeting was strained, uncomfortable, and insofar as learning 
about Chinese diplomacy, largely useless. However, I did learn a great deal more 
about how CFAU students, and their professors, understood obligation, authority and 
hierarchy.  
 
In the regular discussion groups I had been holding before I began teaching at the 
CFAU, we had been talking about the structures of power behind Chinese foreign 
policy decision-making. Walking together to the bus stop after a meeting, Buddy 
suggested to me that if I was interested in this topic, his Dean Professor Wu would be 
an excellent source of information. He told me several times that she was “the expert” 
in the Chinese political system and had an excellent reputation, and “if she didn't 
know the answers, no one would”. He said that he thought he might be able to arrange 
a meeting between us. Buddy seemed very pleased and proud of his initiative and 
ability to draw on his high-level connections in order to do this. In this way, Buddy 
was able to demonstrate his reliability and utility to myself as well as the Dean of his 
department. In my case, I represented a Western scholar-in-the-making, a connection 
with whom may well be useful in later study or career opportunities. At the same 
time, the meeting provided an opportunity for Buddy to demonstrate his diligence and 
his capability to the Dean through utilising his connections with ‘foreign experts’.  
 
Yang describes several examples in her fieldwork in China in the 1990s of the sudden 
and intensive networking and obligation-reciprocation activity which ensues after an 
individual makes a remark about wanting to be able to access a certain good or 
service (1994, 91-99). Reading this description some time after my meeting with the 
Dean brought home to me the extent to which Buddy must have worked behind the 
scenes to achieve what I misunderstood as a simple chat. At the time I did not 
appreciate the amount of personal and academic capital Buddy must have deployed in 
order to arrange this meeting with a rather unknown and junior foreign scholar. 
Neither did I understand the risk to his own reputation among his professors and peers 
at CFAU, nor the implications it could have for his application to work for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Arranging this meeting would not have been a matter of 
simply knocking on the Dean’s door or sending her an email to ask if she would be 
free. Hierarchy in Chinese universities is very strict, and Buddy would have almost 
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certainly needed to call on a number of well-connected friends and teachers to ask 
this favour of the Dean.  
 
What impressed me most about Professor Wu when I met her was her awkwardness 
when talking with me and answering my questions. We met in the ‘good canteen’ on 
the CFAU campus, the one where tables had tablecloths, and waitresses took orders 
from menus, as opposed to the plastic benches, metal trays, and queuing with special 
payment cards system of the other canteens. Students could eat there, but for the most 
part, it was frequented by staff. It was also the venue for banquets for entertaining 
foreign visitors and dignitaries. Prior to this, I had met with and talked to other 
scholars in the main canteen area, but Professor Wu asked for a private room for us. 
She was nervous from the start, and I wondered why she seemed so uncomfortable. I 
had gone into the meeting with a hand-drawn diagram of how I understood foreign 
policy-making to work, pieced together from readings and interviews and media 
reports, and had hoped to ask her to fill in some of the gaps or correct me where I was 
wrong. I thought that this was the most efficient way to ensure nobody’s time was 
wasted. Being so well-prepared for a meeting was just the sort of approach that would 
be met with approval in Australia, and as Professor Wu was an internationally 
renowned expert on China’s diplomacy, I thought that frankness on my part would 
not cause any problems.  
 
During the meeting, Professor Wu confirmed a number of the ideas and concepts I 
had read or heard elsewhere, for example, about the role of the Foreign Affairs Small 
Group in foreign policy setting. However, when I probed more deeply into the issue 
of foreign policy decision making in China, Professor Wu said she “frankly did not 
know who makes decisions”, apart from postulating that perhaps two or three people 
in the Standing Committee of the Politburo were likely to be in charge. When I 
pressed further, she said she thought they might be Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, with 
perhaps Wen Jiabao also taking a role – that is, the best-known three names of the 
group. Similarly, she said she also had no idea about the implementation of policy 
decisions. We talked a little about a recent incident in the South China Sea (March 5 
2009), involving the US navy ship The Impeccable, and again, Professor Wu seemed 
to know little about it. Her lack of knowledge on this topic seemed quite 
extraordinary to me given the high profile the event had in both international and 
177 
 
 
Chinese media. As I asked more questions that she was not able or willing to answer, 
her initial discomfort increased. I felt very keenly that she was aware that she was not 
answering my questions, and to explain herself, she began to insist that “in China, 
politics and diplomacy are separate”, and thus in her role as a diplomatic expert she 
did not know anything about the politics of decision-making. When I asked, “but isn't 
diplomacy political?” both Professor Wu and Buddy laughed and said, “of course!” 
but moved swiftly on without saying more than that “at university in China, you can’t 
study both of them at the same time”. Buddy explained that in China, politics students 
don’t understand diplomacy, and vice versa.  
 
During the course of the meeting, I realised with frustration that my initial approach – 
to be well-prepared and focused – simply was not working, but was rather being met 
with head-shaking and apparent confusion. I decided to change tack, and ask more 
general questions, for example, about the kind of philosophical background that might 
have an effect on Chinese foreign policy decision-making. Professor Wu’s answer to 
this was quick and certain – “ideology has no role to play at all”. I responded that I 
had not meant ideology in particular, but was rather just interested in the general 
background cultural ideas that might underpin how and why policy was made. 
Professor Wu answered, switching to Chinese, that China does indeed have a strong 
culture and philosophy, which would influence leaders to some extent. Professor Wu 
gave the example of the way in which China’s historical experiences have shaped 
how the Chinese government relates with others internationally. She noted that, for 
example, that China had become cautious in its foreign policy because of past events: 
 
Between friends, relations are kind and trustworthy, but in international 
relations, China finally found that there is no such thing as ‘forever friends’. 
China has learned instead how to deal with that state of affairs.  
 
Professor Wu’s answer largely aligns with the dominant discourse in which China’s 
past as a victim of foreign incursions and other international imbalances has left it 
isolated and uncertain in the international arena.43  
                                                
43 I had also heard this view expressed by other Chinese academics, such as Professor Jiang Shixue in 
the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and author 
of ‘The Chinese Foreign Policy Perspective’ (in Roett and Paz, (eds.), 2008, 27-43). In an interview at 
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While Professor Wu provided vague answers that reflected official discourses, Buddy 
was eager to please both myself and the Professor, but at the same time, demonstrate 
his reliability to the professor. The importance for Buddy to perform in this way was 
quite understandable given that the next two or three years of his life would be under 
Professor Wu’s supervision. On the other hand, how his and my relationship would 
evolve was unknown. Like Professor Wu, Buddy said nothing controversial or outside 
of accepted discourse during the meeting. However, at the same time, I got the very 
strong sense that he was uncomfortable with the way the meeting was going, and 
acutely aware of my disappointment with the lack of answers being provided, given 
that he had promoted this meeting to me as an opportunity to find out some useful 
facts. He responded by doing his best to intervene where appropriate to shore up 
Professor Wu’s credibility by demonstrating that her apparent lack of knowledge was 
not a shortcoming on her part, but rather a simple reflection of the great mystery of 
the Chinese system. For example, he took pains to ensure I understood how complex 
and unknowable the system is, repeatedly using terms like “black box” and explaining 
that “nobody knows what’s going on except the top members.”  
 
As I realised later, for Buddy and the Dean the meeting was far more than three 
people sitting down at lunch to chat about some issues in which we were all 
interested. However, immediately following the meeting, I was both disappointed 
about what I had learnt about how Chinese foreign policy mechanisms worked, as 
well as perplexed – how could I apparently know more about the structures of foreign 
policy making in China than the Dean of Diplomacy at the Foreign Affairs 
University? The Dean mentioned, in fact, that she was rather surprised that I knew so 
much myself already. The only way to make sense of what was overall a very strange 
meeting was to place it within a larger context of social obligation. While I was 
disappointed with the meeting at the time, on reflection, what Professor Wu told me, 
and just as importantly, why she did not tell me anything more, was enlightening. The 
                                                                                                                                      
the CASS offices in Beijing in October 2008, Professor Jiang told me about ‘white-eyed wolves’, that 
is, countries which China had helped in the past but which later demonstrated that they were not 
‘friends of China’. He cited the examples of Albania and Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, China had 
given considerable amounts of foreign aid and weapons to the Communists in support of the 
international Communist struggle, but in the late 1970s Vietnam is purported to have used those very 
weapons to fight a war against China. Comments like this by Professor Jiang contextualised Professor 
Wu’s comments as quite commensurate with the accepted public discourse in China about China’s 
victimisation in the international arena. 
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meeting demonstrated the degree to which obligation is contextual, rather than the 
expression of an abstract sense equally applicable across different social situations. 
Indeed, the way in which Professor Wu explained Chinese aid – that it depended on 
friendship, which in turn depended on not making China angry, illustrated this 
understanding of social relations. Obligations were based on fixed and clearly 
understood rules and critera, and if these were not met, no obligation existed.  
 
Teacher-student relationships  
 
Evasdottir notes that “Questions of comportment are … always important” to 
successfully earning authority. “Should the seeker of authority choose a strategy of 
blending in or standing apart? How should she or he act to demonstrate the validity of 
his or her claims? ...  Above all, how will … actions be interpreted…?” (2004, 200). 
Teachers in China usually adopt a strategy of authoritarian insularity for claiming 
authority. Teachers are endowed by their students with considerable hierarchical 
status as experts, the gatekeepers of knowledge, and power-holders, the final arbiters 
of a student’s academic success. As the spatial arrangement of the classroom is 
designed to reiterate, teachers are expected to face their students and provide the 
information that students needed to pass their exams. Students are expected to recall 
what the teacher had told them as accurately as possible in the exam. Teachers would 
then judge to what extent students had successfully memorised the facts they had 
been taught. Discussion, debate, and alternative or critical views are generally not 
encouraged. Indeed, the very notion of giving students a reading in order to critique it 
was, as one student told me, considered rather a waste of time. If it was wrong, why 
would she want to waste her time with it?  In addition, as the ultimate power-holders, 
the givers of grades, it was not at all unusual for teachers at CFAU, as in other 
universities in Beijing, to have their students provide unpaid research assistance for 
their own work, and even run personal errands like shopping for groceries or taking 
care of children. Students tended to assent to this situation with wry realism, 
understanding that it was simply how the system worked, and hoping that in the end 
cooperation would result in a more favourable grade. In return, it was generally 
accepted that students could expect their teachers to be available for them after hours 
and at home. Indeed, on several occasions my students telephoned me late on a 
Sunday evening to talk about the following morning’s class. 
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As part of the same deference to the authoritarian insularity model of hierarchical 
legitimacy, I noticed a very strong tendency for students to automatically grant 
teachers or visiting lecturers from prestigious American universities like Harvard or 
Yale far greater respect than those from non-Ivy League institutions. They, by 
definition, held a superior status. Older male teachers also tended to be accorded more 
legitimacy. As a younger, female, Australian foreign teacher from a non-Ivy League 
establishment, I felt that I had to continually prove and demonstrate gravitas and 
authority. I felt that I needed to compensate for my youth, gender, and insufficiently 
famous university background. As a result, I went to considerable effort to ensure I 
looked as severe and professional as I could. I wore a suit and high heels to every 
class. I also ensured that my classes were very well-prepared and clearly structured, 
more so than many of the other foreign teachers I met there.  
 
Ironically, I undermined my own efforts to generate authority by exhibiting several 
behaviours that did not demonstrate my hierarchical superiority. In particular, my 
decision to ask students to drag their desks around the classroom to rearrange it such 
that they would all be equal among their peers, and that I would be equal among 
them, immediately weakened the authority I was trying to assert. In addition to the 
unintended consequences that arose from my relaxing the norms around hierarchical 
uses of space in my classes, I also weakened my claim to authority through my style 
of teaching. In my classes, I chose not to deliver lectures but instead provided 
students with material to read before class as the basis of class discussions on certain 
themes. I also undermined the proper relationship by asking that the students call me 
by my first name, rather than ‘Professor’. Throughout China it is a mark of respect to 
address someone by his or her professional title, such as ‘doctor’, ‘teacher’, or 
‘driver’. My students were reluctant to move away from this mode of address as it 
was not customary to address teachers by their first names. After some negotiation, 
they tended to call me ‘Miss’. My primary reason for not wanting to be called 
‘Professor’ was that I would have felt like a fraud, masquerading as someone of far 
higher rank. However, like my request to move the furniture, I also wanted to create 
an atmosphere unimpeded by hierarchy where students could feel comfortable 
expressing their ideas and opinions and debating issues.  
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My attempts to create a comfortable space for free discussion and debate did not work 
out as I had hoped. While students did over time appear to relax and feel more 
comfortable in disagreeing and debating, their lack of practice in doing so sometimes 
led to sessions in which a student presenter came under verbal attack from his or her 
classmates for the comments or suggestions he or she had made. Rather than open and 
constructive debate, some students used their newfound freedom to direct scathing 
criticisms at their classmates. In one case, a student gave a presentation on Japanese 
culture. The student giving the presentation, Karen, had travelled in Japan, and noted 
reflectively that the trip had changed her perceptions and understandings of the 
Japanese people. The response to Karen’s comment, which I considered quite 
innocuous, was sudden and very emotional. In a radical departure from the norm, 
many students began shouting out and interrupting each other to tell Karen that she 
was absolutely wrong.  
 
From numerous conversations I have had with students, foreign teachers at CFAU 
and other universities in Beijing, and others, I learned that it is generally understood 
that high school is the arena in which students are pushed the hardest to perform. 
There was a sense that after students had passed their extremely competitive 
university entrance exam, they would be able to relax somewhat. As neither teachers 
nor institutions wanted the loss of face associated with students achieving low grades, 
most students were able to do well with minimum effort. Anything below 90 percent 
was considered a bad grade, and in fact, I was asked by the university administration 
to re-mark papers in which students had scored lower than this – although they had 
not failed. In some cases I was told to simply add marks across the board so that all 
students got a higher grade. The necessity to achieve high grades was difficult for 
students to balance with the need to develop professional work experience. It was 
generally accepted at CFAU that students in senior years needed to focus on finding 
and undertaking professional internships opportunities that would allow them to 
enhance their resumés and ultimately make them more employable in the highly 
competitive market after graduation. Actual face-to-face study and learning was 
largely considered to be of secondary importance. My insistence on setting a 
workload that I felt was appropriate for fourth-year students at an Australian 
university became another area of struggle between my students and I. Unlike many if 
not most of their Chinese lecturers, I based a considerable part of my students’ grade 
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on class attendance and active participation, rather than on performance in the final 
exam.  
 
Throughout my time teaching at CFAU, I received both positive and critical feedback 
on my teaching style. The negative feedback I received reflected not so much the 
content of the course I was teaching but the method in which I taught it. The negative 
and positive aspects of the feedback formed two sides of the same coin – 
fundamentally, I had departed from the normal teaching style, and while some 
students found this to be a positive experience, others found it to be inappropriate and 
unhelpful. Positive feedback came through students talking to me after class or during 
breaks and expressing their interest in ideas and concepts I had introduced that they 
had not been exposed to before. Negative feedback, however, was more common. For 
example, some students took a kindly approach and tried to help me adjust to the new 
environment by giving advice about how to structure my classes and how much 
material was suitable for them to be given to read (generally less). Early in the first 
semester, I received a handwritten note on the back of some homework, suggesting 
that I reduce the reading load and discussion time, and spend more time teaching in 
class. Shane wrote:  
 
Regarding the course of this semester, after three weeks of class, I have some 
suggestions. Just one little one, actually. Since the academic content has 
deepened this semester, I have found it a little overwhelming. Thus I’d like it 
if you could provide more guidance in class instead of leaving discussions in 
our hands. I don’t think the free discussion can be very productive. I’d rather 
listen to you talk and teach.  
 
Formal feedback through the foreign affairs office in charge of recruiting and 
monitoring the foreign teachers reflected this view and suggested that other students 
had complained through official channels. My mid-year feedback email, received in 
January 2009, pointed out that: 
 
It is also suggested that in a course like yours, discussion should be based on 
serious, important topics and regular published or confirmed information. 
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Hearsay and rumour should be ruled out, as unbecoming of a school like 
CFAU.  
 
The negative feedback I received on my teaching style demonstrated not only the 
commitment to a traditional hierarchy between teacher and student, but also the 
structure of the relationships among students. Students’ resistance to calling me by 
my name and my rearrangement of the classroom likewise reflected how I had upset 
their expectations of how teachers and students should interact. The correct 
positioning of the teacher vis-á-vis the students, and the students in relation to each 
other, were both essential elements for the educational system to function effectively, 
and my attempts to circumscribe this system were viewed, for the most part but 
certainly not by all, with scepticism and irritation. My role as a teacher was to help 
students get through university, and demonstrate my credentials as a useful contact 
for the future. As my methods were not focused on teaching them things that they 
could use to pass their final exams, or the civil servant exam, and I was not in and of 
the system in which most of them would be operating in the future, my methods were 
of dubious utility.   
 
Conclusion: To whom are CFAU students obliged? 
 
The cohort model developed at the CFAU taught students not only how to associate 
with others but also with whom to associate, and for what reasons. Through 
schooling, the students learned that fitting seamlessly into a larger whole was the 
most comfortable, appropriate and useful way of interacting. As the discussion in this 
chapter suggests, obligation was understood as being context-dependent in the daily 
lives of the CFAU students I taught, based on what roles any individual inhabited as 
being changeable across time and space. As the students were fundamentally 
embedded in interdependent social relationships, and were “emotionally tied to 
personal obligations as defined by those relationships” (Hamilton and Zheng, 1992, 
25), each individual was required to demonstrate obligation according to constantly 
changing roles.  
 
Through both the content of their classes as well as through the repetition of practices 
in their daily lives, my students at the CFAU were learning to understand themselves 
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first and foremost as Chinese, with their primary obligation to the nebulous Chinese 
state-as-idea. To achieve this, the concentric circles model of social relations and 
related social obligations was reconceptualised so that loyalties to other identity 
markers were subsumed to that of the state. While living and studying at CFAU, 
students were physically removed from all pre-existing social networks and placed in 
an environment in which they were both subject to hierarchical power as well as 
objects and agents of peer-level techniques of surveillance and discipline in the 
classroom. Students’ only chance to come together with peers in anything like a 
private setting was when timetables and physical circumstances permitted, and yet 
even within their dormitories, students learned to deliberately and consciously 
subsume their own interests and needs to the greater collective good. Students needed 
to be able to coexist with their peers in such a way as to demonstrate not only that 
they were reliable and trustworthy individuals to ensure a smooth experience in the 
present, but also to establish networks and contacts for the future. Within this 
framework, students’ experiences taught them to understand other relationships and 
obligations in instrumental terms – that is, to what extent any interaction would 
improve an individual’s ability to achieve his or her personal goals, framed in 
patriotic terms of strengthening China.  
 
This instrumental understanding of the nature of relations and interactions came to the 
fore on a number of occasions while I was teaching at CFAU. I was surprised to find 
that, despite living and studying almost constantly as one tightly knit group, students 
did not necessarily trust one another. Relationships based on fulfilling social roles 
rather than inherent individual characteristics meant that trust was developed on the 
basis of performing roles appropriately in the present and being able to be relied upon 
to provide access to resources in the future. Students adopted an approach of ‘self-
directed self-control’ to negotiate the complex network of relationships and 
demonstrate their appropriateness.  
 
Like Foucault’s prisoners in his discussion of Bentham’s panopticon, the arrangement 
of students’ time and space was such that they knew they were always being watched. 
Ultimately, they watched over themselves. However, unlike Foucault’s prisoners, in 
this circumstance where “the dichotomy of oppressor and oppressed is merged instead 
into an image of mutual interdependence” (Evasdottir 2004, xi), struggle against 
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authority was not the most effective means to negotiate power. As a student’s identity 
arose from how he or she was judged in the eye of the beholder, resisting discipline 
and control and achieving his or her own goals came by means of becoming more 
connected and more involved. Students achieved autonomy through obedience, by 
participation, rather than resistance. Obedience to, rather than struggle against, the 
strict and multitudinous rules and regulations allowed access to the system’s benefits 
and incentives (ibid., x-xi).  
 
On more than one occasion while I was teaching at CFAU, students approached me 
individually after class or by sending an email, wanting to try and explain to me that 
their lack of participation in class (participation being the basis of the highest possible 
grade in my classes) was not for want of opinion, but for fear that their views would 
be taken badly by other students. Indeed, their fears were not unfounded. In the 
example given earlier in which one student’s presentation about Japan resulted in a 
sudden display of emotion, after the class, the presenter, Karen, approached me to say 
that she would have liked to have said more about the changes she thought had 
occurred in Japan, but that she felt that her classmates would have become too angry, 
and they would not have been able to forgive her or forget what she said. She 
explained that if she had said more, it might have consequences for her later in her 
working life. Similarly, a student said to me in a break after a class in which we were 
discussing the issues of media censorship that while there was much more he had 
wanted to say in class, he felt that he couldn’t. He said that whilst perhaps his 
classmates were his friends now, if the situation changed in ten, or twenty, or even 
thirty years, and he was remembered as “the guy who was critical”, his life could be 
turned upside down in an instant. In another case, a young woman with a growing 
interest in Western political science and philosophy said much the same thing – her 
classmates could not be expected to understand, and they might use it against her 
later.  
 
At the CFAU, revealing too much about oneself was not considered wise or desirable. 
Proximity and cohesion did not engender friendship in the way that I had anticipated 
that they would. Students built allegiances, networks, associations and guanxi, but 
this did not necessarily equate with openness and trust. Indeed, it was the deliberately 
cultivated lack of trust that worked as the foundation of social relations among my 
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students at the CFAU.44 This point was made in a very poignant way when one 
student equated openness and honesty with mental illness during her self-introduction 
in the first week of class. I had asked each student to ask another student a question 
(which did not necessarily have to be answered). Pansy said to her male classmate,  
 
I know I have a mental problem and I am like a child both physically and 
mentally, I want to be mature, do you have any tips on how to hide yourself 
deeply and not give everything away? 
 
According to Pansy’s conception, the maturity needed to succeed both at the CFAU 
and in life more broadly rested on not revealing too much about one’s own inner 
beliefs and feelings. This understanding seemed to be widely shared. Being ‘true to 
yourself’ by following your own ideas and goals, so highly valued as a characteristic 
in Anglo-Saxon cultures, did not appear to be considered a virtue at all in the same 
way among CFAU students. Instead, hiding yourself deeply in order to “not give 
everything away” was the ideal.45  
 
Only when the rules of interaction were known and understood could individuals 
have a framework on which to base decisions on what to do and how to behave, and 
just as importantly, how to interpret others’ actions and behaviours (Evasdottir 2004, 
56). The dormitory living arrangements, the classroom structure, the regulated 
schedule, the peer-surveillance class monitoring system – all of these were important 
mechanisms through which CFAU students learned to negotiate the roles and 
obligations necessary for being good Chinese people. At the same time as the peer-
surveillance and monitoring inherent in CFAU students’ daily life taught them to 
merge and blend with others, just as important was recognising and following an 
immutable and deeply internalised hierarchy. Evasdottir terms this combination of 
cohesion and hierarchy “differentiated similarity”, and she argues that it is an ideal 
                                                
44 As Graeme Smith argues in his paper ‘Tiba or not Tiba’ (2011), it is the everyday politics of envy in 
every individual cadre’s quest for political career advancement that determines group allegiances and 
motivates behaviour. A similar vein runs through how the CFAU students relate with each other. The 
threat of competition and the inescapable fact that there are far fewer good jobs than university 
graduates creates a latent underlying competitiveness and distrust of those around them.  
45 This choice of words refers to Deng Xiaoping’s famous “24 character” guideline for China’s foreign 
policy from the early 1990s: “keep a low profile and achieve something” (taoguang yanghui, yousuo 
zuowei: 韬光养晦有所作为).  
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way in which to channel differences into an appropriate organisational structure as a 
means of providing practical experience on how to understand and manage social 
relations both within university and in the broader realm (ibid., 56).  
 
While at university, CFAU students were in an environment in which the national 
was held up as the ultimate social organisation, a conflation and extension of the 
concept of family. The nation-state therefore warranted an extension of the primary 
obligations traditionally owed to family. Likewise, anything outside of the guojia unit 
did not warrant obligation. Students tended to see other countries, particularly 
developed nations, as part of a greater ‘non-Chinese world’, in which all particularity 
was subsumed within the catch-all term ‘abroad’ (waiguo:外国) (see Fong [2011, 6] 
for a discussion of Chinese citizens’ views of the developed world as one imagined 
community). When considered at all, this realm of ‘non-China’ tended to be 
understood only in the light of how it related to China. Other countries were 
conceived of as peripheral entities, little more than distant specks, relevant only in 
terms of how they may or may not relate with China. As demonstrated by Candy’s 
quote at the start of the chapter, Chinese people will only entrust those considered as 
“insiders” “with the deepest secrets”.  
 
At CFAU, my students were socialised to understand that their primary loyalty was to 
the Chinese nation-state. Students negotiated changing audiences and situations in 
order to play the ‘correct’ role and act in a way that would be interpreted as being a 
good and appropriate Chinese citizen. While living on campus, the practices of 
students’ everyday lives were regulated and controlled in ways that sedimented these 
values and norms, and importantly, gave students opportunities to apply their skills in 
negotiating the complex web of social relations and perform their appropriateness 
most correctly. As Evasdottir observes, while there is nothing particularly Chinese 
about the strategies of obedient autonomy, “the implications, meanings and goals of 
such strategies are unique to the Chinese context” (2004, xiv). Applying Candy’s 
logic of social relations and obligation to the macro-level suggests that existing 
discourses around China’s role in the world insufficiently address the implications of 
Chinese elites’ approaches to achieving their interests. 
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Chapter Six – 
CFAU Students’ Views of China’s Role in the World 
 
This chapter examines how my students called on narratives of the nation when 
discussing history, relations of power, and notions of self and other, in their 
explanations of where China is situated in the international context, and what they 
believe China’s role should be. It examines students’ views of how the international 
system should look, and their preference for a multipolar order. I discuss students’ 
normative understandings of what role and responsibilities China should take on in 
this ideal world order, particularly focusing on their sense of China’s obligations to 
global development.  In this chapter, I analyse my CFAU students’ understandings of 
China’s role as a peaceful and responsible actor in the world, with no desire to 
increase its global influence at the cost of existing power relations. I argue that my 
students’ perspectives on the international system and how China should fit within it 
are a result of the processes of sedimentation at the CFAU which create and privilege 
‘the logic of the national’.  
 
Dan, from the International Economics major, was a particularly quick and active 
student. He had a keen interest in Chinese politics, both domestic and international, 
and wanted to pursue a career in government. His motivation for doing so was, as he 
said, “to serve his country”, like his mother, a government official in the Shanghai 
Foreign Affairs Bureau. Dan told me one night over dinner after semester had 
finished how much he admired his mother. Although she was always being offered 
gifts or cheap housing from real estate developers in exchange for quickly approving 
their applications, she never accepted, as her own former Red Guard parents had 
raised her to believe that the most important thing was to serve the country honestly. 
Dan said he wanted an opportunity to do the same. Dan’s mid-semester essay was 
entitled, ‘Rise and Peace’, and in it he outlined the issues he felt faced the 
international system. Dan’s paper showed his understanding of what the international 
system should look like, what China’s role within it should be, and why China takes 
this particular approach: 
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China always pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. The 
fundamental goals of this policy are to preserve China’s independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favourable international 
environment for China’s reform and opening up, modernisation, maintaining 
world peace, and propelling common development. We oppose hegemonism 
and contribute to the establishment of a new international political and 
economic order, and develop good-neighbourly relations of friendship with 
the surrounding countries. Also we take an active part in multilateral 
diplomatic activities. China’s foreign policy so far has brought tighter 
relationships and prosperity to the country.  
 
Dan’s brief paragraph is packed with ‘correct’ formulations for understanding 
China’s role in the world. Like Dan, my other students have also been socialised into 
this worldview from a young age, and their education at CFAU serves to intensely 
reiterate it as undisputable. Dan’s paragraph refers to two recurring themes among my 
students. Firstly, his presumption that history and past behaviour underpins the 
present was a very common trope. Secondly, he implicitly acknowledges the three 
CCP-defined pillars of Chineseness: territorial integrity; economic growth; and an 
integrated Chinese identity. The third pillar of integrated identity is demonstrated in 
the way in which he conflates ‘we’ students and the Chinese state.  Dan criticises past 
imperialism and present systemic disparities with his reference to opposing 
hegemonism and the desire for a new, fairer world order. These values are all framed 
within the ultimate goal, conceived of in national terms – prosperity for the country. 
Dan’s comment neatly encapsulates the perspective of most of the students I taught at 
CFAU. 
 
A New Model for the International System: The virtues of multipolarity 
 
In November 2009, in the course on the role of culture and context in foreign policy, I 
asked my students to write an essay outlining their opinion on any of the topics we 
had discussed so far in class. Across the wide range of issues students addressed, 
certain key themes were repeated. In particular, students were keen to discuss the 
problems inherent in the current international system, what a better system should 
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look like, and what China’s role in that system should be. Their main concerns 
regarding China’s role were what part it could play in environmental protection, 
global peace and security, and international development. They were also keen to 
emphasise the role China already played, which they felt was often unrecognised and 
under-appreciated by Western commentators. Like Dan, most students raised the 
importance of creating a more representative multipolar model for global governance.  
 
Summer, a young woman majoring in International Economics, had strong opinions 
about what a new international system should look like, and what China’s role in it 
should be. As she argued in her essay, ‘A new model for the international system with 
a rising China’, the US was no longer in a position to be able to shoulder the world’s 
responsibilities alone, particularly after the financial crisis. Most other students held 
similar views. As Yellow put it more explicitly,  
 
Since the financial crisis broke out in late 2007, the world is processing a 
difficult time. For the international community, the monopole system no 
longer works to make the world work properly. The United States has been 
seriously hit by the financial crisis and its troops in Iraq and Afghanistan drag 
its economy recovery.  
 
Summer explained that the existing model was evidently no longer tenable: 
 
The last model, the Yalta System, was suitable for the structure of the Cold 
War. The collapse of the Soviet Union declared the end of the Cold War. 
Russia is not as powerful as the Soviet Union was, given its weak domestic 
economy. It is more important that Russia is no longer an enemy to the United 
States. Although the United States is the only super-power, it has some 
problems. It acted as the leader of the whole world and launched wars in 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. And during the financial crisis, the US 
suffers from economic recession.  
 
Based on these elements, Summer, like other students, felt that it was “the right time 
for a new model to replace the Yalta System”. Her conviction was based on what she 
saw as two main material facts: that the end of the Cold War had left the world with a 
191 
 
 
unipolar system in which the US was the sole superpower; and that the increasingly 
globalised environment and the financial crisis in 2008 meant that the US was no 
longer able to bear this burden alone. Most students agreed that the need for a new 
model of international system had become more acute after the global financial crisis 
of 2008. Indeed, the crisis was seen to have already changed the system irrevocably. 
Ken, for example, felt that, “After the financial crisis, the international system has 
changed to a new style which is better adapted to the new phenomena”. In addition to 
the United States’ perceived lack of capacity to continue to dominate as hegemon, 
students accepted that the “main trend of the world in the new century” was the 
inevitability of further globalisation. They also tended to agree that the twenty-first 
century was going to be ‘the Asian Century’46 in which, “the core of the world is 
moving from the West to the East – especially in recent years, and the development in 
the Asia-Pacific is remarkable”. As a consequence of all these factors, students felt 
that the international system needed to allow for a wider range of voices to be heard, 
rather than just representing the interests of the status quo powers.  
 
Whichever of these reasons, or combination thereof, that students put forward as their 
rationale, all students called for a new style of international system. The new system 
most students envisaged was one in which the US-led ‘unipolar moment’ of the post-
Cold War era would be replaced by a different formation of power. Like Summer, 
most students did not see the new scenario as a bipolar moment in which China 
formed a ‘G2’ with the US. They rather promoted a system of multipolarity in which 
five ‘poles’ would balance power among them: the United States, Russia, Europe, 
Japan, and China. Students believed that in this way, China would have more voice 
than in the current regime, and through it, other developing countries would also be 
better represented. As Ken explained, 
 
The structure of the world is changing, we can hear more voices from 
different countries. Just like the G8 has grown to the G20. Developing 
countries are more and more important around the world. 
 
                                                
46 This expression is thought to have first appeared in a 1985 US Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations hearing, and to have first been used by Asian leaders in a 1988 meeting between Deng 
Xiaoping and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.  
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Students expressed strong views that it was no longer appropriate for “one or a few 
countries to be the centre of the international system. The international system is 
maintained by all the countries in the world”. They saw the promotion of equality and 
mutual respect as the rationale behind a multipolar model, asserting that the “validity 
of an international system must be built on the bases of national sovereignty and 
equality”.  
 
As Yellow put it,  
 
It can be concluded that there will be a new international model, and China 
will probably play an important role in it. It is not only a transfer of the 
international patterns of politics, but also a way to keep peace and stability. 
This new model is not like the previous models, which are models of 
hierarchy, but a kind of ‘democratic’ international model.  
 
He went on to explain why more of a role for China would result in a less hierarchical 
system, drawing on official narratives to illustrate how and why this system would be 
superior to what currently exists:  
 
Since China used to be a weak power in international politics, its people and 
leaders are deeply concerned about the suffering of less developed countries; 
they also realise that if a certain country needs to develop its economy, a good 
international environment is essential. On the other side of the coin, a good 
international environment is not a zero-sum game; it would help the developed 
countries have more chance to make their economic and social development 
better. So China would probably act its best to create an international stage 
where each country can have a role. This new model will in that sense be a 
‘democratic’ one, which means every country has the right and ability to 
figure out what it wants. It’s certain that this kind of new international model 
will promote and sustain peace as well as stability all around the globe, just as 
President Hu said in the Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China: a harmonious world.  
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China’s past suffering at the hands of other powers was accepted as an indisputable 
fact among my students. They considered China’s history of humiliation as a 
guarantee that China would protect and promote the rights of less powerful states in 
the future, ideally multipolar, international system.  
 
Multilateralism 
 
In addition to the importance of multipolarity in my students’ vision of an ideal 
international system, students also stressed the critical role of genuinely 
representative multilateral organisations. Students felt that fair and equal 
representation through multilateralism provided the most appropriate framework for 
the future international system. Underpinning their normative view of what the world 
should look like was a widely held view of history in which China’s dignified and 
peaceful past, and trajectory into a similarly dignified and peaceful future, had been 
disrupted by foreign imperialist incursions. Students felt strongly that this kind of 
bullying of weaker states should never again be allowed. Based on the perception that 
previous permutations of the international system had failed weaker states in the past, 
students argued that an ideal international system was one in which weaker states 
were protected as each sovereign nation held equal power and voting rights:  
 
We stand for establishing a new international political and economic order 
that is fair and rational. Politically, all countries should respect and consult 
one another and should not seek to impose their will on others. Peace and 
development are the themes of our era. To preserve peace and promote 
development is for the wellbeing of all nations.  
 
Similarly, another student asserted:  
 
All countries, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the 
international community and have equal rights to participate in world affairs. 
No country or group of countries has the privilege to place itself above the 
international community. They have the equal power to cooperate with each 
other and help each other. There should be mutual cooperation, equality and 
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mutual benefit, and common progress between countries, especially between 
the developed countries and the developing countries. 
 
In general, students felt that while the United Nations system may be imperfect, it 
enjoyed a legitimacy that other organisations, such as the IMF or World Bank, did 
not, because of its ‘one country, one vote’ principle. As Alison argued,  “History has 
proven that strong international institutions are a precondition for building any 
successful international cooperation”. Students felt strongly that China was already an 
active supporter of a multilateral system, noting the different multilateral institutions 
in which it was a constructive member. Katerina argued for example that:  
 
China is eager to open itself to the world and deepen multilateral cooperation 
with global counterparts. In 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was 
founded, with its mission to promote peaceful coexistence and development 
on the basis of mutual trust, respect, benefits, and consultation. Apart from 
SCO, China is taking a more and more active lead in ASEAN, APEC, G20 
and other international cooperative organisations and projects.  
 
Students believed that, unlike China’s genuine support for multilateralism, how the 
US acted in the global arena was the cause of many of the problems within the 
existing multilateral framework for global governance. They believed that China was 
behaving differently in the same circumstances because inherent Chinese cultural 
characteristics guided Chinese political behaviour. As Tony posited, “The United 
States keeps a vague relation with the United Nations. The Yankees put influence on 
the conference round-table for their own interests at the cost of other nations”. Tony 
then argued that China would never undermine the UN system in this way, but would 
rather fully support and participate in its multilateral approach to global governance. 
He noted that, “China is aware of the importance of joining in the world family. That 
can benefit China a lot. We believe that ‘so long as you live in the house, you have to 
keep it clean’”. While the Realist school of IR posits that any state will behave 
according to the constraints of its position, my students firmly believed that China 
would behave very differently to traditional powers, according to its own cultural 
beliefs and worldviews. 
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The Future Shape of the International System 
 
In the past, particularly during the Mao era, China had emphasised a revolutionary 
ideology which underpinned the goal of overthrowing the prevailing international 
norms in order to extend the Communist revolution internationally (see Zhao 1996, 
54-55; and Janos 1964). Official discourse has changed dramatically since Mao’s 
time, and the views and goals expressed by my students at CFAU were certainly very 
different from this previously explicit Chinese position. Students tended to argue that 
the inexorable trend of globalisation drawing China into the world had greatly 
benefited the country, eradicating any interest in overthrowing the system.  
 
My students understood that the current international system, while imperfect, had 
allowed China to develop quickly in the last three decades. They saw further 
economic cooperation and globalisation as the country’s best chance to continue to 
grow economically. They believed that further global integration in which China 
could become economically stronger would lead to a future characterised by “peace 
and development, not revolution and war”. Cooperation and participation were not 
only seen as advantageous for all states across the system, but also as ultimately 
having a beneficial impact on China. As Bobby from the Diplomacy major argued:  
 
International cooperation is emerging and deepening. China is obviously part 
of this complex interdependence and actively participates in the cooperation, 
especially economic cooperation. Therefore, China is gradually becoming a 
beneficiary of the international system and changes its aim from changing the 
system to taking part in the system and gaining interest from it. At the same 
time, the development of international economic cooperation makes China 
develop quickly without invading or expanding in to any other countries.  
 
Another student noted the benefits China had enjoyed from joining the WTO in 2001:  
 
When China joined the WTO, it made its economic policy based on the 
principle that all member countries are equal and what is done towards one 
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members, negotiations are held under WTO supervision. WTO accession also 
has made the Chinese economy more open, more transparent and more 
integrated into the world economic system. 
 
The role of the international system was seen by my students to be, ideally, to 
“maintain international order, encourage the development of the global economy, 
melt different kinds of culture together, and push ahead the communication of 
scientists from all over the world”. Students felt that it was therefore in China’s 
interests to maintain and protect the stability and security of the current system, but at 
the same time, ensure that the system better represented the interests of non-
traditional powers.  
 
Students were, overall, very optimistic about the future: “The world is marching 
toward brightness and progress, the road is tortuous, but the future is bright, the forces 
for peace, justice and progress are invincible after all”. In a stirring conclusion to her 
mid-semester essay, Katerina argued that it was the responsibility of herself and her 
peers as young Chinese to change the world by working towards a new and fairer 
international system:  
 
As part of the new generation, I absolutely think the world needs change. 
Some countries which neglect international law should be punished, and some 
countries’ role as the world’s police should change. We need a new 
international system, and there should be one. As a Chinese, I think that China 
has both obligations and responsibilities to play a relatively important role, 
and I have confidence in my motherland. 
 
Students felt strongly that the bright global future they saw for the world required the 
US to rescind its unilateral hold on power, as indeed it could not hold on to its 
hegemonic status even if it sought to. They believed the most appropriate model for 
the ‘new era’ of peace and development was a multipolar system in which China 
shared control with several other major powers, working in a fair and representative 
multilateral decision-making environment. 
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China’s Role in an Ideal World 
 
Admittedly, as a rising power, we cannot avoid playing a role in the new world 
system, and assuming more responsibilities. But play a leading role? Definitely not! 
        - Karen, International Law 
 
In addition to understanding what the international system does and should look like, 
one of the central tenets of my students’ training was how a proper Chinese official 
ought to view what role China should play within the global order. Students 
envisaged one of China’s key roles as being the representative voice for developing 
countries, as the only developing country among the five poles among which global 
power would be divided. That China may soon not constitute a developing country 
was never raised. My students believed that the new ‘democratic’ world system had a 
key role for China. However, they stressed that having a central role did not equate to 
China taking on a primary leadership position. Rather, as Lily argued,  
 
China will continue to improve and develop relations with developed 
countries; China will broaden the converging points of common interests and 
properly settle differences on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, including differences in social system and ideology. China will 
develop exchanges and cooperation with political parties and organisations of 
all countries and regions on the principles of independence, complete equality, 
and mutual respect for each others’ internal affairs. China will stand for 
establishing a new international political and economic order that is fair to 
Africa. 
 
The two key rationales behind Karen’s argument that China would never play a 
leading role were widely shared among my students. Firstly, their historical 
determinist perspective meant students believed that because China had never in the 
past sought global dominance, it would never do so in the future. Students understood 
certain Chinese cultural traits as fundamental and inherent to all Chinese people 
throughout time. Their belief in historical precedent as the explanation for China’s 
behaviour in the international arena, both now and in the future, is also common 
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among highly respected scholars, such as Li Anshan from Peking University. Li 
Anshan argues that ancient Confucian notions are central to Chinese external relations 
(Li 2012, 41-60). This view is also the central tenet of Yan’s book, Ancient Chinese 
Philosophy, Modern Chinese Power (2010). Yan, from Tsinghua University, argues 
that ancient Confucian ideals fundamentally underpin how China sees the world, and 
should play a more explicit role in China’s overseas engagement (2010). 
 
The second factor underpinning students’ insistence that China would never play a 
leading global role was also based on historical determinism, but was rather more 
pragmatic. This view was based on a cyclical understanding of history in which states 
grew strong, stretched too far, and declined – something China wanted at all costs to 
avoid. For example, in Buddy’s mid-semester essay entitled ‘China, a Participant but 
Not a Changer’, he argued that: 
 
China’s rising is just another rise-and-fall in world history like before. There 
will be no fundamental change to the international system itself, but it’s 
undoubted that China will certainly play a more and more important role in 
world affairs. But we should not play too much of a role. 
 
This sentiment reflects the official position, as indicated by the Chinese government 
television broadcast of a popular 12-part series entitled, The Rise of the Great Nations 
(Daguo Jueqi: 大国崛起).47 This television miniseries catalogued the rise – and 
subsequent fall – of many of the world’s great empires, with a clear message that 
imperial overstretch inevitably leads to downfall. My students had internalised this 
message, arguing that China preferred to chart a modest course in which its dignity 
and material wellbeing were assured, but with no designs on international power over 
and above that. 
                                                
47 The Rise of the Great Nations (also known as the Rise of the Great Powers) was a 12-part series 
aired in 2006 which took three years to make, following a study session of the Politburo in 2003. As 
one commentator observed, “the narrator presents the emergence of the nine countries analysed as 
achievements worthy of emulation, reviewing the globe-spanning colonies of the imperial powers in 
admiring terms. The documentary also stresses historical themes that coincide with policies Chinese 
leaders promote at home. Social stability, industrial investment, peaceful foreign relations and national 
unity are presented as more vital than, for example, military strength, political liberalization or the rule 
of law”. The series was broadcast twice in immediate succession, covering 24 consecutive nights 
(Kahn, 2006).  
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Overall, my students demonstrated a strong desire to support the existing international 
system. However, they agreed that allowing more voice for developing countries was 
critical, especially to balance what they described as unilateral US hegemony. None 
of my students expressed the view that China should challenge the US to take on the 
role as single predominant world power. The certainty with which students believed 
that China would never want to take over the US’ role in the international system 
underpinned their strong belief that the West’s fear of a rising China was so 
misguided that it could only be part of a deliberate political strategy to limit China’s 
growth. Students believed that a new multipolar system in which China had an active, 
but not primary role, would usher in a long period of peace and harmony conducive to 
the wellbeing and development of all – not least for China itself.  
 
The right to a role 
 
The notion that China was once a great power that was ready to re-emerge as an 
active participant on the world stage was a strong theme for many students. For 
example, as Yellow noted,  
 
Historically, China had been a leading power of the world, judged by 
economy and military force, for hundreds of years. It lost its position in the 
19th century when beaten by Western powers. Since then, the Chinese people 
have been trying to let their motherland hold such a position again.  
 
Like Yellow, most of my CFAU students understood China’s rightful and appropriate 
position in the world order as pre-established by historical precedent. According to 
this view, history demonstrates that China has always been a central player in 
international relations. Students’ historical determinism equated this past with how 
the future should naturally unfold. However, they understood this natural schema to 
have been radically disrupted by the incursions of Western imperial powers in the 
1800s, commencing with the Opium Wars and ushering in the Century of 
Humiliation.  
 
Many students felt that in addition to the Chinese people’s own desire for China to 
resume its position, other countries also wanted China to play an increasing role. As 
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Katerina argued, “with China’s development in the late 20th century and the 
beginning of the 21st century, the calling becomes louder for China to take a more 
decisive role in international affairs”, at the same time as there were “more and more 
complaints about America who is used to leading the world on the basis of force.” 
Ultimately, students felt that the time was ripe for China to play more of a role in the 
world. For example, Karen felt that in the crisis of the current international system, 
the old Chinese adage that “heroes always appear in the age of changes”, was very 
apt.  She argued that China represented a refreshing change for the better, compared 
with existing powers:  
 
When you look around the world, besides those old powers and trouble-
makers, you see China, a rising power, with a huge population, a large 
potential market, rich resources, good location, and a strong eagerness to 
develop. It turns out to be the hero in many people’s eyes.  
 
While all students felt that China had the right to more voice in the international 
system, most argued that China should not play a leading role. However, there were 
one or two students who felt that China could step up and take a more important 
position. For example, as Katerina argued: 
 
After the Cold War, the world’s situation has largely changed. Since the 
Soviet Union’s disintegration, the so-called ‘balance of power’ has 
disappeared. In recent years, the US has become the solo superpower in the 
world, (in terms of a country, the EU isn’t included). According to history, 
there needs to be another superpower to balance the world’s interest. And 
China has the potential.  
 
However, these views were rare, and were generally framed not so much in terms of a 
desire for China to assume a global leadership position, but rather a perceived need to 
balance the skewed system of US hegemonic power. 
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Responsibility 
 
Many students argued that China should take on more of a role in the international 
system because it had a right to, because it had a duty to, and because of the 
beneficial impact it would have. As Summer put it, China is “a responsible country, 
who respects sovereignty and doesn’t interfere with other countries’ domestic policies 
when dealing with international affairs”. The concept of responsibility is a strong 
trope in international relations. The ‘responsibility to protect’ was formally adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in July 2009. Even before then, the 
question of China behaving ‘responsibly’ in the international system had been a 
theme since Robert Zoellick asked “the essential question”: “How will China use its 
influence?” (Zoellick 2005). Zoellick exhorted the US to “urge China to become a 
responsible stakeholder in the [international] system” in his 2005 remarks to the 
National Committee on US – China Relations, entitled, Whither China: From 
Membership to Responsibility? (ibid.).   
 
My students were very aware of this discourse and formulated numerous arguments 
to show how China was already and would continue to be a responsible power – 
according to its capabilities. In addition to the sense that China had a natural and 
historical right to adopt a more prominent position in international affairs, CFAU 
students overall tended to stress that China’s increased power behoved it to take on 
more responsibility. Students like Candy expressed a belief that as “China plays a 
more and more important role on the international stage”, the Chinese people would 
accept “our duty to improve the world and deal with the global issues”. Some students 
noted that China was already responsible, as Summer’s remark, above, indicates.  
 
This sense of responsibility in Chinese international relations was seen as appropriate 
for a “rising country with a long history” and was also attributed by some students, 
like Maisie, to Confucian values: 
 
The second Confucian idea that has a great effect on China’s foreign policy-
making is that ‘if you live a life of hardship, you just manage yourself alone, 
but if you are powerful enough, you should also take more care of the world’.  
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The way in which students understood China’s history not only emphasised the 
righteousness and naturalness of China’s ‘recovery’ to its rightful position. At the 
same time, it also granted China a certain ‘exceptionalist’ identity in opposition to 
Western imperial powers, and a concomitant identification with other developing 
countries. For my students, it was a logical step to conclude that as China regained its 
rightful role as an active participant in global affairs, it would share its experiences 
with other developing nations, and always retain a natural distrust of Western powers. 
My students believed that China therefore had a responsibility to align itself and its 
interests with those who had supported it in the past, for example, in regaining UN 
recognition and recovering its position in other ways. 
 
However, while CFAU students agreed that China should be responsible, what that 
specifically entailed was not clearly articulated. Despite the use of the same English 
terminology in both Chinese (English language) and Western discussions, the 
fundamental expectations of what ‘global responsibility’ implies in practice may not 
be the same. For my students, China’s increased responsibility meant that the country 
could influence global norms to “provide an effective alternative for global 
governance” including  “constructively critiquing global unfairness, injustices and 
abuses in the international system” as part of “promoting a harmonious world”. In 
students’ understanding, this meant, for example, continuing to take a lead role in Six 
Party Talks with North Korea, and increasing participation in the UN Security 
Council and the UN more broadly. Responsibility was also seen to imply that China 
should play more of a role in “helping countries that are not so strong get heard, 
mediating in conflicts on their behalf, and fighting for their rights on the international 
stage”. As another student argued, “as the biggest developing country, China must 
play an important role in the international system, not only for the benefit of China 
but also for the stability of the whole world”. Due to their belief that China was 
already an active international participant, my students felt that comments like 
Zoellick’s about China taking on a more responsible international role were not only 
unfounded and unfair, but represented yet another example of Western efforts to 
diminish China’s positive participation in global affairs and undermine its credibility 
in the international system. 
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Taking on responsibility one step at a time 
 
While students felt that China could and should play a role of some sort, some argued 
that the country should be cautious about taking on too much responsibility too 
quickly. Students saw two key and interrelated reasons for this: fear of imperial 
overstretch, and Chinese tradition and culture, in which not interfering in others’ 
affairs is a central tenet. The conclusion they drew from these factors was clear: it is 
not wise to get involved beyond one’s own borders. One student of Diplomacy, 
James, from Sichuan, who wanted to pursue a career in politics “for a while”, argued 
that China’s role in the world should be based on its traditional understanding of 
interaction and obligation: 
 
Traditional Chinese families believe problems and conflicts between their 
family members should only be settled in the family. It is obvious that China’s 
foreign policy holds a similar principle, as is shown in the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence. In the Darfur issue, China follows an invisible custom 
and chooses to respect its paterfamilias first and not to interfere. So what if 
China gains more power in the new century? We can see China has been 
sending many soldiers into the UN Peacekeeping Force, but no more than 
enough. They can try to prevent some severe situations, but will not try to 
interfere too much. 
 
Regarding the fear of overstretch, Buddy argued in his mid-semester essay that:  
 
The reason that China is not willing to stand at the top of the world is that 
China knows its own capability and the reality of the world politics. China has 
won a lot of friendship, but that’s not the same as authority. Getting more 
involved in international affairs means more cost in IR. For China, its 
capability is limited. China also knows that the more power you have got, the 
greater responsibility you have to take; the more you get involved, the quicker 
you decline.  
 
Buddy went on to say:  
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That’s why the decline of superpowers is unavoidable. Maintaining both 
internal and external interests makes more cost for the states, which adds more 
and more burden to its shoulders. There are many examples in history: 
Napoleon’s France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union all declined. If China 
follows in the same tracks, it will do too.  
 
Students’ belief that China should not extend beyond its own borders but at the same 
time take on a more responsible global role seems like a contradiction, if based on an 
assumption that responsibility requires external projections of material strength. 
However, students resolved this apparent tension through the proposition that China 
could do the most good for the world by attending to its own development, security 
and stability: “It is never exaggerated to say that if China is in a stable and 
harmonious state, the world will benefit”.  Additionally, they did not see China 
fulfilling its responsibilities as causing an issue of over-extension, because China 
always worked according to its capabilities, through multilateral channels, and with 
the full consent of relevant stakeholder governments. 
 
Most students at CFAU felt that China could play a constructive role in the 
international system without risking its own stability and harmony in several ways. 
As Summer neatly outlined, the key areas in which “China could take on more 
responsibility in the international system are environmentally; by promoting 
international security, including anti-terrorism; and in utilising China’s own poverty 
reduction experience to further global development”. The following sections of the 
chapter will examine these areas.  
 
China and the Global Environment 
 
My students generally accepted that environmental issues were a cause for concern, 
both domestically and in terms of global public goods. Overall, they understood these 
problems to have been caused by already developed nations as an inevitable 
consequence of the industrialisation process. This belief in the Western origins of 
environmental problems strongly coloured students’ views of how the issues should 
best be resolved. For example, as Katerina noted, “No country in history has emerged 
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as a major industrial power without creating a legacy of environmental damage that 
can take decades and big dollops of public wealth to undo”.  
 
Students also understood that China had already undertaken a raft of reforms to 
reduce and ameliorate the effects of climate change, and felt that the rest of the world 
should recognise these as important steps. As one student explained,  
 
China has recognised the obligation that it should try its best to reduce air 
pollution and seek cooperation with other countries to work out a solution for 
climate change. China has joined the United Nations–China Climate Change 
Partnership Framework Project. China has made great efforts in eco-system 
protection, biodiversity conservation, pollution control, and managing the 
tourism industry, based on the goal of protection and respect for the global 
environment.  
 
Likewise, another student argued,  
 
Recently the Chinese government has set up many regulations to reduce 
emissions and conserve energy. Export subsidies for polluting industries have 
disappeared. Different campaigns have started to close illegal coalmines and 
shut some heavily polluting factories. Major initiatives are underway to 
develop clean energy sources like solar and wind power. At the meeting in 
Copenhagen, China promised to reduce CO2 emission per capita of total GDP, 
and this action was praised by other countries. I think big emitting countries 
such as China and the US are being paid a lot of attention. So politically or 
ethically China should behave well to meet the world’s expectations. For this 
goal, China has a lot to do in the new international system.  
 
Ken noted that,  
 
During the UN climate change summit, China’s President Hu Jintao 
announced plans to cut emissions significantly by 2020, and to vigorously 
develop renewable and nuclear energy to show that China is a responsible 
country in protecting the environment. 
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However, despite students’ acceptance that the global environment was an issue that 
warranted China’s active engagement, it was clear that most felt that China should not 
be obliged to take on the same degree of responsibility as industrialised nations, for 
example, the US. As Matt argued, “China’s position has been consistent, that is, 
common but differentiated responsibility”. The two reasons students gave for this 
position were that firstly, those who created the problems and had thereby arrived at a 
state of development should take responsibility for their actions; and secondly, China 
itself was a developing country and needed more flexibility with environmental 
regulations in order to “complete its transition” to full development.48  
 
How China should correctly address domestic and global environmental challenges 
was seen to derive from China’s traditional values and a continuation of historical 
norms. As Glennis explained,  
 
Chinese traditional culture has played a significant role in all aspects of social 
and cultural life of Chinese people, including when it comes to the harmony 
between human and nature. China still takes the responsibility of protecting 
the environment. 
 
My students’ comments on environmental issues indicate that although they believed 
that existing global environmental problems were not of China’s making, they 
accepted that China’s own rapid development could have significant environmental 
implications, unless managed properly. Students felt confident that China was already 
taking measures to minimise negative environmental impacts domestically, and was 
also participating constructively in international fora to mitigate the effects of climate 
change. A key principle, however, was that China’s efforts would not go beyond its 
capacity, and would be in accordance with its responsibility for causing the problems. 
 
 
 
                                                
48 This trope of ‘shared but differentiated responsibility’ also appears in many other fields of China’s 
international engagement, including in its South-South development cooperation. It is a principle to 
which Chinese negotiators will firmly adhere – as was seen in Copenhagen, as well the High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011, and the fifth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) in Beijing in July 2012. 
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Global peace and security  
 
Students argued that in addition to how traditional Chinese values underpinned 
China’s active role in environmental protection, Chinese values also meant that the 
country could and should participate in protecting and promoting broader global 
peace and security. Glennis’ classmate, a quiet and thoughtful girl who had opted to 
use her Chinese name, Wang Yi, argued that “China is playing a bigger role in 
maintaining global security”, and explained how this was “generated from Chinese 
ancient philosopher Confucius because a big country should take the responsibility to 
keep a balanced situation among countries”. In terms of how that obligation to protect 
global security played out in practice, Summer saw China’s role as primarily one of 
collaboration and cooperation, operating very firmly within multilateral frameworks 
and under United Nations leadership. Most students saw multilateralism as critical for 
achieving global security, arguing that, “we must uphold multilateralism to realise 
common security”. Summer cited the example of the Middle East peace process:  
 
China is gradually beginning to play an important role as a mediator in 
international conflict. The practice of mediation in the Middle East conflict 
reflects the maturity of China’s political mentality. Problems and conflicts in 
the world are not direct threats to China’s interests, but in the view of 
responsibility for world peace, for universal values of human and concern for 
the humanitarian crisis, China must do something to help solve the problems 
and mediate the conflicts.  
 
Her classmate Diamond agreed, positing that: 
 
Politically, China is also becoming an important player on the world stage. As 
a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear weapons state, 
the expanding economy results in a growing global political influence. From 
the ‘Six-Party Talks’ to energy security; from Iran, South Korea to Sudan; 
China is almost everywhere. 
 
These students’ comments demonstrate a very different perspective from that in 
mainstream Western discussions regarding how constructive China’s involvement is 
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in international diplomacy. This divergence in views was also evident in discussions 
of China’s role in regional peacekeeping. My students believed that China was an 
important and constructive player, both because of its traditional approaches to 
dealing with international affairs, as well as its pursuit of contemporary strategic 
concerns. James from the Diplomacy major, for example, argued that:  
 
In today’s world, great powers like the US try to turn other countries into ones 
that are similar to them. They think that will be safer. They regard neighbours 
as opponents first. China doesn’t, however, and adheres to a policy that 
regards neighbours as partners to help them. In today’s foreign policies, China 
keeps an unvarying strategic pattern which includes ‘the neighbourhood 
comes first’. In 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was set up. And 
recently, China decided to give zero tariff status to ASEAN countries and also 
play an active role in the Great Mekong Sub-region Organisation and the 
Tumen River sub-regional development plans. These regional and sub-
regional cooperation practices will build a connecting circle around China, 
which may go further in the future.  
 
Ken noted how rather than trying to forcefully transform other countries into replicas 
of itself as the US was seen to do, China’s traditional approach of good-
neighbourliness had resulted in tangible benefits for peace and security,  
 
During the Six-Party Talks, China has struggled to use its close relationship 
with North Korea to persuade them not to develop nuclear weapons. Basically, 
China used its regional power to keep peace in eastern Asia.  
 
Like Ken, most students saw China as playing a central role in attempts to resolve the 
North Korean nuclear crisis. As Annie explained,  
 
Many diplomatic efforts have been made to convince or cajole the Northern 
regime to give up this quest, and all have so far failed. Since 2003, a new 
multilateral approach – the Six-Party Talks involving the Koreas, China, 
Japan, Russia, and the United States – has raised hopes anew. These hopes are 
209 
 
 
based largely on China playing an active role. China’s role in the Six-Party 
Talks is to promote peaceful talks.  
 
Maisie also argued that “Chinese diplomats were instrumental” in the North Korean 
peace process, reflecting the view among my students that China’s experience and 
wisdom in international negotiations was critical for peace in the East Asian region.  
 
In addition to this positive influence in regional affairs, many students also saw an 
increased role for China working alongside international agencies in the global arena. 
As Ken explained,  
 
China is aware of its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security 
Council of the United Nations. In recent years, China played a more and more 
important role in keeping the peace of the world. After 9/11 China worked 
together with other countries to fight against violence, terror and crime. 
During the Iraq War, China, Russia and the French blamed the United States 
for breaking the peace, bringing the nightmare to the Iraqi people, and 
intensifying contradictions between Western and Eastern cultures. 
Additionally, China has sent more than 6000 peacekeeping troops to Congo 
(Republic) and Haiti to help the government keep the situation peaceful and 
stable. In 2009 the Chinese government sent two battleships and a supply ship 
to fight against the Somali pirates and recover the confidence of marine 
transportation. With its developing economy and the increase in military 
expenditure, China is one of the most important peacekeeping countries in the 
world. 
 
Students saw this extension into global security as a critical element of China playing 
more of a role in the global arena. They did not consider it as presenting a danger of 
eventual decline through overstretching beyond China’s own borders, as the emphasis 
was firmly on involvement according to China’s capabilities. Nor was participating in 
global security regarded as constituting interference in other countries’ sovereignty, 
as China would only be involved in operations conducted through internationally 
sanctioned multilateral organisations.  
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Students felt that a central role China could play in achieving global peace and 
security was to represent the voice of other, less powerful developing countries, or to 
negotiate between major powers, like the US, and less powerful nations. 49  In 
particular, students saw China facilitating relations between East and West. As Ken 
argued,  
 
China plays an important role in the connection between West and East. As 
we know, most developed countries are Western countries and most Eastern 
countries are still developing countries. The different between West and East 
is not only about rich and poor but also modern and traditional, openness and 
exclusion, there is even a difference in sense of worth. But China is an open 
Eastern country. Other countries can find both Western culture and the 
Eastern culture mix together and deal with each other well. You can enjoy 
material life in Western style, at the same time you can deal with life in 
Eastern style. Western countries will see not all the Eastern people are 
terrorists who carry a bomb with them every day. On the other hand Eastern 
countries can see that not all the Western people are capitalists who only care 
about money. So China is a perfect example of how to make West and East 
understand each other better, and without misunderstanding, our world will 
become more and more harmonious.  
 
Ken’s remark reflects the cultural determinism common among students in which 
both East and West have their own inherent characteristics, and in which the West is 
generally considered to be one virtually indistinguishable imagined community (Fong 
2004, 6). Ken’s comment encapsulates students’ tendency to conceive of China’s role 
in protecting and promoting global security as the altruistic behaviour appropriate for 
a responsible state, and not related to protecting China’s interests – as Summer also 
explicitly stated.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
49 Despite its economic strength, China continues to define itself as a ‘developing country’, based on its 
comparatively low GDP per capita, rather than its impressive total GDP. 
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China’s Responsibility to Develop (Others) 
 
One of the strongest themes that came out in class discussions and students’ essays 
was China’s role in development, both internationally and domestically, as this was 
seen to have global implications. For example, as Lily argued,  
 
China will promote the development of economic globalisation in a direction 
conducive to common prosperity, draw on its advantages and avoid its 
disadvantages so that all countries, particularly developing countries, can 
benefit from the process.  
 
Lily was tapping into an issue that has become an increasingly public topic of 
discussion in China, particularly since the first White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid 
was released in April 2011. My students often raised the issue of China’s care for 
other developing countries, particularly in Africa. Given the importance this topic 
seemed to have for students, and the complex interactions the issue has with the 
tropes of nationalism discussed earlier in the thesis, the next section will focus on 
how students understood China’s responsibility in promoting global development.  
 
The majority of my students felt that as China grew economically, it was appropriate 
for the country to play a concomitantly greater role in international development. This 
belief was particularly strong regarding assistance to other developing countries with 
which students believed China shared past experiences of colonisation, and which 
were seen to have supported China in its re-ascendance on the world stage. Assisting 
other countries’ development was seen not as a new expansion of the country’s global 
role but simply as a continuation of how China has always behaved in the 
international system. For example, as Margaret explained,  
 
Helping each other is our basic policy in foreign affairs. Our government did 
its utmost to help the African countries, and donated ten million dollars to 
India. All these examples suggest that China shoulders its responsibility all the 
time. 
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Glennis also noted how “China provides not only technological, but also monetary 
support to African countries, which started in the 1950s and never stopped, no matter 
how hard the Chinese situation was”. Glennis’ comment reflected a broader view 
among students that China had always been a friend to those countries that were, like 
itself, left behind as the Western countries grew economically and politically more 
powerful.  
 
Development with Chinese characteristics 
 
Students believed that development itself was culturally specific, and no universal 
model existed. They felt that “inherent Chinese characteristics” and China’s own 
historical experiences shaped what development meant in China, how development 
should best be achieved, and particularly, who should implement development 
projects. The combination of these characteristics and experiences were understood as 
the foundations of former Premier Zhou Enlai’s famous ‘Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence’, articulated in India in 1954. Building on these principles, in 1964 the 
Chinese government declared the ‘Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical 
Assistance to Other Countries’. The core content of these Eight Principles reiterated 
the importance of equality, mutual benefit, a ‘no strings attached approach’ to 
development and territorial sovereignty.50 Both proclamations are still officially cited 
as the cornerstone of China’s international engagements.51 My students understood 
                                                
50 While a more recent adherent to the nation-state principles arising from the Treaty of Westphalia of 
1648, China has since adopted the notions of state sovereignty with considerable vigour, particularly 
since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. In the same way as China absolutely and 
emotionally resents and condemns any incursion into its own sovereign affairs – such as criticism of its 
human rights, or discussions of autonomy for Tibet, Taiwan or Xinjiang – it utilises the rhetoric of 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity in all its international dealings. 
51 The Five Principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-
aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
coexistence. The Eight Principles are: 1. The Chinese government always bases itself on the principle 
of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of 
unilateral alms but as something mutual; 2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government 
strictly respects the sovereignty of recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for 
any privileges; 3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans, and 
extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden on recipient 
countries as far as possible; 4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese 
government is not to make recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by 
step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development; 5. The Chinese government 
does its best to help recipient countries complete projects which require less investment but yield 
quicker results, so that the latter may increase their income and accumulate capital; 6. The Chinese 
government provides the best-quality equipment and materials manufactured by China at international 
market prices. If the equipment and materials provided by the Chinese government are not up to the 
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that these principles would ensure that Chinese overseas aid would always be “based 
on mutual equality, mutual benefit, and respect for sovereignty”.  
 
My students believed that China should play a role in overseas development, but two 
streams of opinion existed about how that should best be achieved. Echoing 
discussions about China’s overall responsibility in the world, some students felt 
strongly that China should concentrate on resolving its own poverty and inequality 
challenges. They felt that China’s responsibility to help others would be best achieved 
by focusing on China’s own economic development. In fact, not doing so could cause 
development challenges around the world. As Charity argued,  
 
And why do we say that China will bring troubles to other countries if we do 
not concentrate on our development? China has more than 1.3 billion people, 
if we do not develop our economy, not only our domestic environment will 
become turbulent, but also Chinese people will escape to other countries 
because of hunger and poverty.  
 
She went on to say how,  
 
On this issue, on December 13 1999, the Chairman of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) pointed out that China's 
development has never threatened others. On the contrary, if China does not 
concentrate on our development, China will bring many troubles to other 
countries. 
 
Similarly, Charity’s classmate Melanie argued that a peaceful international 
environment “is inseparable from sustained economic development” and therefore 
China’s own domestic development remained the primary means for achieving 
“China’s desire for world peace”. 
                                                                                                                                      
agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese government undertakes to replace them or refund the 
payment; 7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that the 
personnel of the recipient country fully master the technology; 8. The experts dispatched by China to 
help in construction in recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the 
recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any 
special amenities. 
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However, the majority of students felt that China had an obligation to help other 
developing countries by actively engaging in economic cooperation and providing 
development assistance. As Lily set out,  
 
China will promote the development of economic globalisation in a direction 
conducive to common prosperity, draw on its advantages and avoid its 
disadvantages so that all countries, particularly developing countries, can 
benefit from the process. 
 
This obligation to help others develop was seen by students to be a smooth 
continuation of China’s past role in the world, both in recent history since the 1950s, 
and according to ancient Chinese tradition. Yellow explained that: 
 
The reason that China may hold a deep concern for the economic development 
of the neighbouring countries is because China has a tradition of the ‘kingdom 
of heaven’ and will take care of those surrounding countries just as brothers 
take care of each other. The concept of family has a deep root in Chinese 
culture so that China will never let his brothers fall down. 
 
In the more recent past, as Li argued, development assistance to Africa was provided 
not because of China’s wealth and greatness, but at the time when China was at its 
poorest, indicating the extent to which it was motivated by altruism. Li, from the 
Diplomacy major, a young man who had been brought up in Hong Kong, also noted 
China’s assistance in sending soldiers and supplies during the Korea and Vietnam 
Wars, and referred to seventy other countries China had assisted with “personnel, 
infrastructure building, health care, education, and disaster alleviation”. Li concluded 
that it was long-held cultural values that have continued to underpin Chinese 
development behaviour in recent history: 
 
We must not neglect the Chinese values that underlie what China does. Being 
a developing country, China always generously helps other developing 
countries, even during the 1960s when the majority of Chinese were suffering 
from poverty and natural disaster.  
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While some students argued that global development would be best served by China 
taking care of its own affairs, and others felt that China should (continue to) play a 
more active role, all students tended to understand development assistance in terms of 
state-to-state, rather than individual-to-individual, or even state-to-individual, 
relations. For example, students noted how the development support provided by the 
Chinese state has since the early 1950s been repaid by African loyalty and support in 
the international system, including voting for UN representation to be returned to 
Beijing from Taipei in 1971. As Maisie observed,  
 
On October 26th 1971, China regained its rightful seat in the United Nations 
with 76 affirmative votes, 35 dissenting votes and 17 abstention votes. Most 
of the affirmative votes are from third world countries, especially African 
countries. Clearly it was a reflection of China’s intimacy with Africa. 
Nowadays China still keeps a good relationship with African countries and 
has much cooperation.  
 
Katerina also explained the relationship in state-level terms:  
 
Leaders of African countries love China’s help, because unlike the Western 
world, China gives aid without the demand for political or economic reform. 
In this way, we have a lot of African friends, and they are sort of our alliance, 
because we are all developing countries. In the UN councils, China struggles 
for developing countries benefits using its power, and in turn, African 
countries support China’s suggestions.  
 
These understandings reflect Chinese official development discourse and behaviour in 
which the Chinese state works exclusively with partner country national governments 
to decide what assistance will be provided and where. While on occasion, “the 
people” might be “grateful”, ultimately, the interests of the individual are conflated 
with those of the state, as this comment from Ricky suggests: 
 
China built the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, raw minerals were carried out with 
the help of China, and it was China that built the necessary infrastructure 
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facilities. African people thanked us from the heart. These facilities indicate 
the friendship between China and Africa.  
 
Students extended their assumption that ‘China-the-state’ was a proxy family member 
to the international realm. The rhetoric of brotherhood and friendship that peppered 
students’ discussions about international development was also applied to nation-
states. The tendency to anthropomorphise the state was also evident in the way most 
students applied the notion of the state as an extension of the family, and also as a 
friend, to their discussions of international development. The strong trope of 
‘brotherhood’ seen to connect China with other developing countries tended to be 
most commonly employed when talking about Africa. The discourse around this 
relationship often called on motifs of friendship and fraternity. Tony, for example, 
described China’s debt cancellation in Africa as “cancelling the debt for our black 
buddies”.  
 
That my students thought that international development assistance was the 
responsibility of the state rather than individuals could suggest the kind of state-
individual dichotomy prevalent in the West. I argue however that students saw the 
state acting on behalf of individuals, as their comments above demonstrate. My 
students had little conception of international assistance being provided by 
individuals. As a result, they did not see state-sponsored aid as opposed to individual 
aid, as it often is in the West. Instead, students’ conflation of themselves as 
individuals with the Chinese state meant that state-sponsored aid was simply a 
projection of their own desire to help the international family of poor countries. Just 
as students viewed Western countries as a single imagined community, so they also 
understood developing countries as one group, united by their experience of 
colonisation and exploitation at the hands of the West as Western powers pursued 
their own development.  
 
Despite this insistence on “friendship” and “brotherhood” in both official discourse 
and among my students, the way in which students talked about other developing 
countries suggested a certain sense of superiority. As Callahan observes, “the 
diplomatic discourse of friendship is trickier. It implies equality, but does not state it 
outright; indeed, friendship means very different things in different languages” (2012, 
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46). Wang Gungwu refers to this use of the terminology of family and friendship as 
reflecting a trend among Asian leaders to prefer “the softer hierarchy implied in terms 
like family and friends” over the harder Westphalian language of international law 
(2010, 222). Kelvin Cheung explains how the application of Confucian family values 
to the state results in the moral hierarchy in a society being extended to international 
relations (2012, 212-213). 
 
Although the terminologies of brotherhood and friendship do not necessarily imply 
equality, they do imply obligation. Cheung’s explanation fits the way my students 
explained China’s obligation to developing countries as brothers and friends as part of 
the responsibilities and obligations that these relationships demand. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, helping others in an interdependent environment of differentiated 
modes of association is a demonstration of role-appropriate behaviour. This 
demonstration is accompanied by expectations about how the benevolence will be 
reciprocated. As Yang argues, in Chinese society, helping others carries with it an 
inherent “obligation to repay” (1994, 139-145). Yang’s ethnographic research 
suggests there are two basic reasons for this imperative: firstly, one’s standing in 
public opinion (shehui yulun: 社会舆论), to avoid losing face in the eyes of others; and 
secondly, with a “certain sense of self-interest and material benefit in mind” (ibid., 
140). She quotes a worker who explains that “if one does not… spend some effort to 
keep up good relations… a day is bound to come when one needs to cross the same 
river again, but will find no bridge left” (ibid., 140).  
 
Because of the way students personified the state as a rational agent, and projected 
family values onto the international realm, they tended to conceptualise development 
assistance as part of an ongoing instrumentalist friendship at a global level in which 
‘one good turn deserved another’. Students believed that China owed African 
countries a debt of gratitude for Africa’s past support. Based on this, and a sense of 
shared history, students felt that China had an important role in assisting state-led 
growth in Africa and in other developing countries.  
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What ‘developed’ means 
 
Most of my CFAU students felt that China had a responsibility to assist the 
development of other countries. Therefore, exploring how they understood 
‘development’ and its ultimate goal of ‘being developed’ elucidates how they 
believed China could best achieve this obligation.  
 
Overall, my students tended to adopt what they described as a Marxist approach to 
development, in that the material base was seen to provide the foundation for the 
political and social superstructure. They regularly referred to a triangular conception 
of development in which the broad base of fundamental physical and material needs 
had to be met before subsequently addressing other needs. In this vision, economic 
growth and investment in infrastructure were seen as the key factors for achieving 
developed status. In a class discussion on the topic, Buddy leapt out of his seat to 
draw a picture of a triangle on the blackboard, sketching in the components of 
development to illustrate his point more clearly. Students often used this 
understanding of development to explain the importance of prioritising physical needs 
before political or social needs. This method of focusing on the material elements of 
development has been a fundamental tenet of China’s approach to its own 
development, as well as its overseas development assistance.  
 
During one class, I wrote the word ‘developed’ on the blackboard and asked students 
to come up and write their ideas of what the term meant. Words like ‘progress’, 
‘skyscrapers’ and ‘big TVs’ were scrawled on the board. Some students wrote that the 
Birds Nest Stadium, the Water Cube, and other buildings constructed for the 2008 
Beijing Olympics were symbolic of how China had progressed to become a 
developed and modern country.  Similarly, the architecturally wondrous CCTV 
Tower on the east side of Beijing was cited as an example of how China was now 
able to show the world that it was no longer backwards. As we talked about these 
ideas during the class, it became evident that students associated being developed and 
modern with physical and material factors, often designed to demonstrate a proud 
national image to the Chinese people themselves, as well as to outsiders.  
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This materialist vision of what a developed future should look like formed the 
foundation of students’ views of the correct role for China in the development of 
other countries. Less tangible ideas, such as those underpinning Amartya Sen’s notion 
of ‘development as freedom’ (1999) or the United Nations’ Millennium Development 
Goals of ‘reducing poverty’ which represent the ideal among ‘traditional’ donors, 
were far less evident. The majority of my students believed that development should 
be based on material factors before concerns about ‘softer’ aspects were attended to, 
like citizens’ rights. It was only in the 2011 Twelfth Five Year Plan that the Chinese 
Government explicitly adopted a more inclusive approach to growth. To what extent 
this domestic shift will be reflected in China’s international development assistance 
remains to be seen.  
 
China’s Rise is No Threat 
 
Many countries hope China will pursue a ‘Peaceful Rise’, but none will bet their 
future on it.  
    - Robert Zoellick, former head of the World Bank, 2005 
 
A theory like ‘China threat’ is irrational and worthless.  
    - Dan, International Economics major 
 
Some traditional donors see China’s increasing role in international development as 
constituting a threat, undermining the long-term sustainability of their own 
development efforts. Much Western commentary and analysis presents China as 
appealing to some recipients because of factors such as a lack of transparency, less 
stringent environmental requirements, the policy of ‘non-interference’ and its 
disinterest in promoting ‘good governance’ (see for example Henderson and Reilly 
2003; Naim 2007a, b; Shie 2007; and Skehan 2009). Moises Naim, editor of Foreign 
Policy, famously wrote in his article accusing China (among others) of providing 
“rogue aid”, “What’s wrong with the foreign aid programs of China, Venezuela, and 
Saudi Arabia? They are enormously generous. And they are toxic” (2007b). He 
described China’s aid efforts as “development assistance that is non-democratic in 
origin and non-transparent in practice, and its effect is typically to stifle real progress 
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while hurting ordinary citizens”. Criticism is also levelled at the development impacts 
of China’s overseas assistance in terms of whether it constitutes a tool for increasing 
China’s geo-political power, that is, soft power (for a discussion of China’s aid as a 
tool of soft power, see Varrall 2012).  
 
My students at CFAU firmly believed that China’s increased role in international 
development should not be perceived as a threat, either to traditional donors’ 
development goals or to the international political status quo (see Brant 2012 for an 
analysis of the impacts of Chinese development assistance on the international aid 
regime). There were several reasons for their certainty that China did not pose a 
danger, but two key themes emerged. Firstly, students argued that other developing 
countries welcomed Chinese aid as a means to balance dependence on traditional 
donors with their stifling requirements for changes in governance and economic 
management. The second key theme in countering the negative perceptions of 
Chinese aid was the conviction that China never had nor never would have any 
intention of trying to accumulate power or undermine the existing international 
system through its provision of assistance. 
 
The ‘China threat theory’ 
 
In addition to traditional donors’ fears about China’s overseas aid, China’s overall 
increasing global role is also a topic of heated discussion in Western foreign policy 
and international relations literature, as detailed in Chapter Two. Commentators 
debate whether the potential implications are positive or negative across a number of 
fields. My students characterised these discussions as representative of what they 
referred to as the ‘China threat theory’. 
 
The sense that the West was desperately clinging to obsolete views of China and “an 
outdated Cold-War mentality” of how the world worked was a very regularly 
recurring theme in my students’ papers, presentations and essays. While they were 
optimistic about the future of the international system and China’s role within it, they 
also perceived the international realm as an unfriendly place in which China 
continued to be the victim of “unreasonable and humiliating crack-downs” from 
external forces trying to undermine its success.  
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Despite students’ conviction that China’s peace-loving nature in the past clearly 
indicated how China would behave in the future, there was a strong sense that the 
process of China regaining its rightful place in the world was already causing 
international tensions, and would continue to do so. As one student noted, even 
though the Chinese people knew that China was motivated by national pride and not 
geo-strategic power considerations, and China always maintained its “low profile”, 
these facts did nothing to “change other countries’ views”. Other countries insisted on 
treating China’s rise with suspicion because, as one student explained it, 
 
They still feel that China is a threat, there is always this deep sense of 
insecurity in their minds, they feel insecure because they don’t understand 
why a country wouldn’t want to be number one. They think that you are no 
different and they can’t trust you.  
 
Students often expressed frustration and confusion about why Western countries 
continued to misunderstand China and see its development as a threat when its 
message of peace and harmony was so clear: 
 
Morally speaking, China has done a great deal ever since we stepped into the 
world. Though we were distressed in our early days, we tried our best to give 
aid to more than 110 countries and regions. Still, Western countries constantly 
question China’s human right issues. Twice we played a responsible and 
positive role in economic crises. Frustratingly, we suffer all kinds of trade 
sanctions and discriminations from capitalist countries. We are criticised for 
expanding our military budget all the time, yet Chinese troops have become an 
indispensable part in peacekeeping and anti-terrorism missions. With its 
efforts to show responsibility in international affairs, and its vital role in the 
world economy, China hopes that outsiders will gradually move away from 
simple ideological opposition and become more rational.  
 
Students believed that this fear and distrust was not an amorphous and unstructured 
reaction to China’s rise, but rather a deliberate and strategic theoretical position 
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propounded by those who wished to undermine China’s development and maintain 
their own power position. 
 
Most students believed that the popularity they understood the China threat theory to 
hold in the West was largely due to the economic and geo-political advantages seen to 
derive from stifling China’s rise. In addition to the perceived threat to traditional 
norms and practices in international development, the threat theory was seen to have 
three main components: fear of China economically; militarily; and as a threat to 
world energy security. However, one student asserted a more fundamentally 
ideological rationale: because China was a non-Christian country, in which Chinese 
people are considered “devils because they don’t believe in God”.  
 
Students had mixed views on how and where the theory originated. Heaven argued in 
her mid-semester essay that the China threat theory began in Japan. Indeed, she even 
cited the source:  
 
In 1990, a Japanese scholar first put forward this theory in an essay named 
‘Regard China as a Potential Threat’, published in the magazine Seito Shokun, 
however, it is the US which now takes the lead in keeping the theory alive.  
 
Other students also saw a Japanese-US alliance at play, arguing that “the mainstream 
attitude toward China in US society after 9/11 is to try to cut the throat of China by 
joining hands with Japan”. According to one student, Kerry, the theory: 
 
Dates back to the late 19th century and was first proposed by the United 
States. The anti-Chinese sentiments mainly arose after the Cold War when the 
threat from the Soviet Union disappeared and China was on its way to 
prosperity.  
 
Kerry then goes on to describe how the China threat theory returned in three waves:  
 
The first wave of intensive ‘China threat’ theory reached its peak in 1992 and 
1993. The second wave of anti-Chinese sentiment came in 1995 and 1996. 
This was sparked by the Taiwan Strait Crisis. In 1998 and 1999 came the third 
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wave. The Schork Report is a memorable account of the reasoning behind this 
bout of the anti-Chinese epidemic. ‘China is the serious threat to US security,’ 
‘China gathers information via Chinese scientists and students,’ ‘China 
intends to bribe the US government’ were some of the arguments of the era. 
When China joined the WTO and became a new member in 2001, a report 
from an official referred to the ‘China threat’ theory again.  
 
Students saw the theory as a political tool, perpetuated by the Western media by 
continuously, and often deliberately, misrepresenting China’s international activities 
and promulgating partial truths and outright lies. As Harriet explained:  
 
The outsiders spread the ‘China threat theory’ mainly through the media like 
newspapers, magazines, and TV programs. The stories are all under the name 
‘justice and democracy’ to reveal the dark side of China. From time to time, 
some ‘facts’ were proved wrong, because the media is always used as a tool to 
make political gains for a certain party or nation. It is sometimes led by 
politics instead of facts. To give an example, what happened in Xinjiang this 
July [2009] gave those outsiders a good excuse to complain about China’s 
human rights and democracy situation. Misleading pictures and articles could 
be seen on foreign newspapers and TVs. That’s what happened after the 
Chinese allowed the foreign journalists to report the event, and before they 
were allowed, they demanded their right to report it. In the end, it was not 
about the true facts of the event, but the event itself was just an opportunity to 
demonise China’s international image. 
 
While many students blamed Western politicians and media for the spread of the 
theory, several also felt that the majority of the Western public followed the same line 
of thinking:  
 
In my opinion, the most important motive behind Western countries’ theory is 
to artificially create an imaginary enemy for the purpose of enforcing the 
league within the Western countries themselves, especially after the downfall 
of the superpower, the Soviet Union. Another determinant motive is to 
intentionally make China’s developmental needs seem unimportant in the 
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international environment. Obviously, Western public opinion vigorously 
advocates the ‘China threat theory’ and deliberately creates an atmosphere of 
tension to contemptibly drive a wedge between China and the world, 
provoking China’s neighbours’ concerns about China’s normal military 
defence and economic development, thus implementing a ‘soft-suppressed’ 
system at last. 
 
Ultimately, that the West would fear China and try to thwart its rise was seen not only 
as an incontrovertible fact, but also as largely unavoidable. Students’ historical 
determinist view of cultural continuity meant that they believed that Western 
countries by their very nature had always wanted to carve China up for themselves, 
and would therefore continue to do so. They believed that regardless of what efforts 
China might make, it would be impossible for China to change the West’s very 
nature, or prevent past trends from continuing into the future. However, other 
developing countries were not seen to be proponents of the China threat theory. As 
one student in the International Economics major argued, “outsiders who see China as 
a potential threat and try to prevent China from developing are mainly from 
developed countries”. Students felt that the vast majority of “third world countries 
supported China’s rise” and the foreign policy decisions China made. Kerry, like 
other students, felt that: 
 
These third world countries take a positive view of China’s growth because 
they are seeking another superpower to balance the US and strengthen 
themselves. China, as a socialist country, always following a peaceful 
development strategy, fits the demands of these countries well. 
 
Students felt a very powerful compulsion to counter the China threat theory. They 
argued very strongly that the West’s fear of China was entirely unwarranted, as 
“China does not have enough strength or power to threaten the world”, nor did it have 
any “ambition to seek hegemony”. Many of my students used the opportunity of their 
mid-semester essay to explain why the China threat theory was entirely unfounded 
and indeed downright dangerous for international security. While my CFAU students 
felt that China did have a role to play in shaping a new, fairer, and more 
representative international system, they went to great pains to clarify that this did not 
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imply that China was in any way a threat to the existing system, particularly US 
hegemony, and that in fact China did not want to take on any kind of leadership role. 
 
To strengthen their case, students drew liberally on national discourses of history 
which showed how “ancient China was known for its warm hospitality in the world”.  
As they understood it, during its “past period of glory, China never invaded its 
neighbours”. Throughout the “thousands of years of glorious leadership in the world” 
in which China represented “the most advanced economy and society, the most 
popular culture, and the main source of inventions”, the “Great Kingdom” saw its 
neighbours as “socially, culturally and politically inferior barbarians”, and as such, 
chose to help them with “kindness and assistance rather than the hostility of 
invasion”. The Han and Tang Dynasties were often noted as a peak in “friendly 
international economic, cultural and educational relations with North Korea, Japan, 
Vietnam, and other countries”.  
 
China’s long history of glorious peacefulness was understood to have had the effect 
of “converting some ideas into traditions widely accepted by citizens and completely 
integrated into our behaviour”. Students argued that Chinese policy-makers still drew 
on these “ancient ideas of fairness and justice”, and “unconsciously presented their 
conservative side, that is, considering ancestral ideology and traditional meanings, 
when faced with major foreign policy affairs”.  
 
As one student explained, 
 
Because of experiencing thousands of years of war and peace, the Chinese 
people firmly believe that ‘peace is precious’, and beneficial to both sides, 
whereas war will harm both. Today China’s traditional culture and 
harmonious view of the world means that China’s main state of mind is the 
process of peaceful development. The rise of China will not pose a threat to 
the world.  
 
Li noted that a key characteristic of China’s role in the world would be the pursuit of 
harmony in diversity, again seen as predicated on the ancient teachings of Confucius. 
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These traditional characteristics meant that China would “never cause conflict based 
on different approaches to political or social systems”. Li argued that: 
 
Chinese think gentlemen are those who are in harmony with each other in 
spite of differences between them. Bad persons are those who are in 
disharmony with each other in spite of uniformity among them.  
 
Li went on to explain how this  
 
Understanding and conception is part of the motivation that drives China to 
seek a diverse and colourful world in a peaceful environment, and advocate 
multilateralism in world affairs. Specifically speaking, China’s foreign policy 
clearly points out that each country has the right to independently choose its 
own social system and road to development.  
 
Li then cited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as saying that to “have only one model 
for every nation-state was impossible, and the difference in social systems and values 
should not be the reason or excuse for conflict”.  
 
Most students felt that in fact, rather than posing any kind of threat, China had been 
fulfilling its obligations as an emerging economic power, bearing in mind its capacity 
constraints as a developing country with a natural focus on pursuing its own 
development. Students felt that despite what they saw as Western attempts to delimit 
China’s international position, China was behaving responsibly and negotiating its 
rise skilfully. As Kerry explained, 
 
China has embraced a peaceful diplomatic ideology. It’s true that China’s 
rapid and sustained development will influence world politics and the 
economic order. However, the nation will not endeavour to threaten the world 
but to foster and strengthen ties with all countries in the world, to promote its 
own development and common prosperity in the world, and pursue co-
operation with other countries.  
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Students also felt that international events supported the legitimacy of their claim that 
China’s peace-loving nature formed the core element of its approach to international 
relations, and would continue to do so in the future. For example, Charity argued that 
despite the US continuously “causing trouble for China”, China had consistently met 
these provocations with fairness and wisdom:  
 
China has cast aside those old scores with the United States. In the past, the 
United States helped Chiang Kai-shek to fight the Chinese Communist Party, 
and fought the war in Korea. In recent years, the United States has interfered 
in China’s sovereignty and territorial issues many times. China has many 
reasons to ignore the economic crisis of United States. But China did not! 
China knew very well that the US dollar was in a non-stop depreciation, and 
China continued to purchase US treasury bonds to support the United States’ 
economy. I think everyone in the world can see China’s performance in this 
economic crisis. The Chinese people are so peace-loving, constantly extending 
a helping hand. 
 
Students explained increases in China’s defence expenditure which have caused 
concern around the world in terms of peace-keeping and building security. For 
example, Lily argued that,  
 
 To eliminate negative concerns, China has been trying to reassure the whole 
world that China’s defence modernisation is just to maintain its own security 
and regional security. As Asia’s largest country, its military modernisation is 
definitely conducive to Asia’s stability and prosperity, and more broadly, 
world peace. In practice, China has devoted itself to making every effort to 
adopt multilateralism in international negotiations to resolve disputes. When 
actively participating in the United Nations, China also plays an important 
role in the field of arms control, as well as compliance with international 
safety regulations, and opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 
Students also explained China’s increased military expenditure as being a means of 
regaining self-respect and national pride. For example, as Kerry put it,  
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As we all know, stronger military policy is becoming more and more 
important. We all know that in 1999, NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade, so it is necessary for China to develop its military power to show 
that that can’t happen again.  
 
Another classmate, Glennis, concluded that, “yes, it’s a national pride issue. It’s 
because we were weak in the nineteenth century and we got invaded”.  
 
Students insisted that it was wrong for overseas analysts to construe these kinds of 
material manifestations of power as threatening. Rather, students explained that their 
primary purpose was to encourage and invigorate the domestic population and 
convince them that China was well on the way to recovering from past weakness and 
resuming its dignity. 
 
The reasons that China did not pose a threat now were seen to hold just as strongly in 
a future in which China had fulfilled its destiny and resumed its status as a great 
country. As Dan explained,  
 
There are doubts, since the policy is made while China is still developing, will 
it still be effective when the country becomes a super power in the world? The 
answer is yes. China will never seek hegemony even after it becomes a 
developed country in the future, just as Chairman Jiang stated ten years ago. 
 
Students seemed to hold a particularly deeply shared perspective when it came to the 
issue of China’s positive and constructive role in the global system. However, they 
also felt strongly that China would not bow to international pressure to change its 
policies or behave in certain ways. Issues of pride and dignity based on China’s long 
history as a great nation were prominent in these discussions.  
 
Pursuing an independent policy of peace 
 
To whatever extent China takes on an increased role in the world system in the future, 
a common theme among students was that China would always continue to “pursue 
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an independent foreign policy of peace”. The desire to counter the West’s perceived 
concerns about China’s rise was tempered with an equal measure of national pride 
and dignity – China should and would not be seen as pandering to its critics by 
changing its policies to please them. China’s foreign policy of peace was a product of 
its cultural heritage and would be, as it had always been, independently derived.  
 
Despite this determination to resist external pressure, an official change was made in 
the terminology from ‘peaceful rise’ to ‘peaceful development’ in order to ameliorate 
international misunderstandings. Official discourse about China’s role in the world 
was amended from describing ‘China’s peaceful rise’ in 2002 to ‘China’s peaceful 
development’ in 2004.52 The main reason cited in public discourse for this change 
was the undertones of the Chinese word for ‘rise’ – jueqi (崛起), which has implicit 
within it the sense of a sudden, abrupt rise to a towering position. As Katerina noted,  
 
With its motto of ‘keeping a low profile’ in mind, the phrase of ‘China’s 
peaceful rise’ was replaced by ‘China’s peaceful development’ to avoid 
further misunderstanding about China’s ambition in the future.  
 
Despite this change in rhetoric, Matt argued that Chinese policy itself had not shifted: 
 
Unfriendly opinion pushed China to change the term from ‘Peaceful Rising’ to 
‘Peaceful Development’. However, China’s foreign policy did not change 
after the expression had been changed to ‘Peaceful Development’, and 
unsurprisingly, the change had little effect of improving China’s image in 
outsiders’ eyes.  
 
Matt’s comment also demonstrates the depth to which historical inevitability was 
understood to play a role in all actors’ behaviour in international relations. His remark 
draws on a strong thread of opinion that despite China’s best efforts, ‘outsiders’ 
(Westerners) had changed little from the Opium War days and remained determined 
to thwart and exploit China at every turn, perpetuating the notion of China as a victim 
of deliberate Western bullying.  
                                                
52 See Lynch 2009 for a discussion of the difference between how Zheng Bijian presents peaceful rise 
and peaceful development to Chinese and foreign audiences. See also Glaser and Medeiros 2007, 293 
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Ultimately, national pride underpinned students’ position that China should and 
would not compromise its growth and development or change its foreign policies 
because of external pressures, but would instead demonstrate by its actions that other 
countries had nothing to fear. For example, Hannah posed the rhetorical question of 
whether: 
 
This threat theory will have any effect on China’s policy, especially on 
China’s foreign policy? Well, my answer is a definite no! In my opinion it is 
the national opinion and global environment that influence the policy making, 
not foreigners’ views. 
 
As Dan argued, “will China compromise to those untenable theories? Never! What 
China should do is to tell the world through actions that she is not a threat and will 
rise peacefully”. Likewise, Harriet asserted that, 
 
China cannot get rid of the threat theory as it is becoming stronger each day. 
What it should do is to stand up and be counted, do what should be done 
unhesitatingly. Like the old saying goes: stand straight and never mind if the 
shadow inclines. Time will tell that China has not departed from its basic 
foreign policy essence.  
 
As Dan stated forcefully,  
 
It’s fine for foreigners to consider China a dangerous threat, so what? The 
world can’t part with China. We may take outsiders’ views into consideration 
when making a decision, but only friendly and justified ones. 
 
While most students held a similarly strong commitment to independent 
policymaking and prioritising factors within China’s national borders, some felt that 
“despite the independence policy [for foreign policy making], China’s government 
has to change these negative views of China, and make foreign policy decisions adapt 
to it [the China threat theory]”. For example, Primo argued that in fact the China 
threat theory would have a distinct impact on China’s foreign policy decision making: 
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China does have the intention to adjust its foreign policy after this theory 
emerged. On one hand, this theory may be an obstacle in the process in which 
China tries to get involved in the international economic and political affairs; 
on the other hand, the cultural and historical features of China lead it to avoid 
such an annoying theory. Basically, this theory has the possibility to change 
the decision-making of China only because it may lead to confrontation, and 
that’s what China hates most, especially in this era of globalisation. To avoid 
being isolated in this connecting world, to avoid the economic downturn 
thereof, China will naturally change its foreign policy to make itself more 
acceptable around the world. 
 
Unlike Primo, most other students saw the China threat theory as having no bearing 
on China’s foreign policymaking. They felt strongly that China was a mature and 
experienced international political actor, and it was a matter of national dignity that 
Chinese leaders made policy without interference. They also saw independent policy-
making as a necessity, firstly because other countries attempting to influence China 
were doing so to protect their own interests, and secondly because experience had 
demonstrated that despite China’s positive and constructive efforts in the global 
arena, Western powers would not be convinced that China was not a threat. Many 
agreed that under these circumstances, it was ‘soft power’ that offered China the best 
hope for ameliorating the negative impacts of the apparently all-pervasive China 
threat theory. 
 
The Role of Soft Power 
 
Soft power is a contested concept, even within Western discussions. In Joseph S. 
Nye’s original explanation, soft power means exporting values and norms to shape 
others’ preferences in order to get them to want what you want, not as a means of 
getting others to do or give you what you want (1990). It is the opposite of ‘hard 
power’, or using coercion or force to achieve goals. Nye’s understanding of soft 
power was brought up on many occasions by my students as China’s best technique 
to convince the world of its benign intentions. For example, Candy argued that,  
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Instead of threats and military force, a nation wins influence abroad by 
persuasion and appeal. Soft power, mainly including culture, education and 
diplomacy, is mentioned frequently nowadays. Just as Joseph S. Nye, a 
Harvard University Professor, said: ‘Success depends not only on whose army 
wins, but also on whose story wins’.  
 
The concept and practice of soft power are not new to China. In fact, “using virtue” to 
attract others goes back hundreds of years (Ding 2008, 24). As Katerina explained, 
 
In the conduct of China’s diplomacy in international affairs, China has always 
cared a great deal about image building, by following the universally 
acknowledged principles, upholding international laws and providing 
humanitarian support to less developed countries. With a strong sense of self-
discipline in mind, rarely will China come across the border or violate a 
promise. She’s earnest to win a good reputation and favourable impression by 
lending out the renqing [人情, human spirit] to other countries, such as the 
huge sum of donation to tsunami or hurricane-suffered countries and technical 
teams to least developed countries.  
 
As Katerina’s comment suggests, students saw international aid as one method for 
China to increase its soft power and ameliorate the China threat theory. For example, 
as Candy argued, while it is “our duty to improve the world and deal with the global 
issues”, China should also adopt this course because a “China contribution” is a “big 
attack to the China threat”. This role for soft power was seen as holding particularly 
true for other countries in the developing world, especially those on China’s 
peripheries. Government officials acknowledge that, although Chinese aid is 
distributed in a “balanced” fashion around the world, with about 40 percent going to 
Africa and roughly the same going to Asia, within that amount, countries bordering 
China “do get more of a share”.53  
 
While some students saw aid as a tool of soft power that could rebut the China threat 
theory, others saw Chinese culture itself as the best means of undermining the power 
                                                
53 Telephone conversation between author and Ministry of Commerce official, Beijing, June 2012 
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of the China threat theory. As Kerry argued, citing Wu Jianmin, President of the 
China Foreign Affairs Institute, “if China’s ideas on the concept of a harmonious 
society and a harmonious world are better understood, fewer people will believe in 
the ‘China threat’”.  
 
That China has the cultural appeal necessary to win influence was undisputed by 
students. For example, Katerina argued:  
 
“Almost everyone in the world has at some time been charmed by the 
charisma of Chinese culture with its unique philosophical origins,” said 
historian Tang Yin Bi. Yeah, this really reflects today’s situation with Chinese 
culture. China with a history of more than 5000 years and 27 World Heritage 
sites in the country, hopes to enthral the whole world with her unique culture, 
known for its dragon-shaped lanterns, Peking Opera, Wu Shu or martial arts, 
and even chopsticks. Especially nowadays, Confucianism is very popular 
among other nations. And the representative book of Confucianism called 
‘Lun Yun’ has already been translated into English.  
 
However, while my students considered China to have no lack of the raw materials 
required for increasing soft power, they felt that modern China had so far not been 
able to harness the benefits that this approach could provide. One student argued that 
“soft power, which is defined as the ability to obtain what a country wants through 
co-option and attraction, is something that China should learn to use better”. In this 
way, she argued, “the Chinese government can build a better reputation for China”. 
Annie felt that the lack of success to date in promoting China’s soft power was due to 
communication problems with Western powers. She saw these problems in 
communication arising from the “scarring of the Chinese people’s hearts when Britain 
compelled China to open its doors to opium through the Opium War of 1840-1842”. 
Annie argued that these events had led to Chinese people being “scared to 
communicate with Western powers. It’s just like a person who fears the bullies who 
beat him up. Consequently, avoidance has brought misunderstanding and conflicts”. 
In this way, students placed responsibility for what they saw as the ongoing 
difficulties facing China in the international arena at the feet of Western powers. They 
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portrayed China as the ongoing victim of Western bullying, one of the key elements 
of which was the West’s deliberate perpetuation of the China threat theory.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, my CFAU students viewed the future of the international system, and 
China’s role within it, with great optimism and a profound certainty of China 
recovering its “rightful position”. They felt that the unipolar moment in which the US 
held hegemonic status was no longer tenable, and that a multipolar system in which 
China took a key position was the direction in which the system was evolving. In this 
multipolar world, China would represent the voices of other developing states as the 
largest, and only, developing country at the table. Students felt that China would be, 
and was already being, a responsible player in this system.  
 
Students’ optimism coexisted simultaneously with the strongly held sense that 
Western powers were inevitably going to continue to harass and bully China, and try 
to contain its growth no matter what China did. My students interpreted almost every 
Chinese pronouncement or behaviour as China doing its very best to demonstrate its 
good intentions to the world. At the same time, drawing on and reinforcing the view 
of China’s victimised status in the world, almost everything Western countries did in 
relation to China was viewed with suspicion and distrust. These beliefs closely 
mirrored official narratives. For example, former President Hu warned in a 2004 
speech on the primary role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA): “Western hostile 
forces have not given up the wild ambition of trying to subjugate us, intensifying the 
political strategy of Westernising and dividing up China” (Hu 2004). 
 
Students went to great lengths to counter views that China’s inevitable rise may be 
any cause for concern, and to show that China would not pose any threat. They 
demonstrated a deep sense of frustration that this message was not being received 
clearly outside of China, and blamed Western politicians for perpetuating the notion, 
and Western media for its biased reporting on China and Chinese issues.  
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Students’ experience at CFAU intensely reinforced the socialisation process that had 
already been underway since their early years. The practices of their everyday lives, 
their interactions with their peers, and what they learnt at the university deepened and 
consolidated the sedimentation of the national logic. Ideas of who constituted 
insiders, and who therefore constituted outsiders, and what obligations these ideas 
entailed, gave rise to views of how China should behave in the international realm. 
My students were certain that China was a responsible great nation who would show 
the world how ancient traditions and Confucian ideals combine to create a 
harmonious society and a harmonious world – just as before the Century of 
Humiliation.  
 
That China’s history fundamentally underpinned its behaviour in the present and 
would continue to do so was also undisputed. As Amelia argued, for example, 
 
The most significant influence [in foreign policy decision making] is that all 
the thoughts are coming from the thinkers’ context and background, which are 
influenced by the environment where they grew up, their education and so on. 
Moreover, for Chinese decision-makers, the environment they live in and 
education they get are full of Chinese culture. As a result, with these context 
and culture, the decision-makers’ decisions are all about the pursuit of these 
values.  
 
Students felt strongly that as China had always been peaceful, and had experienced 
such disruptive shocks from foreign incursions, it would always respect the 
sovereignty of other nations. Students also extended their understanding of the 
relationship between state and society to China’s role in the world. They held a highly 
Westphalian conception of international relations as interactions among 
geographically bounded states which represented and were part of their country’s 
society, in the same way as they understood the Chinese state to be part of Chinese 
society. Overall they projected their ideas of immanent cultural characteristics, the 
predictive power of history, the relationship between people and power, and their 
views of self and other onto the international system.  As this chapter illustrates, 
students particularly emphasised the critical importance of China’s unique history and  
culture in its foreign policy decision-making.  
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These aspects of my CFAU students’ worldview undermine presumptions among 
American or European foreign policy-commentators that Chinese foreign policy 
decision-makers understand the international system or China’s role within it in the 
same way as it is understood in the West. My students saw the global system as one 
in which harmony and peace could prevail when the principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity were genuinely respected, and tensions were resolved through 
dialogue and discussion, rather than forceful ‘interference’ which they believed 
characterised the US approach. Of particular significance to dominant views in 
international relations is that my students did not see the global system as an anarchic 
realm in which power is finite and to be viewed in zero-sum terms, in which one 
state’s rise automatically equates to another’s demise. My students saw China as a 
responsible international actor in regard to issues of global public goods, such as the 
environment, global security, and international development. They felt that China, 
conceived of as the biggest developing country, already acted as a representative for 
the developing world, and would increase its role in this regard given the opportunity 
to have more of a voice. Critically, they felt unanimously certain that China posed no 
threat whatsoever to existing power relations, as the Chinese people had no interest in 
replacing the US as sole superpower, or even in being part of a ‘G2’ arrangement of 
power.  
 
The students in my study represent an extreme case of conformity with official 
narratives of the nation. This does not imply that other students would necessarily 
display the same profile. However, given that my students were in training managed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to become official representatives of the Chinese 
state, the way they saw the international system has implications for Realist 
presumptions regarding China’s increased international involvement, and the 
tendency to conclude that China’s rise will inevitably lead to a clash with existing 
powers. As noted earlier, Realists like Mearsheimer argue that, based on the 
unchangeable exigencies of the international system, China simply cannot rise 
peacefully. Mearsheimer and other Structural Realists, whose views form the 
intellectual core of many nation-states’ foreign policy approach, assert that as China 
becomes more powerful, the country will inevitably want to dominate the world 
system: “You can rest assured that as the country gets more and more powerful, and 
its military more formidable in 20 or 30 years... you don’t think they won’t push 
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when they’ve got muscle?” (Mearsheimer 2010). I argue that external parties 
interacting with China would do well to question Realist understandings of China’s 
motives as pre-ordained due to it being ‘a rising power’ in an anarchical world 
system. Rather, analysts and commentators need to be more aware of the 
psychological and emotional elements underpinning Chinese decisions and policy 
behaviour when dealing with what may seem to be simple geo-strategic issues. 
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Chapter Seven – Conclusion 
 
Much popular, media and scholarly attention is focused on China’s rise and whether it 
constitutes a threat or opportunity, raising concerns about the potentially negative 
implications for traditional and non-traditional security across a number of areas. 
Most of these debates tend to be based on assumptions from mainstream IR theory, 
particularly the dominant Realist approach. According to the Realist approach to 
understanding international relations and foreign policy, all states are functionally 
alike and exist in an anarchic realm with no overarching ultimate authority – 
sometimes characterised as being like billiard balls. Therefore the Chinese state, like 
any other state, is conceived of as a unitary and monolithic actor, whose behaviour is 
constrained and pre-determined by the exigencies of its position within the 
international system. The approach promoted by Realist scholars such as Ikenberry 
(2008) and Mearsheimer (2005, 2006, 2010) presumes that structure dictates 
behaviour, and that because the international system is anarchic, and the amount of 
power is fixed and limited, states have no choice but to maximise their relative power 
in a zero-sum game.  
 
Realists, and the many foreign policy commentators who accept these assumptions, 
therefore see the development of a state such as China in terms of a ‘rise’ or 
‘emergence’ into a space that is already occupied. China is thus understood as an 
inherent threat to existing relations of power. Realists contend that because of the 
structure of the international system, China will naturally desire to maintain and 
maximise its relative power once it has ‘risen’. However, Realism, and the other 
mainstream approaches that derive from the same basic assumptions, have limitations 
in analysing Chinese foreign relations. Taking the state as central actor as a given, 
these theoretical approaches tend to neglect the innumerable variations of what a 
‘state’ can mean, and how it can be constituted. 
 
My Chinese students at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing shared many 
views in common with the Realist approach to understanding international relations 
and diplomacy. They accepted that the territorially bounded sovereign state was the 
primary organisational unit in the international system. They also followed other key 
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tenets of Realism, such as that all states are functionally alike, and that the state is a 
unitary and rational actor. However, where their views diverged dramatically from 
Realism and the dominant debates in international relations was regarding the 
question of how and why states would act in certain ways in the international system.  
My students were convinced that states’ actions were a function of their specific 
cultural, political, social, economic and historical circumstances. As my students saw 
it, the presumption that China would simply have no choice but to pursue the 
maximisation of its power relative to other states, thereby posing a threat to the 
existing arrangements of power, was fundamentally incorrect. Their certainty that 
China’s circumstances were unique meant that they believed China would behave in 
very different ways from those presumed in the conventional wisdom prevalent in 
mainstream understandings of international relations. 
 
Unlike Realism and the other schools of IR theory which accept its presumptions, a 
Constructivist approach to understanding international relations argues that the nature 
of the international system does not fully explain state behaviour. Constructivists do 
not accept the Realist assumption that all states are functionally alike (Waltz 1979), 
but famously posit that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). That is, 
Constructivists argue that the system may be as it is, but what happens next depends 
on the worldviews and perceptions of the actors within states. People and their ideas 
matter in assessing and explaining state behaviour. As Constructivism understands the 
state as a socially produced entity and focuses on the people and ideas that constitute 
it, a Constructivist perspective provides a way to ask what we mean by the state in 
China. Understanding how Chinese citizens conceptualise what the state is and does 
is critical to understanding how China will operate in the international arena. Because 
Constructivism treats the ‘reality’ of the state as a “question in need of an answer” 
(Pieke 2004, 532; see also Hobsbawm 1992, 9), it allows an opportunity to better 
understand Chinese diplomatic behaviour.  
 
If a Constructivist approach to international affairs questions the pre-existent reality 
of the state, and rather understands it as a question in need of an answer, the 
anthropology of the state offers the analytical tools to begin to provide the answer to 
the question. To genuinely understand the “causes, direction, and consequences” of 
the state, it is essential to treat the state as a “configuration of communities of 
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practice” (Pieke 2004, 533). By doing so, we can better understand not only what, but 
also why a state behaves in certain ways. Following Pieke’s call to understand the 
state as society (ibid., 533), my research has focused on the specific role of education 
in the ideology formation of the Chinese diplomatic community. I have investigated 
what the state means as imagined and experienced by the students being carefully 
trained to be its representatives. This training is a critical element in configuring the 
community of practice that constitutes the Chinese state. Drawing on Foucault’s 
notions of governance and discipline through institutions, this research has examined 
how the CFAU functioned as a technology of governing in the formation of national-
minded citizens. By living and studying together for four years, the practices of my 
students’ daily lives at CFAU confirmed and reinforced the practices of the other 
members of the group, constantly reduplicating the self-evidence of that social 
imaginary (Bourdieu 1977, 167). The modern form of socialist governance of 
education through the CFAU provided both the institutional and structural 
environment for disciplining students in how to properly conduct themselves as ideal 
citizens and Chinese diplomats (see Hoffman 2010, 145).  
 
The opportunity to understand the processes of power provided by turning the 
anthropological gaze upwards, what Nader described as “studying up” (1972), allows 
us to observe how the educational institution of the CFAU shapes students and their 
views. Through the subjects in the curriculum and the control of the practices of their 
everyday lives, the CFAU experience taught students both what worldviews were 
appropriate for future foreign policy officials, and at the same time carefully 
precluded other ways of seeing the world.  
 
Through the processes and techniques of governance at the CFAU, my students 
developed a social imaginary in which aligning oneself with the national logic 
became doxa, firmly within the realm of undisputable (Bourdieu 1977, 164-169). 
Bourdieu describes how every established order produces the naturalisation of its own 
arbitrariness which “is the basis of the most ineradicable adherence to the established 
order” (1977, 164).  At CFAU, my students were being trained to be the state, to 
internalise the national logic as their primary tool for understanding the world, the 
Chinese nation-state, and their own social roles. Therefore what my students were 
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being taught to think about the state is critical for understanding how the Chinese 
state functions in the international arena.  
 
As has been explored throughout this thesis, there were several key themes that my 
students took as being absolutely self-evident. As they saw it, the natural social order 
was one in which being Chinese was synonymous with the Chinese nation-state. They 
understood China to be a timeless and eternal entity, as I discussed in Chapter Three. 
Students’ shared vision of history and the relationship between the past, present and 
future combined to produce a narrative in which the Chinese nation arose from an 
immemorial past, and would glide into a limitless future. For my students, it was an 
unquestionable truth that Western powers subjugated China in the Century of 
Humiliation from the mid-1800s, marking an irrevocable break in China’s historical 
destiny. Students understood their commitment to principles of territorial integrity 
and national sovereignty as deriving from these past experiences. They firmly 
believed that because of what China had suffered at the hands of Western powers in 
the past, China would never interfere in the sovereignty of other countries now or in 
the future. It was also undisputable that China had a natural role as one of the world’s 
great nations, and should, and would, resume this position.  
 
Due to the way in which students understood the past to causally underpin the present 
and the future, they also were in no doubt that China’s tradition as a peace-loving 
country would continue to provide the model for its behaviour in the future. Based on 
the same logic, students also believed that Western powers would continue to exhibit 
the same suspicion of China and determination to counter its rise regardless of what 
China said or did to contradict this fear. Students also regarded Japan with great 
enmity because of past events, and firmly believed that just as China’s inherent love 
of harmony and peace underpinned its behaviour and would continue to do so, so 
would Japan continue to be untrustworthy in the future.  Both what was taught and 
what students experienced in their everyday lives at CFAU reinforced the broader 
social discourses about China’s history, and strengthened their existing worldviews. 
 
Another truth my students considered to be undisputable was that state was not 
distinct from society, as they understood it to be in the West. As this thesis has 
highlighted, the students believed that the relationship between the people and the 
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Chinese nation-state was best represented by the concept of guojia (country-family). 
In their view, the state was an extension of the family, and should therefore be 
accorded all the obligations and loyalty traditionally due to family. On many 
occasions my students described the state as being like a parent, and that it was 
therefore right for the state to be strict and firm at times in order for the family as a 
whole to prosper. My students felt strongly that while it was acceptable for them or 
other Chinese people to comment on shortcomings or mistakes of the Chinese nation-
state, it was entirely inappropriate for those outside the guojia unit to do so. Indeed, 
students took external criticism of China very personally, explaining their often 
emotional response in terms of being “offended”, or of experiencing hurt feelings. 
The belief that the nation-state was an extension of the family was part of a broader 
unifying ideology of integrated Chinese identity. For my students, being Chinese 
meant being part of the Chinese guojia unit. They considered this Chineseness as an 
inherent characteristic that they could not unlearn, and which outsiders could never 
learn. 
 
My students felt that China’s existing governance structures were the best 
arrangement for managing the country, and ensuring China continued to develop and 
progress in the future. Students considered development and becoming “more 
modern” as synonymous, and unquestionably positive. The Party-state system was 
seen as the only model able to provide the stability so essential for the future 
prosperity of the country. Students felt strongly that any threat to stability was a 
danger to China achieving its destined re-emergence as a great and respected member 
of the international community. They believed that the Party-state was right to take 
measures to prevent instability. For example, there could be too much media freedom, 
and in the wrong hands, this could lead to social unrest. Similarly, while they believed 
that democracy was important, they explained that it needed to be appropriate for 
specific Chinese circumstances, and introduced slowly as many Chinese people had 
never experienced democracy and “might not know how to use it properly”.  
 
Another undisputed element in my students’ social imaginary was the necessity of 
performing particular social roles depending on the audience and situation. Students 
did not regard being true to themselves regardless of circumstances as a valid claim to 
social worth. Such an approach seems at first glance to “violate most if not all tenets 
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of Euro-American theories of morality and agency” (Evasdottir 2004, xii). However, 
for my students, performing correct social behaviours according to specific social 
circumstances was the only way to demonstrate reliability and trustworthiness. In the 
interdependent environment at the CFAU, striking out on one’s own and doing things 
differently was not an option for my students. Through the curriculum and daily 
practices at the CFAU, students learned to correctly “play the role of ‘student’ in 
relation to teachers and fellow students” and at the same time learn to view the 
performance of these roles as essential resources for pursuing his or her own interests 
(ibid., xii). For my students, it was unthinkable to envisage one’s self as a self-
contained unit, unchanged and unaffected by circumstances. Rather, relationships 
depended entirely on who occupied each position in any given scenario and what the 
external factors surrounding the exchange were.  
 
For the students in my study, the ideas set out above and examined throughout the 
thesis were self-evident and firmly within the field of doxa. However, as this thesis 
has explored, all of these themes contained aspects which the students were able to 
discuss and on which they were comfortable in presenting their opinions. For example, 
students were at ease in class conversations about what degree of media censorship 
was appropriate; or how political corruption should be dealt with. My students 
believed that they had a more sophisticated awareness of the complex challenges 
facing modern China than did the average Chinese citizen.  
 
However while these subjects were in the universe of argument, my students adopted 
an orthodox position. Their comments never criticised the existing Party-state 
structure, or implied that the challenges facing the country could be in any way 
systemically related to the existing processes of power. Their suggestions were 
without exception apolitical and technical propositions for how the Party-state could 
govern more effectively. The students themselves strove to exhibit the attributes that 
they believed the modern Chinese Party-state required for China’s continued success. 
It was inconceivable that improvement in those areas which were acknowledged to 
warrant attention could be achieved through direct resistance.  It was never disputed 
was that an individual student’s fundamental interests, both personally and 
professionally, would be best served by aligning with the state-sanctioned official 
narratives of the nation.  
244 
 
 
 
In her concept of “ethnographic refusal” Ortner observes that studies of resistance 
often position subalterns as monolithic heroes dedicated to a struggle against power 
(1995). She writes that “resistance studies are thin because they are ethnographically 
thin: thin on the internal politics of dominated groups, thin on the cultural richness of 
those groups, thin on the subjectivity – the intentions, desires, fears, projects – of the 
actors involved in those dramas” (ibid., 190). The understanding that state and society 
are a priori in clear and culturally unspecific relations of power and resistance very 
much disallows for the great complexities in the way the state, the Party, and the 
people are inextricably interrelated in China 
 
Through the CFAU’s role as a mechanism for the reproduction of the social order, 
students learnt that aligning with the national logic and contributing to the national 
good was in their own interest and thus they did so by their own will (Hansen 2012); 
what Evasdottir describes as ‘obedient autonomy’ (2004). It was unthinkable for them 
that they could or would want to actively resist adopting that position. 
 
My CFAU students’ collective awareness of what constituted acceptable ways of 
thinking and speaking and their knowledge of which topics and subjects existed in the 
realm of the undisputable were part of a larger subjectification process in which they 
were trained to understand the Chinese state in certain acceptable ways. When my 
students talked about citizenship or the role of the state, they drew from a social 
imaginary developed from the training they had experienced both in order to be 
accepted at the CFAU, and the further sedimentation of those ideas while at the 
university. This included the peer surveillance, self-monitoring, and other informal 
technologies of power highlighted throughout the thesis.  
 
Bourdieu argues that the ideas in the realm of doxa are not easily shifted into the 
universe of argument. This is because the “dominant classes”, those with vested 
interest in perpetuating the status quo, have a considerable interest in “defending the 
integrity of doxa” and ensuring that the “arbitrariness of the taken for granted” is not 
exposed (1977, 169). Bourdieu’s position is perhaps not the most accurate reflection 
of the relationship between subaltern and power in the case of my CFAU students. 
Evasdottir demonstrates that in conditions of ongoing interdependence, as 
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characterise the CFAU, success and progress is only achieved by working within the 
existing channels and relations of power (2004). My students were already well-
versed in using order to achieve their goals. To even be studying at the CFAU they 
have had to negotiate a complex system by adopting a strategy of obedient autonomy.   
 
As I have outlined in this thesis, there may appear to be a tension between whether 
my students genuinely held these views or whether they simply expressed them 
because they thought they were expected to do so. However, this perspective is 
predicated on an image of the world divided into oppressor and oppressed. In this 
thesis I have argued that such a view is “thin” because it insufficiently accounts for 
internal politics, cultural richness, and the subjectivity – intentions, desires, fears, 
projects – of the actors (Ortner 1995, 190). When the state is understood not as a 
power to be resisted, but as society, as it was among my students, strong incentives 
exist to consent to and operate within power rather than struggle against it. As 
Evasdottir explains in her work, when “the dichotomy of oppressors and oppressed is 
merged instead into an image of mutual interdependence”, as was the case for my 
students at CFAU, “the very definitions of concepts such as hierarchy, authority, 
power and autonomy must change” (2004, xi). Students believed that success could 
not come from resistance or struggle against the system. Connection and participation, 
rather, provided the most benefits. For students, doing and saying what was expected 
of them was deeply held doxa. In their social imaginary, not conforming would not 
yield any positive results. Because benefits derived from maintaining social order, 
students consented to consent. 
 
Having been so deeply integrated into a system in which success comes from 
consenting to control, including self-control, I would argue that my students are 
unlikely to upset the order which they understand will help them best achieve their 
goals. They are, to use Bourdieu’s terms, simultaneously the dominant and the 
dominated class. In this way, students have no incentive to challenge what is 
undiscussed and bring it into the arena of discussion, and thus, unthinkable topics 
remain in the field of doxa. Students were not encouraged to question or critique the 
social order which they took so much for granted. Even where they had the 
opportunity to do so, such as accessing news from foreign websites, they tended to 
view the information they received from these channels with great suspicion. They 
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saw any criticism of China as part of a deliberate Western strategy to delimit China’s 
rise and curtail its international influence. Given the coherence of their worldview, it 
is feasible to conclude that my students’ views of the state will not be easily dislodged 
or overturned regardless of what exposure to alternatives they are offered in the future. 
 
As this thesis demonstrates, how my students understood the state was very different 
from mainstream discussions of international relations in general, and China’s role in 
the world system in particular, in a number of aspects. In particular, my students 
believed that the Chinese state and society were not discrete and oppositional entities, 
but part of a coherent whole. They felt that China’s history and tradition meant that 
China would have no interest in challenging existing powers in order to become sole 
superpower, or even sharing global leadership in a ‘G2’ with the US. China had no 
interest at all, in their view, in accumulating relative power gains at the cost of other 
international actors. As China became more economically influential, my students 
believed the country would use this strength for the good of the world, particularly by 
representing and providing a voice for other developing nations in international fora. 
Woven throughout students’ discussions of China’s role in the world was the 
sometimes incoherent and emotional ‘pessoptimism’ arising from their fundamental 
belief in the narrative of national humiliation. 
 
In order to understand how China fits into the world, we need to move away from the 
usual dichotomous question of whether China’s rise will constitute a material threat 
or opportunity for the international system, and ask who China is, and how it 
socialises itself into a particular view of itself and the world (Callahan 2010, 193).  
Combining the Constructivist argument that national identity needs to be 
foregrounded for a rich understanding of foreign policy motivations and behaviours, 
and the worldviews of future Chinese diplomats offered by an anthropological 
approach, allows a timely re-assessment of the dominant discourses around China’s 
rise.  
 
For my students, beliefs about what being Chinese meant, and how Chinese 
characteristics would influence China’s behaviour in the global arena were far more 
than studied attitudes; their views were deeply internalised and firmly within the 
realm of doxa. Based on the premise that state is not just in society but is society, and 
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given that my students were being carefully trained to embody the Chinese state as 
future foreign policy officials, their perspectives of the Chinese nation-state are 
critical to understanding how China functions in the international arena.  
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